【摘要】：近年來隨著國家經(jīng)濟實力的不斷提升，人民生活水平的不斷提高，人民的物質(zhì)文化需求與當(dāng)前物質(zhì)文化無法滿足人民需求之間的矛盾不斷上升，人民對住房的要求越來越高就是一個明顯的縮影，相比之下，一些低收入人群住房權(quán)益由于個人經(jīng)濟問題遲遲得不到保障，越發(fā)得凸現(xiàn)出來。國家對此也引起了高度的重視，著手實施了保障性安居工程，通過建設(shè)大量的保障性住房來保障低收入人群的居住權(quán)益，為了確保保障性住房建設(shè)的順利進行，我國在汲取了國外先進的保障性住房建設(shè)經(jīng)驗的同時，也結(jié)合自身的國情，制定了一套有中國特色的保障性住房建設(shè)的相關(guān)制度。但是，方方面面都存在著不足或者說需要學(xué)習(xí)、改進的地方。正如本文的側(cè)重點：保障性住房融資方面就是存在以下問題：○1建設(shè)規(guī)模大，建設(shè)資金無法及時到位；○2融資模式較為陳舊，或收益低，或投資回收期長，或融資效率低，或操作難度大等等。造成這些問題的主要原因有：○1建設(shè)融資過度依賴政府撥款，而政府財力不足；○2融資渠道，融資模式缺乏創(chuàng)新；○3融資體系缺乏法律保障。 針對上述問題，可以知道本文的主要研究內(nèi)容是革新保障性住房的融資模式，本文提出了一種新型的保障性住房融資模式——BTT融資模式。其主要的運營模式與傳統(tǒng)的BOT模式類似，政府低價出讓土地，項目公司在土地上建設(shè)保障性住房，竣工后，住房移交給政府用以實施保障性住房，一定期限后，再次移交給項目公司，由項目公司在履行完合同規(guī)定的持有期限后可以隨意處置該項目資產(chǎn)。 為了幫助項目公司做參與決策，本文的決策階段包含兩個部分:○1利用博弈論中的動態(tài)博弈下的斯坦科爾伯格模型，結(jié)合逆向歸納法，得出一個可以達到雙贏局面的項目公司持有期限，寫入招標(biāo)文件；○2項目公司結(jié)構(gòu)自身的技術(shù)經(jīng)濟水平，利用凈現(xiàn)值法，結(jié)合招標(biāo)文件中規(guī)定的持有期限，做出決策，看是否參與該項目的建設(shè)。 通過本論文的詳盡分析，可以論證:BTT融資模式用以我國的保障性住房建設(shè)，是可行的，具有風(fēng)險低，，收益高，回收期短等優(yōu)點。將來若以完善的配套制度輔助運營，將給予我國保障性住房建設(shè)融資注入一股新鮮的血液。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the continuous improvement of national economic strength and the continuous improvement of people's living standard, the contradiction between the material and cultural needs of the people and the current material culture can not meet the needs of the people has been rising. People's higher and higher demand for housing is an obvious microcosm, by contrast, some low-income people's housing rights and interests have become more and more prominent because of personal economic problems. The state has also attached great importance to this issue and embarked on the implementation of the indemnificatory housing project to protect the housing rights and interests of low-income people through the construction of a large number of affordable housing, in order to ensure the smooth progress of the construction of affordable housing. While drawing on the advanced experience of the construction of the indemnificatory housing in foreign countries, our country has also formulated a set of relevant systems of the construction of the indemnificatory housing with Chinese characteristics in the light of its own national conditions. However, there are shortcomings in all aspects, or need to learn, improve the place. Just as the focus of this paper: the following problems exist in the financing of affordable housing: the construction scale of the construction project: 01 is large, the construction funds cannot be put in place in time, the financing model of YU02 is relatively old, or the income is low, the payback period of the investment is long, or the financing efficiency is low. Or difficult to operate and so on. The main causes of these problems are the overdependence of the construction financing on government funds, the lack of government financial resources and the lack of legal protection of the innovative financing system. In view of the above problems, we can know that the main research content of this paper is the financing mode of innovative affordable housing, and this paper puts forward a new financing mode of affordable housing, BTT financing mode. Its main mode of operation is similar to the traditional BOT model. The government sells land at a low price, and the project company builds affordable housing on the land. After completion, the housing is transferred to the government for implementation of the affordable housing, and after a certain period of time, Transfer again to the project company, and the project company may dispose of the project assets at will after fulfilling the holding period stipulated in the contract. In order to help the project company to participate in decision-making, the decision stage of this paper consists of two parts: 01, using the Steinkelberg model under the dynamic game in game theory, and combining the reverse induction method. A project company holding period that can achieve a win-win situation is obtained, which is written into the technical and economic level of the structure of the project company in the bidding document, and the decision is made by using the net present value method and combining the holding period specified in the bidding documents. See if you are involved in the construction of the project. Through the detailed analysis of this paper, it can be proved that the financing mode of "BTT" is feasible and has the advantages of low risk, high income, short payback period and so on. In the future, if we use perfect supporting system to assist the operation, we will inject fresh blood into the financing of affordable housing construction in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F299.23

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 高麗峰;張國杰;杜燕;;利用動態(tài)博弈中的“分蛋糕”模型確定BOT項目特許權(quán)期[J];商業(yè)研究;2006年02期

2 柯永建;趙新博;王盈盈;王守清;;民營企業(yè)發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目的SWOT分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2008年12期

3 高廣春;侯菊萍;;保障房融資的國際經(jīng)驗[J];銀行家;2011年02期

4 何濤;趙國杰;;基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施BOT項目中政府擔(dān)保估值與特許期決策研究[J];城市發(fā)展研究;2010年10期

5 冉令剛;周婕;;BOT模式下開發(fā)經(jīng)濟適用房的博弈決策模型分析[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟;2009年10期

6 曾廣錄;;保障性住房私人融資的不足性及彌補對策[J];當(dāng)代財經(jīng);2011年08期

7 李啟明,申立銀;基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施BOT項目特許權(quán)期的決策模型[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2000年01期

8 楊宏偉,周晶,何建敏;基于博弈論的交通BOT項目特許權(quán)期的決策模型[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2003年03期

9 秦旋;基于CAPM的BOT項目特許期的計算模型[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2005年02期

10 鮑海君;;基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施BOT項目特許權(quán)期決策的動態(tài)博弈模型[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2009年04期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 吳孝靈;基于博弈模型的BOT項目利益相關(guān)者利益協(xié)調(diào)機制研究[D];南京大學(xué);2011年

2 余群舟;基于風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的垃圾焚燒BOT項目特許期政府決策[D];華中科技大學(xué);2012年

本文編號：2248164