發(fā)布時間：2018-08-29 17:23

【摘要】：文章基于委托代理理論、公司治理理論和國內(nèi)制度背景研究了最終控制人對非標(biāo)審計意見的影響,研究了民營上市公司、地方國資委上市公司和中央國資委上市公司經(jīng)營風(fēng)險與非標(biāo)審計意見關(guān)系曲線。發(fā)現(xiàn)民營上市公司被出具非標(biāo)審計意見概率顯著高于地方國資委上市公司,地方國資委上市公司被出具非標(biāo)審計意見概率顯著高于中央國資委上市公司;民營上市公司的經(jīng)營杠桿(代表經(jīng)營風(fēng)險)與非標(biāo)審計意見關(guān)系曲線呈U型,而地方國資委上市公司、中央國資委上市公司經(jīng)營杠桿與非標(biāo)審計意見關(guān)系曲線不呈U型。
[Abstract]:Based on principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory and domestic institutional background, this paper studies the influence of final controller on non-standard audit opinions, and studies private listed companies. Local SASAC listed companies and Central SASAC listed companies operating risk and non-standard audit opinion curve. It is found that the probability of non-standard audit opinions issued by private listed companies is significantly higher than that of local SASAC listed companies, and the probability of local SASAC companies issuing non-standard audit opinions is significantly higher than that of the listed companies of the Central State-owned assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The operating lever (representing the operating risk) and the non-standard audit opinion curve of the private listed company are U type, but the relationship curve between the local SASAC listed company and the Central State-owned assets Supervision Commission listed company and the non-standard audit opinion curve is not U type.
【作者單位】： 北京第二外國語學(xué)院國際商學(xué)院;
【分類號】：F271;F239.4
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本文編號：2211899