本文選題：管理層權(quán)力　切入點(diǎn)：經(jīng)營(yíng)性負(fù)債　出處：《南京理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：債務(wù)融資是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)資本融資必不可少的方式之一,并且我國(guó)上市公司2014年末的平均資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率已達(dá)到49.93%。國(guó)外學(xué)者從不同的角度進(jìn)行分析檢驗(yàn),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)債務(wù)融資會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)的非效率投資行為發(fā)揮約束作用。但是國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者在進(jìn)行相關(guān)研究時(shí)卻發(fā)現(xiàn),債務(wù)并不能總是發(fā)揮對(duì)非效率投資的治理作用。所以我們有必要基于中國(guó)具體的情境下研究分析債務(wù)治理失效的原因。在我國(guó),因?yàn)檎鳛閲?guó)有企業(yè)中的第一大虛擬控股股東,這使得"內(nèi)部人控制"問(wèn)題十分嚴(yán)峻;而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中,公司創(chuàng)始人不僅是企業(yè)的第一大控股股東,還掌握著企業(yè)的各項(xiàng)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的決策權(quán),因此管理者會(huì)擁有更多的話(huà)語(yǔ)權(quán)。而在我國(guó)這樣外部監(jiān)督薄弱、公司內(nèi)部治理不完善的大環(huán)境下,管理層為了侵占更多的利益極有可能采取各種各樣的方法,例如選擇更加符合自己利益的融資方式、信息披露的方式等,管理層所采取的這些行動(dòng)會(huì)削弱債務(wù)的相機(jī)治理作用。所以我們必須從管理層權(quán)力這個(gè)角度來(lái)探索債務(wù)治理失效的原因。李心合等(2014)[1]指出,不同于西方國(guó)家成熟的資本市場(chǎng),中國(guó)企業(yè)進(jìn)行負(fù)債融資首選考慮的是內(nèi)部融資,其次是經(jīng)營(yíng)性負(fù)債,最后是金融性負(fù)債。而國(guó)內(nèi)很多研究把經(jīng)營(yíng)性負(fù)債排除在外,或者認(rèn)為債務(wù)是同質(zhì)的基礎(chǔ)上來(lái)研究不同來(lái)源的負(fù)債與企業(yè)投資行為之間的關(guān)系,這樣的做法并沒(méi)有考慮中國(guó)具體的情況,因此必然對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)缺乏足夠的解釋力。因此本文利用滬深兩市A股的數(shù)據(jù),從債務(wù)的來(lái)源這個(gè)角度考察負(fù)債對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司非效率投資的影響以及管理層權(quán)力對(duì)債務(wù)治理作用的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:我國(guó)上市公司中的經(jīng)營(yíng)性負(fù)債可以約束過(guò)度投資以及緩解投資不足;金融性負(fù)債可以抑制過(guò)度投資以及緩解投資不足。所以在基于異質(zhì)性的解釋上,不同來(lái)源的負(fù)債對(duì)企業(yè)的非效率投資發(fā)揮了治理作用。管理層權(quán)力不僅可以削弱不同來(lái)源的負(fù)債對(duì)過(guò)度投資的抑制作用,也可以削弱不同來(lái)源的負(fù)債對(duì)投資不足的緩解作用。
[Abstract]:Debt financing is one of the indispensable ways of modern enterprise capital financing, and the average asset-liability ratio of listed companies in China has reached 49.93in end of 2014. The results show that debt financing can constrain the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises, but domestic scholars have found that, Debt can not always play a governance role in inefficient investment. Therefore, it is necessary for us to study and analyze the reasons for the failure of debt governance based on the specific situation in China. Because the government is the largest virtual controlling shareholder in state-owned enterprises, this makes the problem of "insider control" very serious. In private enterprises, the founder of the company is not only the largest controlling shareholder of the enterprise. It also holds the decision-making power of the various business activities of the enterprise, so the managers will have more voice. But in our country, the external supervision is weak, and the internal governance of the company is not perfect. In order to encroach on more interests, the management is very likely to adopt various methods, such as choosing financing methods that are more in line with their own interests, ways of information disclosure, and so on. These actions by management will weaken the camera governance role of debt. So we must explore the reasons for the failure of debt governance from the perspective of management power. [1] Li Xinhe et al. (1) pointed out that unlike mature capital markets in western countries, The preferred consideration for debt financing for Chinese enterprises is internal financing, followed by operational liabilities, and finally financial liabilities. However, many domestic studies exclude operating liabilities. Or that debt is based on homogeneity to study the relationship between debt from different sources and enterprise investment behavior. This approach does not take China's specific situation into account. Therefore, it is inevitable that there is a lack of sufficient explanatory power for Chinese enterprises. Therefore, this paper uses the data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares, From the perspective of the source of debt, this paper investigates the influence of liabilities on the inefficient investment of listed companies in China and the influence of management power on the governance of debt. The results show that the operating liabilities of listed companies in China can be reduced to one another. Overinvestment and mitigation of underinvestment; Financial liabilities can curb overinvestment and alleviate underinvestment. So in terms of heterogeneity, The power of management not only weakens the restraining effect of debt from different sources on overinvestment, but also weakens the mitigation of underinvestment by liabilities from different sources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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