本文選題：盈余管理　切入點(diǎn)：債務(wù)融資　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：盈余管理的研究是近幾年來國內(nèi)外學(xué)者廣泛研究的課題,研究主要圍繞著盈余管理的契約動機(jī)、盈余管理的手段及方法等問題展開,已有許多學(xué)者對盈余管理與債務(wù)融資,債務(wù)融資與企業(yè)非效率投資進(jìn)行了研究,但很少有文章對盈余管理、銀行債務(wù)融資以及企業(yè)非效率投資三者之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。 本文以資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論、委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論以及信號傳遞理論為理論基礎(chǔ),對銀行債務(wù)融資在盈余管理與企業(yè)非效率投資之間的中介效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了理論分析,并提出了研究假設(shè)。在實(shí)證研究階段,文章選取我國2007-2012年的滬深A(yù)股上市公司為研究對象,分別建立應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理計(jì)量模型以及非效率投資模型對應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理以及企業(yè)非效率投資進(jìn)行了估計(jì),并利用回歸分析的方法對盈余管理、銀行債務(wù)融資以及企業(yè)非效率投資進(jìn)行了研究,并得出以下研究 結(jié)論： 第一,本文以盈余管理作為解釋變量,投資效率為被解釋變量,研究企業(yè)上期盈余管理對當(dāng)期投資效率的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在過度投資的樣本組中,盈余管理與過度投資程度具有正相關(guān)關(guān)系,說明盈余管理越大的企業(yè),過度投資的程度就越高,投資效率就越低；對于投資不足的樣本組,盈余管理越大的企業(yè),投資不足的程度也越大,研究說明了盈余管理越高的企業(yè),投資效率就越低。 第二,文章以盈余管理為解釋變量,新增的長期借款為被解釋變量,研究盈余管理與銀行長期借款之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在控制了企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、成長性、總資產(chǎn)收益率以及國有性質(zhì)之后,上期的盈余管理與企業(yè)新增銀行長期借款具有顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,企業(yè)在上期進(jìn)行的盈余管理越大,企業(yè)新增的長期銀行借款越多。研究表明,企業(yè)為獲得銀行的長期貸款,普遍進(jìn)行了盈余管理行為。 第三,文章以新增銀行長期借款為解釋變量,企業(yè)的非效率投資作為被解釋變量,研究新增銀行長期借款與企業(yè)投資效率之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在控制了企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、成長性、總資產(chǎn)收益率以及國有性質(zhì)之后,企業(yè)新增長期銀行借款與過度投資具有顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,企業(yè)新增銀行借款越多的企業(yè),過度投資的程度就越大,說明企業(yè)通過新增銀行長期借款獲得了更多的自由現(xiàn)金流量,且發(fā)生了過度投資；研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),新增銀行長期借款與投資不足的程度顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,新增銀行長期借款越多的企業(yè),投資不足的程度就更小,說明新增銀行長期借款抑制了企業(yè)的投資不足行為。 第四,文章對長期借款在盈余管理與非效率投資中的中介效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在過度投資的樣本組中,銀行長期借款在盈余管理與投資過度中存在著部分中介效應(yīng),即盈余管理部分直接導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)的投資過度行為,也有一部盈余管理通過影響銀行長期借款,間接影響了企業(yè)的投資過度行為。在投資不足樣本組中,盡管盈余管理導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)長期借款的增加,而長期借款的增加能夠抑制了投資不足行為,但是盈余管理直接導(dǎo)致的投資不足的程度大于抑制的程度,最終導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)的投資不足行為。 本文的研究不僅對盈余管理的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究進(jìn)行了補(bǔ)充,揭示了盈余管理對企業(yè)非效率投資影響的過程,對如何進(jìn)行債權(quán)人保護(hù)以及正確的進(jìn)行企業(yè)投資決策具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:The research of earnings management is the subject of extensive research by scholars at home and abroad in recent years, the research mainly focuses on the contractual motivations of earnings management, issues of earnings management means and methods, there are many scholars on the earnings management and debt financing, debt financing and inefficient investment are studied, but few articles on earnings management, to study the relationship between debt financing and corporate inefficient investment three.
Based on capital structure theory, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and signal transfer theory as the theoretical basis of bank debt financing in the enterprise earnings management and non efficiency investment intermediary effect between the theoretical analysis, and put forward the research hypothesis. In the stage of empirical research, this paper selects 2007-2012 years in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed company as the research object, established the accrual earnings management measurement model and non efficiency investment accrual earnings management and corporate inefficient investment is estimated, and the use of regression analysis on earnings management, bank debt and corporate inefficient investment are studied, and the following research
Conclusion:
First, based on the earnings management as explanatory variables, the efficiency of investment as explanatory variables, study the impact of earnings management on enterprises, the current investment efficiency in the sample group study found that excessive investment, earnings management and the over investment degree has a positive correlation between the corporate earnings management more clearly, the degree of over investment the higher the investment efficiency is low; the sample group, insufficient investment, earnings management is the lack of investment in the greater degree, research shows that earnings management more enterprises, investment efficiency is low.
Second, based on earnings management as explanatory variables, long-term loans added as explanatory variables, study the relationship between earnings management and the long term bank loans. The study found that, in the control of the enterprise asset size, growth, after the rate of return on total assets and state-owned property, has a significant positive correlation between earnings management and enterprise period new bank long-term loans, earnings management in the period of the new enterprise, more long-term bank loans. The study shows that the enterprises to obtain long-term bank loans, generally the earnings management behavior.
Third, the new bank long-term loans as explanatory variables and non efficiency investment enterprises as explanatory variables, study the relationship between the new bank loans and long-term investment efficiency. The study found that in the control of the enterprise asset size, growth, after the rate of return on total assets and state-owned enterprises, the new growth of Bank loans and over investment has a significant positive correlation between enterprises, more new bank loan business, the greater the degree of over investment, enterprise through the new long term bank loans obtained more free cash flow, and the occurrence of excessive investment; the study also found that the new bank long-term loans and investment insufficient degree of negative correlation the new enterprise, long term loans more, the degree of under investment is smaller, that new bank long-term loans suppressed enterprises inadequate investment behavior.
Fourth, the long-term loans are verified in the earnings management and the mediating effect of non efficiency investment. The study found that in a sample of over investment, long term loans in earnings management and excessive investment exist in the part of the mediating effect, i.e. the earnings management part directly leads to the excessive investment behavior of enterprises, has a surplus management department through the influence of long term bank loans, indirect effects of the excessive investment behavior of enterprises. In the lack of investment in the sample group, although earnings management leads to an increase in long-term loans, long-term loans increased can inhibit investment activities, but not directly lead to earnings management investment is greater than the degree of inhibition. Eventually led to the lack of investment behavior of enterprises.
This research not only supplements the research on the economic consequences of earnings management, but also reveals the process of earnings management's impact on inefficient investment. It has important theoretical and practical significance to protect creditors and make investment decisions correctly.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275;F832.4

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