發(fā)布時間：2018-01-10 11:30

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)管制機構(gòu)與反壟斷機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)機制研究　出處：《浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 電信產(chǎn)業(yè) 管制機構(gòu) 反壟斷機構(gòu) 協(xié)調(diào)機制

【摘要】：電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的健康發(fā)展既離不開行業(yè)管制機構(gòu)的規(guī)范和監(jiān)督，也離不開反壟斷機構(gòu)對市場競爭秩序的維護，然而兩類機構(gòu)在實際執(zhí)法中卻容易發(fā)生沖突。一方面，管制機構(gòu)為了保證電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟性，維護電信市場的安全秩序，必須適當(dāng)控制企業(yè)的數(shù)量，制定嚴(yán)格的市場準(zhǔn)入和企業(yè)運營標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；反壟斷機構(gòu)則負責(zé)維護市場經(jīng)濟的正常競爭秩序，盡可能地減少遏制競爭的行為。出發(fā)點的不同導(dǎo)致兩類機構(gòu)決策主張的差異，有時甚至?xí)䦟ν皇袌鲂袨榻o出截然相反的判定，這便容易引起兩類機構(gòu)間的矛盾和沖突。另一方面，我國管制機構(gòu)與反壟斷機構(gòu)在處理電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的競爭問題時，存在法律規(guī)定不明確、權(quán)責(zé)定位不清晰等現(xiàn)象，使兩類機構(gòu)間的沖突加劇。此外，隨著電信產(chǎn)業(yè)市場程度的不斷提高，反壟斷機構(gòu)對電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的干預(yù)將逐漸增加，兩類機構(gòu)在電信產(chǎn)業(yè)執(zhí)法中的交叉領(lǐng)域也將增加，如果不能在管制機構(gòu)與反壟斷機構(gòu)間建立有效的協(xié)調(diào)機制，那么在機構(gòu)建設(shè)和法律法規(guī)不完善的情況下，兩類機構(gòu)間的矛盾將不斷凸顯。 鑒于以上原因，本文研究了中國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)管制機構(gòu)與反壟斷機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)問題，以期建立完善的協(xié)調(diào)機制，，提高兩類機構(gòu)的整體效率，促進電信產(chǎn)業(yè)市場化改革和政府職能轉(zhuǎn)變的順利進行。 具體來講，本文首先對電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的經(jīng)濟特征、管制與反壟斷機構(gòu)的相關(guān)理論以及行業(yè)法規(guī)與《反壟斷法》執(zhí)法優(yōu)先權(quán)的學(xué)者觀點進行綜述。其次，對兩類機構(gòu)的權(quán)力配置現(xiàn)狀與沖突加以分析，并深入探討了沖突產(chǎn)生的制度性原因。同時，結(jié)合我國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀，對兩類機構(gòu)的權(quán)利配置模式進行了比較選擇。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文借鑒庫珀—約翰協(xié)調(diào)博弈的基本模型，構(gòu)建了一個兩類機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型，對直接影響協(xié)調(diào)成功的策略互補性進行了描述，分析了協(xié)調(diào)失敗的原因及其改進方法，并在此基礎(chǔ)上得出了加強策略互補性的動力機制。最后，針對機構(gòu)間沖突的根源，結(jié)合協(xié)調(diào)博弈的分析結(jié)果，提出了建立兩類機構(gòu)協(xié)調(diào)機制的政策思路，主要有一下四個方面：完善法律制度；明確兩類機構(gòu)的職能定位；建立兩類機構(gòu)間協(xié)調(diào)的激勵制度；形成信息溝通和互相監(jiān)督機制。 本文可能在以下幾個方面有所創(chuàng)新： 1.基于產(chǎn)業(yè)運行效率的新視角對兩類機構(gòu)的權(quán)力配置模式進行選擇。本文在對兩類機構(gòu)權(quán)力配置模式的比較選擇中，除了從產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展和政策導(dǎo)向的角度進行探討，還對目前電信企業(yè)的運行效率進行了簡單的實證分析，并以實證結(jié)果為依據(jù)，從效率改進的角度進一步對權(quán)力配置模式進行選擇論證，豐富了研究方法和研究內(nèi)容。 2.應(yīng)用協(xié)調(diào)博弈理論應(yīng)用分析兩類機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)問題。以往管制機構(gòu)與反壟斷機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)研究中，更多是通過案例和經(jīng)驗分析進行政策設(shè)計，本文將政策設(shè)計的基礎(chǔ)建立在博弈分析的結(jié)果上，使得出的結(jié)論更加具有說服力和應(yīng)用性。同時，本文根據(jù)沖突現(xiàn)狀分析，在已有的庫珀—約翰協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上，構(gòu)建了一個兩類機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型，并引入策略互補性的概念探討我國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)兩類機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)機制。 3.初步構(gòu)建了多視角的兩類機構(gòu)協(xié)調(diào)機制。以往的研究往往只提出較為片面單一的協(xié)調(diào)措施，沒有從整體協(xié)調(diào)過程給出全面的合理建議。本文從多個視角為機構(gòu)協(xié)調(diào)提出明確且可行的一系列措施，更加具有針對性和實用性，有助于實現(xiàn)兩類機構(gòu)的協(xié)調(diào)運行，減少綜合效率的損失。
[Abstract]:The healthy development of the telecommunications industry not only cannot do without the regulation of the industry norms and supervision mechanism, also cannot do without the maintenance of antitrust authorities on the market competition order, however, the two types of institutions are easily in the actual enforcement of conflict. On the one hand, the control mechanism in order to guarantee the economy scale of telecommunication industry, the maintenance of security and order of telecom market the number of enterprises must, appropriate control, strict market access and operating standards; anti monopoly agency is responsible for the maintenance of the normal order of market economy competition, reducing as far as possible to curb competition. The starting point of the different causes the differences between the two types of decision-making bodies argued, sometimes even in the same market behavior are opposite the judge, it is easy to cause the contradictions and conflicts between the two institutions. On the other hand, China's regulatory agencies and the antitrust authorities in the competition problem of telecom industry, existence The law is not clear responsibilities, localization is not clear, the conflict between the two institutions increased. In addition, with the continuous improvement of the level of telecom market, antitrust intervention in the telecommunications industry will gradually increase, the two types of institutions in the field of telecommunications industry cross law enforcement will also increase, if the establishment of coordination mechanism not in the effective regulatory agencies and antitrust authorities, so in the construction sector and the laws and regulations are not perfect, the contradiction between the two institutions will continue to highlight.
In view of the above reasons, this paper studies the coordination between China Telecom's industrial control institutions and antitrust institutions, with a view to establish a sound coordination mechanism, improve the overall efficiency of the two kinds of institutions, and promote the smooth implementation of the marketization reform of the telecommunications industry and the transformation of government functions.
Specifically, firstly, economic characteristics of the telecommunication industry, summarizes the relevant theories of regulation and antitrust agencies and industry regulations and "anti-monopoly law enforcement priority > scholars'views. Secondly, the status quo and conflict of power allocation on the two types of institutions are analyzed, and the discussion of the institutional causes of conflict. At the same time, combined with the current development of China's telecom industry, rights allocation mode of two types of institutions were compared. On this basis, this paper from the basic model of Cooper - John coordination game, constructs a game model of coordination of two types of institutions, directly affect the success of the coordination of Strategic Complementarities are described. Analysis of the causes of coordination failure and its improvement method, and based on the dynamic mechanism of strengthening the complementary strategy. Finally, aiming at the root cause of the conflict between institutions, combined with the coordination game Based on the results, we put forward the policy thinking of establishing two kinds of agency coordination mechanism. There are mainly four aspects: improving the legal system, defining the function orientation of the two kinds of institutions, establishing the incentive system of two kinds of inter agency coordination, forming information communication and mutual supervision mechanism.
This article may be innovative in the following aspects:
1. new perspective of industrial efficiency based on power allocation model of two types of institutions were selected. Based on the comparison and selection of two kinds of organization power allocation mode, apart from the industrial development and policy oriented perspectives on the present operating efficiency of telecom enterprise makes a simple empirical analysis, and empirical results on the basis of efficiency improvement from the angle of further power allocation mode selection demonstration, enrich the research methods and research content.
The application of game theory to analyze the coordination problem of two types of institutions to coordinate 2.. Previous research coordination regulatory agencies and antitrust agencies in more cases and through the empirical analysis of policy design, this paper will base policy design based on the results of the game analysis, the conclusion is more convincing and application. At the same time in this paper, according to the analysis of the current situation of conflict, based on existing Cooper John coordination game model, constructing a game model of a class two coordination mechanism, and the introduction of the concept of strategic complementarity and coordination mechanism of China telecom industry two types of institutions.
3. constructs a coordination mechanism of two types of institutions and multi perspective. Previous studies often suggested only one-sided single coordination measures, no coordination suggestions from the whole process are given. In this paper, from the angle of institutional coordination and put forward a series of measures clear and feasible, more targeted and practical, help to realize the coordinated operation of the two types of institutions, reduce the loss of efficiency.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.294;F626

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