發(fā)布時間：2018-03-10 16:01

  本文選題：財務(wù)重述　切入點：融資約束　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：截至2016年11月底,我國滬深上市公司總數(shù)由1991年的14家增至2923家,增加了 208倍,但已有的研究表明,非效率投資現(xiàn)象在我國上市公司中占比很高。非效率投資分為兩種,一種是投資于凈現(xiàn)值為負的項目導(dǎo)致的投資過度,另一種是放棄凈現(xiàn)值為正的項目導(dǎo)致的投資不足。信息不對稱和代理沖突導(dǎo)致的非效率投資嚴重損害了投資者的利益,給股東和債權(quán)人造成嚴重損失。從市場角度來看,資金的非效率流動造成資金利用率低下,不利于資本市場的發(fā)展。自上世紀九十年代開始,財務(wù)重述事件頻繁發(fā)生,綜觀中國證券市場,每年約15%的上市公司發(fā)布各類年報更正或者補充公告(魏志華2009[56])。而本文在收集數(shù)據(jù)過程中的統(tǒng)計結(jié)果也顯示近幾年來發(fā)生財務(wù)重述的上市公司比例超過了10%。財務(wù)重述的發(fā)生引起企業(yè)股東和外部債權(quán)人的高度關(guān)注。本文從財務(wù)重述的信號傳遞效應(yīng)入手,首先研究對于投資過度和投資不足的上市公司來說,發(fā)生財務(wù)重述會對其產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響,進而研究其作用機制,即融資約束在財務(wù)重述作用于非效率投資的過程中的是否發(fā)揮中介作用,是完全中介還是部分中介作用。為了驗證上述問題,本文采用了實證分析的方法,建立相關(guān)模型,并選取2011年-2015年滬市主板上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,對財務(wù)重述與非效率投資之間的關(guān)系及其作用機制進行研究。研究結(jié)果表明:對于存在投資過度的樣本,相比于未發(fā)生財務(wù)重述的公司,發(fā)生財務(wù)重述后投資過度程度會得到改善,且融資約束在其中發(fā)揮部分中介作用。對于存在投資不足的樣本,相比于未發(fā)生財務(wù)重述的公司,發(fā)生財務(wù)重述后投資不足程度會更加嚴重,且融資約束在其中同樣也發(fā)揮了部分中介作用。綜上所述,本文的研究豐富了財務(wù)重述與非效率投資及其作用機制的相關(guān)研究,為今后學(xué)者的研究提供一定的參考和借鑒。從研究結(jié)果來看,明確了財務(wù)重述、融資約束及非效率投資之間的關(guān)系,引導(dǎo)企業(yè)治理層和管理層在企業(yè)運營過程中誠信經(jīng)營,加強公司治理,提高企業(yè)信息透明度,從根本上改變企業(yè)投資非效率的局面,而不要試圖投機取巧,因為一旦這種行為被發(fā)現(xiàn),財務(wù)重述的發(fā)生無論從公司治理還是融資約束影響現(xiàn)金流的角度都會對企業(yè)產(chǎn)生很大影響,長遠來看,只會使企業(yè)投資效率更低,經(jīng)營更加惡化。
[Abstract]:By the end of November 2016, the total number of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen had increased by 208-fold, from 14 in 1991 to 2,923, but the research has shown that the phenomenon of inefficient investment is very high in the listed companies in China. There are two kinds of non-efficient investment. One is overinvestment in projects with negative net present value, the other is underinvestment due to the abandonment of projects with positive net present value. Information asymmetry and inefficient investments resulting from agency conflicts seriously harm the interests of investors, From the market point of view, the inefficient flow of funds results in low utilization of funds, which is not conducive to the development of capital markets. Since -10s, financial restatements have occurred frequently. Looking at China's securities market, Every year, about 15% listed companies issue correction or supplementary announcements of all kinds of annual reports (Wei Zhihua 2009 [56]). The statistical results of this paper in the process of collecting data also show that in recent years, the proportion of listed companies with financial restatement has exceeded 10.0% of the total number of listed companies. The occurrence of restatement has aroused great concern of shareholders and external creditors. This paper starts with the signal transfer effect of financial restatement. First of all, to study the impact of financial restatement on overinvested and underinvested listed companies, and then to study its mechanism. That is, whether the financial constraints play an intermediary role in the process of financial restatement in the process of inefficiency investment, whether it is a complete intermediary or a partial intermediary. In order to verify the above problems, this paper adopts the method of empirical analysis to establish a relevant model. From 2011 to 2015, the data of listed companies in Shanghai main Board were selected as the research samples to study the relationship between financial restatement and inefficient investment and its mechanism. Compared with companies without financial restatement, the degree of overinvestment after financial restatement will be improved, and financing constraints play a part of the intermediary role. The degree of underinvestment after financial restatement will be more serious, and financial constraints also play a part of the intermediary role. In summary, the research in this paper enriches the research on financial restatement and non-efficient investment and its mechanism. From the point of view of the research results, the relationship among financial restatement, financing constraints and inefficient investment is clarified, and the corporate governance layer and management are guided to operate in good faith in the process of enterprise operation. Strengthen corporate governance, improve transparency of enterprise information, fundamentally change the inefficient situation of enterprise investment, rather than try to speculate, because once this behavior is discovered, The occurrence of financial restatement will have a great impact on the enterprise whether from the perspective of corporate governance or financing constraints affecting the cash flow. In the long run, it will only make the investment efficiency lower and the management worse.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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