本文選題：上市公司　切入點(diǎn)：虛假信息披露　出處：《遼寧大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近些年來(lái)，雖然證券市場(chǎng)日臻成熟，拉高了首次公開發(fā)行的公司門檻，規(guī)范了上市公司信息披露的形式，加強(qiáng)了對(duì)上市公司的監(jiān)督管理。然而，極速的發(fā)展必然伴隨著巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。信息的不對(duì)稱性降低了信息的預(yù)測(cè)價(jià)值，侵害了投資者的利益，阻礙了證券市場(chǎng)平穩(wěn)、高效、有序地運(yùn)行。目前，政府雖嚴(yán)格打擊造假企業(yè)，信息披露的違規(guī)行為仍屢禁不止，，并且形式花樣不斷翻新。 上市公司被要求披露的會(huì)計(jì)信息在某種角度上具有公共產(chǎn)品的屬性，它應(yīng)該并且需要被投資者以及其他利益相關(guān)者掌握，業(yè)務(wù)收入、稅后利潤(rùn)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況這些信息是投資者做出理智決策的基礎(chǔ)。而上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息失真、財(cái)務(wù)造假的例子屢見(jiàn)不鮮，某種程度上與社會(huì)環(huán)境相關(guān)，其中當(dāng)然少不了利益的驅(qū)動(dòng)。上市公司愿意鋌而走險(xiǎn)，冒天下之大不諱地違規(guī)操作，原因顯然是多種多樣的。從公司內(nèi)部角度來(lái)分析，高層管理者和會(huì)計(jì)人員是不能推卸責(zé)任的，要么工作不盡職要么同流合污；從宏觀來(lái)說(shuō)，政府監(jiān)管部門、中介機(jī)構(gòu)等并未完全發(fā)揮其功用，調(diào)查能力、執(zhí)法能力還有待提升進(jìn)步，所依據(jù)的法律法規(guī)依舊有極大完善的空間。 本文以案例分析為基礎(chǔ)，事件與理論相結(jié)合的方式，針對(duì)頻繁造假企業(yè)科達(dá)股份進(jìn)行了關(guān)于虛假信息披露、財(cái)務(wù)造假以及監(jiān)管漏洞問(wèn)題的研究。除了詳盡地列舉出虛假信息披露的方法及表現(xiàn)形式，還徹底地剖析了上市公司虛假信息披露、財(cái)務(wù)造假的內(nèi)部、外部原因，并基于各種角度分析了此案例中上市公司本身、證監(jiān)會(huì)、證交所、地方政府等相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門所暴露出的問(wèn)題。從虛假信息披露等造假方法延伸到會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的主要問(wèn)題，最后建議上市公司調(diào)整內(nèi)部控制、優(yōu)化治理結(jié)構(gòu)，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)完善監(jiān)管的體系和制度、制定更全面的法律法規(guī)。
[Abstract]:In recent years, although the stock market has matured, pushed up the initial public offering of the company threshold, standardize the information disclosure of listed company, strengthen supervision and management of listed companies. However, the speed of development will inevitably lead to a huge risk. Information asymmetry reduces the predictive value of information, infringement of the investors interests, hindered the stock market stable, efficient and orderly operation. At present, the government is strictly against corporate fraud, information disclosure irregularities are still repeated, and the form of ever-changing pattern.
Property listed companies were required to disclose the accounting information of public goods in a certain angle, it should also need to be investors and other stakeholders to grasp, business income, profit after tax, risk status of the information is the basis for investors to make rational decision making. And the listed company accounting information distortion, financial fraud case It is often seen. to some extent. With the social environment, which of course driven interests. Listed companies are willing to rush into danger, great risks to illegal operations, the reason is obviously varied. Analyzed from the internal perspective, senior management and accounting personnel can not shirk its responsibility, not due to either work or complicit; from a macro point of view the government, regulatory authorities, intermediary agencies did not fully play its role, research ability, ability of law enforcement remains to be improved on the basis of progress. There is still a lot of room for laws and regulations.
In this paper, on the basis of case study, events and the combination of theory, aiming at the frequent fraud enterprise Kodak shares of the false information disclosure of financial fraud, and regulatory loopholes problems. In addition to the exhaustive enumeration method of false information disclosure and the form, also thoroughly analyzes the false information disclosure of listed companies and external reasons internal, financial fraud, and based on various analyses in this case the listed company itself, the Commission, stock exchange, the local government and the relevant regulatory authorities revealed the problem. From the method of false information disclosure fraud extends to accounting information disclosure problems, the final recommendations of listed companies to adjust the internal control, optimization control the structure, improve the regulatory system and the system of supervision, formulate laws and regulations more comprehensive.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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