本文選題：電信代理渠道　切入點：業(yè)務(wù)分成　出處：《科技與經(jīng)濟》2016年01期

【摘要】：考慮由一個電信運營商和一個電信代理商組成的電信代理渠道中,電信運營商處于主導地位,電信業(yè)務(wù)的市場需求量主要取決于銷售價格和電信代理商服務(wù)水平,應(yīng)用動態(tài)博弈論理論分別建立電信代理渠道集中決策模型、業(yè)務(wù)分成契約模型和基于業(yè)務(wù)分成與努力成本共擔的組合式契約模型,最終模型證明了傳統(tǒng)的業(yè)務(wù)分成契約并不能實現(xiàn)渠道的協(xié)調(diào),給出了實現(xiàn)渠道協(xié)調(diào)時的業(yè)務(wù)分成比率與努力成本分擔比率,并提出了實現(xiàn)電信代理渠道帕累托改進的轉(zhuǎn)移支付機制。最后通過算例分析驗證了所提出的協(xié)調(diào)契約的有效性。
[Abstract]:Considering that telecommunications operators are dominant in the telecommunications agency channels composed of a telecommunications operator and a telecommunications agent, the market demand for telecommunications business mainly depends on the selling price and the level of service provided by the telecommunications agent. Based on the dynamic game theory, the centralized decision-making model of telecommunication agent channel, the business division contract model and the combined contract model based on service sharing and effort cost sharing are established respectively. The final model proves that the traditional service sharing contract can not achieve channel coordination, and gives the ratio of service sharing and effort cost sharing when channel coordination is realized. An improved transfer payment mechanism for telecommunications agent channel Pareto is proposed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed coordination contract is verified by an example.
【作者單位】： 昆明理工大學管理與經(jīng)濟學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目——“需求依賴利率和服務(wù)水平的賣方消費信貸與協(xié)調(diào)機制”(項目編號:71461014;項目負責人:經(jīng)有國)成果之一 云南省引進人才科研啟動基金項目——“定制手機的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化研究”(項目編號:KKSY201208049;項目負責人:經(jīng)有國)成果之一 云南省教育廳重點項目——“基于模塊化服務(wù)平臺面向客戶需求的服務(wù)配置方法研究”(項目編號:KKJD201208006;項目負責人:經(jīng)有國)成果之一
【分類號】：F626
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本文編號：1667280