本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式比較研究　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股票期權(quán) 限制性股票 股權(quán)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)是一種新型的薪酬分配制度,通過(guò)授予經(jīng)理人公司股權(quán),意在降低由所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者兩權(quán)分離帶來(lái)的代理成本,提高公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。2005年12月,中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)公布《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》,標(biāo)志著我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度進(jìn)入了規(guī)范化發(fā)展階段。隨著相關(guān)配套政策的不斷完善,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司已經(jīng)初現(xiàn)規(guī)模,其中股票期權(quán)和限制性股票是最常用的激勵(lì)模式。隨著股權(quán)激勵(lì)應(yīng)用范圍的不斷擴(kuò)大,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在實(shí)際應(yīng)用中是否能有效地降低代理成本,提升公司價(jià)值,成了學(xué)術(shù)界和實(shí)務(wù)界共同關(guān)心的問(wèn)題。同時(shí),不同上市公司應(yīng)該如何選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式,這是股權(quán)激勵(lì)合約優(yōu)化的重點(diǎn),也是影響我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度未來(lái)是否能夠蓬勃發(fā)展的重要因素。 本文從激勵(lì)模式的視角切入,對(duì)股票期權(quán)與限制性股票模式在機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)務(wù)操作中的差異進(jìn)行總結(jié),并以2006年至2011年間推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司為樣本,對(duì)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后業(yè)績(jī)變化進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,得出上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效與股權(quán)激勵(lì)程度成正比,而在激勵(lì)程度相同時(shí),限制性股票的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)優(yōu)于股票期權(quán)；同時(shí),非國(guó)有公司業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)優(yōu)于國(guó)有公司,且這種優(yōu)勢(shì)在限制性股票模式下被放大。綜上所述,本文的結(jié)論為繼續(xù)完善我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度給予支持,同時(shí)也為公司優(yōu)化股權(quán)激勵(lì)合約提供參考。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is a kind of new salary distribution system, through the managers to a stake in the company, intended to reduce the agency cost caused by the owner and operator of two power separation, improve the operating performance of the company.2005 in December, China Commission announced "equity incentive of listed companies management approach (Trial)", marking China's equity incentive system into the standardized development stage. With the constant improvement of the relevant supporting policies, the implementation of equity incentive companies have early scale, including stock options and restricted stock incentive is the most commonly used mode. With the equity incentive of expanding the scope of application, whether equity incentive in practice effectively reduce agency costs, enhance the value of the company. Has become a common concern in academic and practical circles. At the same time, the different listed companies how to choose the mode of equity incentive, the incentive contract optimization The emphasis is also an important factor that affects the future of China's equity incentive system.
This paper starts from the perspective of incentive mode, the difference of stock options and restricted stock model and operation mechanism design are summarized, and for the period from 2006 to 2011 the implementation of equity incentive plans of listed companies as the sample of Listed Companies in the implementation of equity incentive performance empirical analysis before and after the change, the operating performance and equity incentive the degree of listed company is proportional to, and in the same degree of incentive, the incentive effect of stock option is better than restricted stock; at the same time, the non state-owned company's performance is better than that of state-owned companies, and this advantage in restricted stock mode is enlarged. To sum up, the conclusion of this paper is to give support to improve the equity incentive system, at the same time provide a reference for the optimization of company stock incentive contracts.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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