發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-29 01:23

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + DEA-TOBIT模型　； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文使用DEA方法對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效率進(jìn)行了測(cè)評(píng),并將效率值作為因變量投入到Tobit模型中,通過Tobit模型分析了影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具選擇的因素、影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)效率的因素。其中,影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具選擇的因素包括公司規(guī)模,兩職合一,股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具與公司規(guī)模的二階交互項(xiàng),股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具、公司規(guī)模與公司成長性的三階交互項(xiàng),股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具、股權(quán)性質(zhì)與大股東控制權(quán)的三階交互項(xiàng),股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具、大股東控制權(quán)與管理層持股水平的三階交互項(xiàng)。影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)效率的因素包括股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具、公司規(guī)模、成長性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在一般情況下,股票期權(quán)的效率要高于限制性股票,但對(duì)于高成長性的大公司、低成長性的小公司和大股東控制權(quán)與管理層激勵(lì)沖突激烈的國企來說,股票期權(quán)的效率較低,限制性股票的效率有可能超過股票期權(quán)。將這些因素作為自變量投入到新的模型中,從而得到了股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具選擇的模型,通過計(jì)算股票期權(quán)和限制性股票的效率值來確定選用哪種股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具。公司只需提供以上因素的值帶入計(jì)算比較,即可得到更適合公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具。
[Abstract]:In this paper, DEA method is used to evaluate the efficiency of equity incentive, and the efficiency value is used as a dependent variable in the Tobit model. Through the Tobit model, the factors affecting the choice of equity incentive tools and the factors affecting the efficiency of equity incentive are analyzed. Among them, the factors that affect the choice of equity incentive tools include the company size, the integration of two positions, the second order interaction between equity incentive tools and company size, the equity incentive tools, the third order interaction between company size and corporate growth, and the equity incentive tools. Third order interaction between ownership nature and control right of large shareholders, equity incentive tools, and third order interaction between control right of large shareholders and management holding level. The factors that affect the efficiency of equity incentive include equity incentive tools, company size and growth. It is found that stock options are more efficient than restricted stocks in general, but for large companies with high growth, small companies with low growth and state-owned enterprises with fierce incentive conflicts between the control rights of large shareholders and the management, it is found that the efficiency of stock options is higher than that of restricted stocks. The efficiency of stock option is low, and the efficiency of restricted stock may exceed that of stock option. These factors are put into the new model as independent variables, and the model of stock incentive tool selection is obtained, which equity incentive tool is chosen by calculating the efficiency value of stock option and restricted stock. Companies only need to provide the value of the above factors into the calculation comparison, can be more suitable for the company's equity incentive tools.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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