本文關(guān)鍵詞：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)中小板上市公司非效率投資影響的實(shí)證研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資 非效率投資 公司治理 信息不對(duì)稱

【摘要】：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在20世紀(jì)六七十年代起源于美國,隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的興起,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在發(fā)達(dá)國家和地區(qū)迅速的擴(kuò)張,成為了新一輪科技革命的助推劑。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的創(chuàng)立促進(jìn)了具有市場(chǎng)潛力的高科技企業(yè)的生存與發(fā)展,推動(dòng)中小企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)初期的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新與產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)升級(jí)。 隨著2004年中小板的創(chuàng)立和2009年創(chuàng)業(yè)板的成功推出,我國資本市場(chǎng)給風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)發(fā)展帶來了新的機(jī)遇,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資成為了我國創(chuàng)新高科技企業(yè)的孵化器。它不僅作為一種權(quán)益性資金注入創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè),而且參與企業(yè)經(jīng)營決策、提供專業(yè)化的服務(wù),在創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)后續(xù)的人事聘用、技術(shù)發(fā)展、銷售增長(zhǎng)、價(jià)值增加等方面扮演著重要的角色。 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資利用其專業(yè)的知識(shí)背景,對(duì)需要資金的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)進(jìn)行評(píng)估篩選,再將資金投向創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè),經(jīng)過創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)家的經(jīng)營管理,資本增值后流回投資,最后風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資將獲得的收益分配給投資人,從而周而復(fù)始的循環(huán)資本。此外,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資通過金融契約、分段投資、介入董事會(huì)、更換管理層等方式參與被投資公司治理。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資之所以能對(duì)公司治理產(chǎn)生直接的作用,最關(guān)鍵在于董事會(huì)作為公司治理機(jī)制的核心,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在被投資企業(yè)董事會(huì)中占有席位,而且保持有對(duì)重大經(jīng)營決策的一票表決權(quán),從而能對(duì)被投資企業(yè)進(jìn)行監(jiān)控和管理。另外,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資既具備法律、財(cái)務(wù)、管理方面的專業(yè)才能,又對(duì)某些領(lǐng)域具有特定專業(yè)知識(shí)和投資經(jīng)驗(yàn)。不少研究表明風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)上市公司具有監(jiān)督作用,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資會(huì)通過各種方式來監(jiān)督上市公司以控制其投機(jī)行為。 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資資金是權(quán)益性資金,會(huì)使被投資公司的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相應(yīng)降低,被投資公司自身的成長(zhǎng)能力也會(huì)因?yàn)轱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的介入而得到市場(chǎng)的認(rèn)可,為企業(yè)后續(xù)融資提供了便利。除此之外,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資通常與投資銀行家、基金、券商等投資者有密切的聯(lián)系,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資利用自己的資源網(wǎng)絡(luò),可以幫助企業(yè)引來更多的資金。 因此,從理論來看,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不僅可以發(fā)揮監(jiān)督職能減少代理問題,而且可作為第三方發(fā)揮認(rèn)證效應(yīng),降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè)與投資者的信息不對(duì)稱,并利用自身的社會(huì)資源為被投資企業(yè)吸引更多的資金。從國內(nèi)外研究文獻(xiàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),近年來對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與非效率投資各自相關(guān)研究已十分深入,而關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司投資效率方面的研究較少,本文試圖探索風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資能否對(duì)公司非效率投資產(chǎn)生影響? 本文在選擇樣本時(shí),考慮到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的投資對(duì)象主要是高成長(zhǎng)潛力又具有較大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的中小型創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè),而深交所中小板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司正是為中小企業(yè)提供融資的平臺(tái),但鑒于創(chuàng)業(yè)板2009年才推出,能滿足本文要求的上市公司樣本很少,因此,本文只選取了在2010年12月31日之前在中小板上市的328家公司作為研究樣本,并沒有將創(chuàng)業(yè)板作為考察對(duì)象。 為了證實(shí)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)過度投資和投資不足的影響。本文首先回顧了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資和非效率投資的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),并介紹了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司非效率投資影響的主要理論和作用機(jī)制。然后結(jié)合國內(nèi)外理論分析和作用機(jī)制提出了本文的假設(shè),并對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。最后提出了文章的結(jié)論,并根據(jù)結(jié)論提出政策建議。基于以上邏輯思路,全文共劃分為6個(gè)部分,具體安排如下： 第一部分為諸論。這一部分主要介紹文章的研究背景和意義、研究方法、研究思路和文章結(jié)構(gòu)。 第二部分是相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)回顧。主要是對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資和非效率投資方面的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了回顧,并對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與公司非效率投資的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了評(píng)述。 第三部分是對(duì)我國風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司非效率投資影響的理論分析。這部分內(nèi)容首先基于“信息不對(duì)稱理論”、“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資契約理論”和“認(rèn)證理論”展開闡述,為后文分析風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)非效率投資的影響奠定理論基礎(chǔ)；然后,對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資和非效率投資的概念進(jìn)行了界定；最后,介紹了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的基本運(yùn)作模式,并總結(jié)了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司非效率投資的治理機(jī)制。主要從內(nèi)部公司治理角度和外部融資環(huán)境作用角度分別介紹了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資介入公司治理后的治理機(jī)制。其中,內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制主要是論述對(duì)被投資企業(yè)的過度投資進(jìn)行監(jiān)控,可能抑制過度投資,而外部融資環(huán)境的作用機(jī)制主要是對(duì)被投資企業(yè)的融資環(huán)境進(jìn)行優(yōu)化,可能使投資不足得到緩解。 第四部分是研究設(shè)計(jì)。首先是根據(jù)前面部分提出的理論分析,提出了本文的四個(gè)假設(shè)：(1)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資具有良好的監(jiān)控作用,有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資介入的公司比沒有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資介入的公司更能抑制過度投資；風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資具有認(rèn)證作用和社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò),有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資介入的公司比沒有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資介入的公司更能緩解投資不足。(2)存在過度投資的公司中,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資持股比例與過度投資負(fù)相關(guān)；存在投資不足的公司中,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資持股比例與投資不足負(fù)相關(guān)。(3)存在過度投資的公司中,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量與過度投資負(fù)相關(guān)；在投資不足的公司中,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量投資不足負(fù)相關(guān)。(4)在政府背景、民營背景、外資背景、混合型背景四種背景中,政府背景風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資由于管理人員任命模式等原因,使其對(duì)被投資公司監(jiān)控作用較弱,從而對(duì)過度投資的抑制作用較小。但風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資能利用政治關(guān)系等資源,更能容易地緩解被投資企業(yè)的投資不足。然后進(jìn)行模型的設(shè)計(jì)以及變量的定義。 第五部分是實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)與分析。首先,對(duì)預(yù)期投資模型的變量進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),并對(duì)各變量進(jìn)行相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn),計(jì)算出預(yù)期投資水平；然后,是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與過度投資和投資不足進(jìn)行的實(shí)證分析。分別從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是否介入、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的持股比例、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量以及不同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景來分析與非效率投資的影響。 第六部分是文章的研究結(jié)論、政策建議和展望。通過實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),得出的研究結(jié)論。本文通過回歸分析對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),得出以下結(jié)論：(1)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)介入被投資企業(yè)與非效率投資(過度投資和投資不足)顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。(2)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資持股比例與過度投資不存在顯著相關(guān)性,與投資不足呈現(xiàn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。(3)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資數(shù)量與非效率投資(過度投資和投資不足)顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。(4)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的四種背景中,民營背景、混合型背景與過度投資行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；政府背景與投資不足顯著負(fù)相關(guān),其他背景與非效率投資沒有顯著的相關(guān)性。本部分在總結(jié)全文的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合實(shí)證分析結(jié)果,分別人才培養(yǎng)、風(fēng)投管理模式、聯(lián)合投資、資金引導(dǎo)方面提出有針對(duì)性的建議和政策：(1)加強(qiáng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的人才培養(yǎng)。(2)改善國有背景風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的管理模式。(3)加強(qiáng)國內(nèi)外風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)之間的協(xié)作。(4)積極引導(dǎo)社會(huì)資金進(jìn)入風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)。 本文的擬創(chuàng)新之處主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面： 首先,非效率投資的相關(guān)研究成果主要在代理問題、融資約束、自由現(xiàn)金流等方面,很少從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的角度研究對(duì)公司非效率投資的影響。本文主要基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資能夠克服逆向選擇、克服道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、發(fā)揮認(rèn)證效應(yīng)作為切入點(diǎn),從公司內(nèi)部治理和外部融資環(huán)境優(yōu)化的角度,分析風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司非效率投資影響的可能性。 其次,在模型建立方面,選用Richardson(2006)的投資模型衡量非效率投資的程度,考慮到我國資本市場(chǎng)有效性的影響,用托賓Q值作為代理變量會(huì)導(dǎo)致成長(zhǎng)性測(cè)量的偏差。同時(shí),考慮到股權(quán)分置改革及存在限售股對(duì)托賓Q值計(jì)算的影響,因此,本文采用銷售收入增長(zhǎng)率作為成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的替代變量。 最后,本文將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景細(xì)分為了政府背景、民營背景、外資背景、混合型背景,來分析不同的背景對(duì)過度投資和投資不足的影響差異。
[Abstract]:The risk of investment in twentieth Century 60s and 70s originated in the United States, with the rise of the Internet, the expansion of investment risk in developed countries and regions rapidly, has become a booster of a new round of technological revolution. The creation of venture capital institutions to promote the survival and development of the market potential of the high-tech enterprises, promote technological innovation and industrial upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises in the early days.
Founded in 2004 with small board and gem in 2009 the successful launch of China's capital market for venture capital industry development has brought new opportunities and risks of the incubator of our innovative high-tech enterprises become the investment. It not only as an equity funds into the enterprise, and participate in the management of enterprises, to provide professional in the follow-up service, enterprise personnel, technology development, sales growth, value increase and play an important role.
The risk of investment by their professional knowledge background, evaluated in need of funding for start-ups, the funds to invest in venture enterprises, through the management of entrepreneurs, to invest capital gains, income distribution risk investment will be the last to investors, so the cycle of capital circulation. In addition, the risk of investment through financial contracts. In the board of directors, staged investment, change of management and other ways to participate in corporate governance. Investment risk investment is can have a direct effect on corporate governance, the key lies in the core of the board of directors of the corporate governance mechanism, risk investment in the invested enterprise board seats, and keep on major business decisions one vote right, so as to enable the invested enterprise monitoring and management. In addition, venture capital has legal, financial, management and professional talents, and There are specific expertise and investment experience in some areas. Many studies show that venture capital has a supervisory function on listed companies. Venture capital will supervise listed companies in various ways to control their speculation.
Venture capital is equity capital, will make the investment firm's debt risk is reduced accordingly, investment in the company's own growth ability will be recognized by the market because of the risks involved in investing, providing convenience for subsequent financing enterprises. In addition, the risk of investment and investment bankers, fund, close contact the brokerage and venture capital investors, using their own resources network, can help enterprises to attract more capital.
Therefore, from the theoretical point of view, the risk of investment can not only play a supervisory function to reduce the agency problem, but also can play as the third party certification effect, reduce the risk of asymmetric information of enterprises and investors, and the use of their own social resources for the invested enterprises to attract more funds. From domestic and foreign research literature in recent years, research on risk investment with their non efficiency investment has been very thorough, but the research on risk investment on investment efficiency is less, this paper attempts to explore the risk investment will affect the company's non efficiency investment?
Based on the selection of samples, taking into account the risk investment object is mainly small and medium sized enterprise high growth potential and higher risk, and the Shenzhen SME board and GEM listed companies is to provide financing platform for small and medium-sized enterprises, but in view of the gem was launched in 2009, this paper can meet the requirements of the listed companies rarely, therefore, this paper only chooses 328 companies before December 31, 2010 in the small board listed as the research sample, and not the gem as the object of study.
In order to confirm the effects of risk investment on excessive investment and insufficient. This paper reviews the related literature on risk investment and inefficient investment at home and abroad, and introduces the main theory and the mechanism of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment. Then combined with the analysis and mechanism of domestic and international theory put forward the hypothesis, and for hypothesis test. Finally, the conclusion of this paper, and put forward policy recommendations according to the conclusions above. Based on logical thinking, this paper is divided into 6 parts, as follows:
The first part is the various theories. This part mainly introduces the background and significance of the research, the research methods, the research ideas and the structure of the article.
The second part is related literature review. It reviews the literature on venture capital and inefficient investment, and reviews the relationship between venture capital and inefficient investment.
The third part is to analyze the influence of risk investment in China on non efficiency investment theory. This part firstly based on "information asymmetry theory", "contract theory" and "risk investment authentication theory" are discussed, which lays the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment; then, the concept of risk investment and inefficient investment are defined; finally, introduces the basic operation mode of venture capital, and summarizes the governance mechanism of venture investment on non efficiency investment. The main function of company governance from the internal and external financing environment angle angle introduces risk investment after intervention in corporate governance governance mechanism. Among them, the main the internal governance mechanism is discussed for the monitoring of the over investment by investment companies, may inhibit the excessive investment, while the mechanism of external financing environment is mainly to be The optimization of the financing environment of the investment enterprises may alleviate the shortage of investment.
The fourth part is the research design. Based on the analysis of the front part of the proposed theory, put forward four hypotheses: (1) venture capital has the good effect of monitoring, risk investment companies to curb excessive investment more than no risk investment company; risk investment with authentication function and social network, have risk investment companies can alleviate the lack of investment more than no risk investment company. (2) there is over investment companies, venture capital holdings and over investment are negatively correlated; there is insufficient investment in the company, the problem of venture capital holdings and investment negative correlation. (3) the existence of excessive investment company in the number of venture capital institutions and over investment are negatively correlated; in the lack of investment in the company, lack of risk investment institutions to invest in a number of negative correlation. (4) in the background of government, private background, foreign capital back King, mixed background of four kinds of background, the government investment risk management personnel appointed as background model, the investee company monitoring effect is weak, so as to inhibit the excessive investment is small. But the risk investment can use political relations and other resources, can more easily alleviate the shortage of the invested enterprise and investment. The design model and the definition of the variable.
The fifth part is the empirical test and analysis. Firstly, the expected investment model variables were analyzed by descriptive statistics, and test the correlation of variables, calculate the expected level of investment; then, risk investment and empirical overinvestment and underinvestment analysis. Respectively from the risk investment is involved, the shareholding ratio of risk investment the number of venture capital institutions and different background to analyze the impact of venture capital investment and non efficiency.
The sixth part is the research conclusion, policy suggestion and prospect. Through the empirical analysis, the conclusions of this study. This paper makes an empirical test on the hypothesis by regression analysis, draw the following conclusions: (1) in the invested enterprise and non efficiency investment risk investment institutions (overinvestment and underinvestment) a significant negative correlation (2.) venture capital holdings and excessive investment has no significant correlation, showed a significant negative correlation with the lack of investment. (3) the amount of investment and non efficiency investment risk (overinvestment and underinvestment) a significant negative correlation. (4) four private background of venture capital in the background, mixed background and significant over investment behavior negative correlation; government background and the lack of investment had a significant negative correlation, no significant correlation between other background and non efficiency investment. This part is on the basis of summing up, combined with the results of empirical analysis, respectively, personnel training, Venture capital management, joint investment funds, guidance and put forward some suggestions and policies: (1) strengthen risk investment institutions in personnel training. (2) improve the state-owned background of venture capital management. (3) to strengthen cooperation between domestic and foreign venture capital institutions. (4) actively guide social capital into the venture investment institutions.
The innovation of this article is mainly embodied in the following aspects:
First of all, the relevant research results of the non efficiency investment mainly in the agency problem, financing constraints, free cash flow, impact on non efficiency investment research from the perspective of venture capital. This paper is mainly based on the investment risk is rarely able to overcome adverse selection, overcome the moral risk, play the certification effect as a starting point, from the company's internal governance and optimize the environment of external financing point of view, the possibility analysis of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment.
Secondly, to establish the model, using Richardson (2006) investment model to measure the efficiency of investment, taking into account the impact of the effectiveness of China's capital market, as a proxy for growth will lead to the deviation of measurement with the Tobin Q value. At the same time, taking into account the equity division reform and the existence of restricted stock value calculation the influence of Tobin Q, therefore, the growth rate of sales income as the proxy of growth opportunities.
Finally, the background of venture capital is subdivided into government background, private background, foreign capital background and mixed background, to analyze the influence of different backgrounds on overinvestment and underinvestment.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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