本文選題：政治關(guān)聯(lián)　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《武漢紡織大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：內(nèi)部控制是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)管理架構(gòu)的組成部分，是企業(yè)持續(xù)發(fā)展的制度保證，但內(nèi)部控制總是嵌入在有效的互動(dòng)或多種社會聯(lián)系中。政治關(guān)聯(lián)是指企業(yè)和各級政府部門及其輔助支持性機(jī)構(gòu)之間的聯(lián)系，尋求并建立與政府的聯(lián)系是很多國家企業(yè)普遍存在的現(xiàn)象。一方面，企業(yè)通過借助政治關(guān)聯(lián)這種非正式的替代機(jī)制可以提升與政府部門的“溝通”效率，獲得各種有利于企業(yè)發(fā)展的“稀缺資源”；另一方面，當(dāng)企業(yè)擁有了更為充分的資源，更有可能對內(nèi)部控制進(jìn)行建設(shè)和完善，從而提升企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性。政治關(guān)聯(lián)已然成為影響內(nèi)部控制有效性的重要因素之一。 本研究以政治關(guān)聯(lián)與企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性為核心進(jìn)行兩者之間影響機(jī)制的研究，側(cè)重于探討高管薪酬、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)在政治關(guān)聯(lián)和企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性之間所起到的作用。首先，在梳理國內(nèi)外關(guān)于政治關(guān)聯(lián)和企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)之上，結(jié)合相關(guān)經(jīng)典理論，分析了政治關(guān)聯(lián)、高管薪酬、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的內(nèi)在作用機(jī)制。其次，選擇以2009~2011年滬深兩市全部A股上市公司作為初始樣本，結(jié)合所設(shè)定的模型來檢驗(yàn)本研究所提出的各項(xiàng)假設(shè)，得到如下研究結(jié)論：政治關(guān)聯(lián)對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性存在顯著的積極影響，政治關(guān)聯(lián)與高管薪酬和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例顯著正相關(guān)。通過進(jìn)一步的檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)，政治關(guān)聯(lián)對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的這種積極影響，部分經(jīng)由高管薪酬和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。也就是說，高管薪酬和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例在政治關(guān)聯(lián)與企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性之間能起到中介作用。另外，通過對政治關(guān)聯(lián)進(jìn)行分層級檢驗(yàn)以后發(fā)現(xiàn)，，中央層級政治關(guān)聯(lián)對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的積極影響顯著大于地方層級政治關(guān)聯(lián)。再次，本研究通過檢驗(yàn)還發(fā)現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)為非國有的企業(yè)中，政治關(guān)聯(lián)對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的正向影響更大一些。換句話說，產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)在政治關(guān)聯(lián)對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的影響中能起到調(diào)節(jié)作用。最后，基于理論分析和實(shí)證結(jié)論，并結(jié)合我國處于轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)期的背景，對我國企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制有效性的建設(shè)和完善給出了建議。
[Abstract]:Internal control is an integral part of the modern enterprise management framework and a system guarantee for the sustainable development of an enterprise. But internal controls are always embedded in effective interaction or multiple social connections. Political connections are the links between businesses and government departments at all levels and their supporting agencies. Seeking and establishing connections with governments is a common phenomenon in many countries. On the one hand, companies can improve their "communication" efficiency with government departments by using informal alternative mechanisms such as political connections. Access to various "scarce resources" conducive to the development of enterprises; on the other hand, when enterprises have more adequate resources, they are more likely to build and improve internal controls, In order to enhance the effectiveness of internal control, political connection has become one of the important factors affecting the effectiveness of internal control. This study focuses on the mechanism of influence between the political connection and the effectiveness of internal control, focusing on the executive compensation, institutional investor shareholding ratio. First of all, on the basis of combing the domestic and foreign literature on the political association and the effectiveness of internal control of enterprises, combining with the relevant classical theory, the nature of property rights plays a role in the relationship between political relevance and the effectiveness of internal control of enterprises. This paper analyzes the internal mechanism of political connection, executive compensation, institutional investor holding and the effectiveness of enterprise internal control. Secondly, we choose all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011 as the initial sample. Combined with the established model to test the hypotheses put forward by this study, the following conclusions are obtained: political association has a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of internal control. There is a significant positive correlation between political association and executive compensation and the proportion of institutional investors holding shares. Through further tests, it is found that political association has a positive effect on the effectiveness of internal control. This is partly achieved through executive compensation and institutional investor shareholding ratios. That is, executive compensation and institutional investor shareholding ratios play an intermediary role between political connections and the effectiveness of internal controls in the enterprise. Through the hierarchical test of political association, it is found that the positive impact of central level political association on the effectiveness of enterprise internal control is significantly greater than that of local level political association. This study also finds that in non-state-owned enterprises with non-state-owned property rights, the positive impact of political connections on the effectiveness of internal control is greater. In other words, The nature of property right can play a regulating role in the influence of political connection on the effectiveness of enterprise internal control. Finally, based on theoretical analysis and empirical conclusions, combined with the background of our country in the period of transition economy, Suggestions are given for the construction and improvement of the effectiveness of internal control in Chinese enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢紡織大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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