【摘要】：本文選擇2003—2013年滬深兩市A股非金融類上市公司作為樣本,以具有外生沖擊特性的市級政府官員變更作為切入點,研究政治不確定性對公司收到審計意見概率的影響及其作用機理,以驗證我國審計是否具有保險功能。研究結(jié)果表明,從總體上看,政府官員變更將會提高審計師對其轄區(qū)內(nèi)公司出具非標審計意見的概率,但按照產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)分組檢驗后,該結(jié)果僅在市屬國有企業(yè)樣本中顯著。進一步檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn),市級政府官員變更使得企業(yè)風險水平上升,同樣,該結(jié)果也僅在市屬國有企業(yè)樣本中顯著。以上結(jié)果表明,審計師會因外部政治不確定性增加帶來的企業(yè)未來風險增加,而提高出具非標意見概率。這支持了審計保險假說,檢驗了中國資本市場相關審計訴訟法律制度的政策效應。
[Abstract]:This paper chooses Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies as samples from 2003 to 2013, and takes the change of municipal government officials with exogenous impact characteristics as the starting point. This paper studies the influence of political uncertainty on the probability of receiving audit opinions and its mechanism to verify whether the audit of our country has the function of insurance. The results show that, on the whole, the change of government officials will increase the probability of auditors issuing non-standard audit opinions on the companies in their jurisdiction, but the results are only significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises after grouping according to the nature of property rights. Further tests show that the change of government officials at the municipal level increases the risk level of enterprises, and the results are also significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises. The above results show that auditors will increase the probability of issuing non-standard opinions because of the increase of external political uncertainty. This supports the audit insurance hypothesis and tests the policy effect of the relevant audit litigation legal system in China's capital market.
【作者單位】： 暨南大學管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目(71372167、71602069)資助
【分類號】：F239.4

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本文編號：2380879