發(fā)布時間：2018-03-29 05:28

  本文選題：產(chǎn)品市場競爭　切入點：競爭類型　出處：《西南財經(jīng)大學》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：盈余管理作為學術界的研究熱點,吸引了大量學者的關注。直到真實盈余管理的出現(xiàn),這股盈余管理的研究熱潮又一次涌起。但無論應計盈余管理還是真實盈余管理,研究都只是停留在公司治理層面。大量的文獻集中于研究產(chǎn)權性質,股權結構等內部治理機制與應計或真實盈余管理之間的關系。但對于經(jīng)營層面因素是否影響公司盈余管理策略的研究還較少,雖然國外學者在該方面的研究處于領先地位,但其研究均指向應計盈余管理,尚未涉及真實盈余管理。產(chǎn)品市場競爭力如何影響公司盈余管理策略以實現(xiàn)管理公司報告盈余仍是一個被忽略的問題。 雖然研究表明產(chǎn)品市場競爭主要通過公司治理機制和信息機制影響盈余管理,但研究都僅限于“競爭強度”這個概念,事實上,競爭強度只是產(chǎn)品市場競爭最基本的一個維度,單從競爭強度這個概念,并不能明晰產(chǎn)品競爭對盈余管理的作用機制。管理層在進行盈余管理決策時,除了受到產(chǎn)品市場競爭強度的影響,必定會受到其他可能因素的影響。因此,有必要將產(chǎn)品市場競爭進行多維度劃分后,再進行研究。 競爭強度衡量了公司所處行業(yè)的競爭程度以及行業(yè)內所處的競爭地位,代表了一種外部競爭環(huán)境。在面臨不同程度的競爭壓力時,企業(yè)由于自身所處行業(yè)的特質以及在行業(yè)內所處的競爭地位,在面對需求下降的風險時,擁有不同程度的緩沖能力,因此,盈余下降程度也不盡相同,管理層的盈余管理動機強弱程度自然也受到相應的影響�？傮w來說,競爭強度主要考量的是外部競爭環(huán)境對盈余管理動機強弱問題的影響。 單個企業(yè)在面臨競爭壓力的情況下,勢必會根據(jù)現(xiàn)時的產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭強度分析結果,確定一種可成為努力目標的競爭優(yōu)勢,即確定競爭戰(zhàn)略,成本化或差異化競爭戰(zhàn)略。差異化和成本化戰(zhàn)略是市場上公司實現(xiàn)競爭優(yōu)勢的兩大典型戰(zhàn)略方式,每種戰(zhàn)略都是基于不同的價值鏈活動和不同的資源契約。從事差異化競爭戰(zhàn)略的公司,要么在技術上領先,要么擁有較高的客戶忠誠度,只有這樣才能使自己與競爭對手區(qū)分開來。為了實現(xiàn)這一目標,差異化戰(zhàn)略實行者需要在關鍵領域增加投資,比如：新產(chǎn)品的研發(fā),品牌的創(chuàng)建,市場營銷和廣告的推廣,雇員培訓,質量控制等。然而,這些資源是專門用來實現(xiàn)其戰(zhàn)略化目標的,一般是不可移動或者不能完全移動的,因此,對于差異化戰(zhàn)略實行者來說,減少這些專業(yè)化資源的調整成本過高,當收入下降時,差異化戰(zhàn)略實行者較成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者會將閑置資源保留至下一期使用,只要這些資源的調整成本高于保留成本。對于成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者,該類型的公司試圖以最低的成本提供產(chǎn)品和服務,實現(xiàn)利潤最大化。為了實現(xiàn)這一目標,成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者集中于成本控制活動,對于成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者來說,維持一定的銷售規(guī)模和市場份額遠比專業(yè)化資源重要的多,當遭遇同等水平的需求下降,成本化戰(zhàn)略企業(yè)會較快并且較大程度的削減閑置資源,最大限度的降低成本以減少利潤下降程度。也就是說,在收入下降時,差異化戰(zhàn)略較成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者具有較高的成本粘性。 如果競爭戰(zhàn)略類型確實影響成本粘性,則意味著不同戰(zhàn)略類型的企業(yè)在成本性態(tài)上存在差異。那么,當遭遇需求下降或者利潤下降的困境時,成本性態(tài)的差異會不會使企業(yè)在盈余下降程度上存在差異?從長期來看,是否影響企業(yè)盈余的波動性,進而影響分析師盈余預測偏差?這種差異是否會影響企業(yè)管理層的盈余管理動機強弱程度?從而導致管理層從事不同程度及不同方式的盈余管理行為?這些問題將在文中進行詳細探討。 競爭戰(zhàn)略衡量了單個企業(yè)面對外部競爭壓力時為維持競爭優(yōu)勢所作出的戰(zhàn)略選擇,當這些競爭戰(zhàn)略仍然無法實現(xiàn)企業(yè)的競爭目標時,就會主動尋求與競爭對手建立一種長期或短期的合作關系以實現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略性目的,這種多個企業(yè)之間達成的戰(zhàn)略合作關系稱之為“戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟”。這種合作是企業(yè)為了現(xiàn)實生存或長遠發(fā)展的需要而采取的行動,具有明確的戰(zhàn)略意圖和目標,但合作關系本身則不一定是長期穩(wěn)定的,戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟成員之間既是合作伙伴又是競爭對手。 通常,企業(yè)群體之間容易達成的兩類戰(zhàn)略互動聯(lián)盟是產(chǎn)量競爭和價格競爭聯(lián)盟。這種競爭類型的差異,往往導致企業(yè)在經(jīng)營策略和管理策略上存在一定的差異。對于產(chǎn)量競爭類型的公司,最重要的是確定下階段是否有能力實現(xiàn)目標產(chǎn)量的增加以實現(xiàn)利潤最大化,為了實現(xiàn)該目標,公司需要獲得融資進行資本投資,此時,以最低成本獲取資金就變得尤為重要。這種經(jīng)營目標導向使得企業(yè)將注意力集中在融資市場上,競爭成員之間即合作又競爭的關系使其提供高質量的盈余信息以獲得低成本的資金成為其首選；處于價格競爭類型的公司,由于產(chǎn)能已經(jīng)在經(jīng)營的上一階段確定,下一階段的主要目標是維持企業(yè)在聯(lián)盟成員之間以及行業(yè)內的競爭地位,戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟即合作又競爭的關系,使其選擇披露更低質量的盈余報告,以阻止競爭對手聚焦于他們的公司,這是因為過多的重要信息披露給競爭伙伴或者對手,很可能使戰(zhàn)略伙伴通過戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟探測市場,等到“羽翼豐滿”,再分灶吃飯。這樣一來,昔日的“兄弟”很有可能成為不共戴天的對手,提供高質量的盈余信息,只會削減企業(yè)未來的自身邊際收益并享受不到任何資本成本下降帶來的好處,因此,該類型的企業(yè)將會選擇提供質量更低的盈余報告。 如上所述,對于產(chǎn)量競爭類型的公司,其盈余管理的主要動機是基于資本市場動機,而價格競爭類型的公司,其盈余管理的動機主要是基于產(chǎn)品市場。因此,產(chǎn)品市場競爭類型這一維度主要考察競爭類型對盈余管理動機差異的影響,以及對盈余管理程度及方式的影響。 本文將從產(chǎn)品市場競爭角度出發(fā),在對產(chǎn)品市場競爭進行多維度細分的情況下,試圖研究經(jīng)營層面因素如何影響管理者盈余管理決策。具體的,本論文擬從產(chǎn)品市場競爭的三個維度：產(chǎn)品市場競爭強度、產(chǎn)品市場競爭戰(zhàn)略和產(chǎn)品市場競爭類型分別展開研究。 實證研究部分的研究結論可概括為以下幾點： (1)產(chǎn)品市場競爭強度與盈余管理策略。本章通過將行業(yè)競爭強度細分為行業(yè)間競爭強度和行業(yè)內競爭優(yōu)勢兩個層面,檢驗了產(chǎn)品市場競爭對盈余管理水平以及盈余管理方式的影響,同時對國有與非國有企業(yè)做了比較分析。研究表明：從盈余管理程度來看,無論行業(yè)層面還是公司層面,面臨較高競爭程度和競爭壓力的企業(yè)(競爭性行業(yè)和競爭劣勢企業(yè)),盈余管理水平較高,產(chǎn)品市場競爭并未有效發(fā)揮治理機制；在盈余管理方式上,競爭性行業(yè)的企業(yè)偏向使用應計盈余管理,處于競爭劣勢地位的企業(yè)偏向使用應計和真實盈余管理相結合的方式；而區(qū)分產(chǎn)權性質后,國有企業(yè)中處于競爭性行業(yè)以及處于競爭劣勢的企業(yè)更偏向使用真實盈余管理,而非國有企業(yè)中,以上企業(yè)則選擇使用應計盈余管理,尤其偏向使用負向應計盈余管理,說明產(chǎn)品市場競爭在非國有企業(yè)更多的發(fā)揮了信息機制,使其為避免掠奪性威脅采取了調減利潤的行為。 (2)產(chǎn)品市場競爭戰(zhàn)略與盈余管理策略。本章將產(chǎn)品市場競爭戰(zhàn)略作為主要研究對象,通過引入成本粘性的分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)產(chǎn)品市場競爭戰(zhàn)略與盈余管理存在以下關系：差異化競爭戰(zhàn)略與成本化競爭戰(zhàn)略對盈余管理程度的影響并不顯著,只在盈余管理方式上存在顯著差異,從整體來看,成本化戰(zhàn)略實行者偏向使用真實盈余管理。進一步的,考慮競爭強度這一外部因素,筆者發(fā)現(xiàn),從行業(yè)間競爭強度來看,在競爭程度較低的行業(yè),差異化戰(zhàn)略偏向應計盈余管理,成本化戰(zhàn)略選擇應計與真實盈余管理相結合的方式。從行業(yè)內競爭地位來看,處于競爭劣勢的企業(yè),采用差異化戰(zhàn)略程度越高,越偏向使用應計盈余管理實現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略目標,而處于競爭優(yōu)勢的企業(yè),成本化戰(zhàn)略的使用程度越高,越偏向使用真實盈余管理。最后,按照產(chǎn)權性質分類后,在國有企業(yè),差異化戰(zhàn)略企業(yè)偏向使用應計盈余管理,成本化戰(zhàn)略企業(yè)偏向使用應計和真實盈余管理相結合的方式。以上結果表明,差異化戰(zhàn)略和成本化戰(zhàn)略雖然在成本粘性上存在顯著差異,但這種成本粘性的差異對盈余管理水平并沒有顯著影響,而對盈余管理方式作用顯著。 (3)產(chǎn)品市場競爭類型與盈余管理策略。本章主要研究了產(chǎn)量競爭和價格競爭兩種類型的公司在盈余管理水平及盈余管理方式上是否存在顯著差異,以及行業(yè)競爭環(huán)境是否影響了其作用機制。研究成果表明：首先,與經(jīng)典文獻中的假設不同,產(chǎn)量競爭類型的公司較價格競爭類型公司從事了更多的盈余管理活動,并在盈余管理方式上呈現(xiàn)出顯著差異,產(chǎn)量競爭類型偏向使用應計盈余管理和真實盈余管理相結合的方式實現(xiàn)特定盈余動機,而價格競爭類型只偏向與負向應計盈余管理；其次,較非戰(zhàn)略互動公司而言,產(chǎn)量競爭類型和價格競爭類型的公司都從事了較高程度的盈余管理,也就是說,戰(zhàn)略互動的公司比非戰(zhàn)略互動公司從事了較多的盈余管理；考慮產(chǎn)品競爭強度后,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)激烈的競爭環(huán)境(行業(yè)間與行業(yè)內結論一致)加劇了產(chǎn)量競爭類型和價格競爭類型的盈余管理活動；最后,考慮產(chǎn)權背景后,經(jīng)驗證據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn)在國有產(chǎn)權背景下,行業(yè)競爭環(huán)境越發(fā)激烈,產(chǎn)量競爭類型從事盈余管理的動機越強,并且主要方式是真實盈余管理；而價格競爭類型公司從事負向應計盈余管理的動機也隨之增強。在行業(yè)內競爭優(yōu)勢方面,實證結果并未得出競爭優(yōu)勢地位降低兩類競爭類型公司盈余管理程度的證據(jù),反而支持了競爭優(yōu)勢地位的國有價格競爭類型企業(yè),更容易采取負向應計盈余管理隱瞞利潤。 本文可能的創(chuàng)新體現(xiàn)在以下幾點： 1.與以往研究不同,本文從經(jīng)營層面的因素—產(chǎn)品市場競爭出發(fā),研究其與盈余管理水平之間的關系,打破了盈余管理與公司治理之間的固定思維模式,拓展了盈余管理影響因素的研究；另外,本文將真實盈余管理納入研究范圍,在拓展盈余管理影響因素研究的同時,也豐富了真實盈余管理領域的研究成果；最后,結合產(chǎn)權背景,明晰了產(chǎn)品市場競爭的兩大作用機制在不同產(chǎn)權背景下所發(fā)揮的不同作用,將產(chǎn)品市場競爭與制度背景有機的結合在一起,具有一定的現(xiàn)實意義。 2.與以往研究不同,本文通過實證方法將產(chǎn)品市場競爭細分為3個維度：產(chǎn)品市場競爭強度、產(chǎn)品市場競爭戰(zhàn)略和產(chǎn)品市場競爭類型,尤其是對競爭類型的劃分,在國內研究成果中十分罕見。同時,對各種維度下,產(chǎn)品市場競爭對盈余管理的作用機制展開詳細研究。細化了產(chǎn)品市場競爭領域的相關研究。 3.本文提出企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略因在成本粘性上存在差異,因其應對風險時對閑置資源調整幅度施的差異,導致其盈余波動性存在差異,進而影響外部分析師的盈余預測偏差,最終導致兩者采取的盈余管理程度及盈余管理方式也有所差異,這一研究成果是對成本粘性領域的拓展研究,豐富了成本粘性經(jīng)濟后果方面的研究成果。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has attracted a lot of scholars ' attention as a hot spot in the academic circle . However , the research of surplus management is only staying at the corporate governance level until the emergence of real earnings management . However , the research is focused on the research on the property of property rights and equity structure and the relationship between the internal governance mechanism and the accrual or real earnings management . However , the research on whether the management level factor affects the management of earnings management has not been involved in real earnings management .

Although the research shows that the product market competition mainly affects earnings management through corporate governance mechanism and information mechanism , the research is limited to the concept of " competitive strength " . In fact , competition intensity is only one dimension of product market competition . In fact , the competition intensity is only one dimension of product market competition .

The competition intensity measures the competition degree of the industry and the competitive position in the industry . It represents an external competitive environment . In the face of the different degree of competition pressure , the enterprise has different degree of buffering capacity in the face of the characteristics of the industry and the competitive position in the industry . Therefore , the degree of earnings decline is not the same , and the strength and weakness degree of the management ' s earnings management motivation are also affected . Generally speaking , the competition intensity mainly considers the influence of the external competitive environment on the weak problem of earnings management motivation .

In order to achieve this goal , differentiated strategy practitioners need to increase investment in key areas , such as R & D of new products , brand creation , marketing and advertising promotion , employee training , quality control , etc . In order to achieve this goal , differentiated strategy implementers need to increase investment in key areas , such as the development of new products , brand creation , marketing and advertising promotion , employee training , quality control , etc .

If the type of competitive strategy does affect the cost stickiness , it means that there is a difference in the cost behavior of enterprises with different strategic types . In the long run , whether the difference in the cost behavior will not make the enterprise difference in earnings fall ? From the long term , it will affect the earnings forecast deviation of the analyst . Will this difference affect the earnings management motivation of the management of the enterprise ? These problems will be discussed in detail in this paper .

The competitive strategy measures the strategic choices made by a single enterprise to maintain competitive advantage in the face of external competitive pressure . When these competition strategies still fail to achieve the enterprise ' s competitive goals , it will actively seek to establish a long - term or short - term cooperative relationship with the competitors to achieve strategic objectives . Such cooperation is an action taken by the enterprise to achieve the needs of survival or long - term development , with clear strategic intentions and objectives , but the cooperative relationship itself is not necessarily long - term stable , and the strategic alliance members are both partners and competitors .

Generally speaking , the two types of strategic interaction alliance which is easy to achieve among the enterprise groups is the alliance of production competition and price competition . The difference of this kind of competition often leads to the existence of some differences in the business strategy and management strategy . For the company with the competitive type of production , it is important to determine whether the next stage has the ability to achieve the maximization of profit . In order to achieve the goal , the company needs to obtain financing for capital investment . At this time , the company needs to obtain financing for capital investment .
Companies that are of the type of price contend that , as capacity has been identified in the previous phase of operations , the main objective of the next phase is to maintain the competitive position of the business between the members of the Alliance and within the industry , the strategic alliance , which is a cooperative and competitive relationship , to prevent competitors from focusing on their companies , because too much of the important information is likely to become a rival , providing high - quality surplus information , reducing the future self - marginal benefits of the enterprise and enjoying the benefits of a decline in any cost of capital . Therefore , the type of business will choose to provide a lower quality surplus report .

As mentioned above , for companies of the type of production competition , the main motivation of earnings management is based on the incentive of capital market , while the company with price competition type is mainly based on the product market . Therefore , the dimension of product market competition type mainly examines the influence of the competition type on the difference of earnings management motivation and the influence on the degree of earnings management and the way .

From the point of view of product market competition , this paper attempts to study how to influence managers ' earnings management decision - making in the case of multi - dimension segmentation of product market competition .

The conclusions of the empirical research can be summarized as follows :

( 1 ) Product market competition intensity and surplus management strategy . This chapter examines the impact of product market competition on earnings management and earnings management by dividing industry competition intensity into two levels of competition intensity in industry and competitive advantage in industry .
In the way of surplus management , enterprises in competitive industries prefer to use accrual surplus management , and the enterprises in competitive disadvantage are biased towards the combination of using accrual and real earnings management ;
After distinguishing the property right property , the enterprises in the state - owned enterprises are in the competitive industry and the enterprises in the competitive disadvantage are more inclined to use the real earnings management , while in the non - state - owned enterprises , the above enterprises choose to use the accrual surplus management , in particular to the use of the negative accrual surplus management , which indicates that the market competition of the products has played an information mechanism more in the non - state - owned enterprises , so as to adopt the action of reducing profits to avoid predatory threats .

( 2 ) The strategy of product market competition and surplus management strategy are discussed in this chapter .

( 3 ) Product market competition type and surplus management strategy . This chapter mainly studies whether there are significant differences in earnings management and earnings management of companies with different types of production competition and price competition , and whether the competition environment of industry affects their mechanism of action .
Secondly , compared with non - strategic interactive companies , companies of the type of production competition and price competition are engaged in a higher degree of earnings management , that is , the firms with strategic interaction are engaged in more surplus management than non - strategic interactive companies ;
After considering the competitive strength of the products , the research finds that the fierce competition environment ( which is consistent with the conclusion in the industry ) increases the profit management activities of the yield competition type and the price competition type ;
Finally , after considering the background of property rights , empirical evidence has found that under the background of state - owned property , the stronger the competition environment of the industry , the stronger the incentive for the surplus management of the production competition type , and the main way is the real earnings management ;
In the field of competitive advantage , the empirical results do not conclude that the competitive advantage position reduces the earnings management level of the two types of competition types , but instead supports the state - owned price competition type enterprise with competitive advantage status , and it is easier to take the negative accrual surplus management to conceal the profit .

Possible innovations of this article are reflected in the following points :

1 . Unlike previous research , this paper studies the relationship between earnings management and earnings management from the factors of management level - product market competition , breaks the fixed thinking mode between earnings management and corporate governance , and expands the research on the influencing factors of earnings management ;
In addition , in this paper , the real surplus management is included in the research scope , and the research results of real earnings management are also enriched while the influence factors of surplus management are expanded .
Finally , with the background of property right , the different roles of the two mechanisms of product market competition in different property rights background are clarified , and the market competition and the system background are combined together , which has practical significance .

2 . Unlike previous research , this paper divides the product market competition into three dimensions : product market competition intensity , product market competition strategy and product market competition type , especially the classification of competition type , which is very rare in domestic research results .

3 . In this paper , the author puts forward that the enterprise ' s competitive strategy is different because of the difference in the cost viscosity , which leads to the difference of the surplus volatility and the surplus forecast deviation of the external analyst . The result is that the surplus management degree and the surplus management method are different . The research result is an expansion study in the field of cost sticky , which enriches the research results in the economic consequences of cost sticky economy .

【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275;F273.2

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前9條

1 雷光勇;劉慧龍;;控股股東性質、利益輸送與盈余管理幅度——來自中國A股公司首次虧損年度的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2007年08期

2 朱紅軍;大股東變更與高級管理人員更換:經(jīng)營業(yè)績的作用[J];會計研究;2002年09期

3 吳聯(lián)生;薄仙慧;王亞平;;避免虧損的盈余管理程度:上市公司與非上市公司的比較[J];會計研究;2007年02期

4 陳旭東;楊文冬;黃登仕;;企業(yè)生命周期改進了應計模型嗎?——基于中國上市公司的實證檢驗[J];會計研究;2008年07期

5 李增福;顧研;連玉君;;稅率變動、破產(chǎn)成本與資本結構非對稱調整[J];金融研究;2012年05期

6 盧永艷;;宏觀經(jīng)濟因素對企業(yè)財務困境風險影響的實證分析[J];宏觀經(jīng)濟研究;2013年05期

7 楊長虹;彭丁;;中國企業(yè)雙重上市影響因素及經(jīng)濟后果研究——來自香港聯(lián)交所的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];宏觀經(jīng)濟研究;2013年08期

8 申慧慧;;環(huán)境不確定性對盈余管理的影響[J];審計研究;2010年01期

9 林芳;馮麗麗;;管理層權力視角下的盈余管理研究——基于應計及真實盈余管理的檢驗[J];山西財經(jīng)大學學報;2012年07期

，

本文編號：1679771