本文選題：審計(jì)質(zhì)量 + 客戶重要性��； 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自從改革開(kāi)放以來(lái),中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力不斷增強(qiáng),資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展也是日新月異。在各類企業(yè)從資本市場(chǎng)融得大量資金的過(guò)程中,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的審計(jì)在融資的過(guò)程發(fā)揮了很重要的作用。審計(jì)可以對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表信息的真實(shí)可靠提供一定程度的合理保證,減少財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表出現(xiàn)虛假陳述的可能性,降低投資者掌握企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理情況的信息成本,降低企業(yè)的融資成本,有利于中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展,為中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定增長(zhǎng)保駕護(hù)航。 會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所憑借自己的專業(yè)知識(shí)和品牌聲譽(yù)為被審計(jì)單位提供審計(jì)等服務(wù)并向客戶收取審計(jì)費(fèi)用來(lái)獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,所以會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)重要客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴是否會(huì)損害審計(jì)質(zhì)量便成為了學(xué)術(shù)界和實(shí)務(wù)界關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。特別是近年來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)外大量爆發(fā)的上市公司審計(jì)失敗案例不僅引起了人們對(duì)審計(jì)失敗的關(guān)注,而且引起了人們對(duì)審計(jì)師或會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)審計(jì)客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴是否會(huì)損害審計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性進(jìn)而損害審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)注。更有甚者,審計(jì)師對(duì)一些大型跨國(guó)企業(yè)的審計(jì)失敗丑聞讓人們沒(méi)有理由不懷疑審計(jì)師或會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)審計(jì)客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)獨(dú)立性和審計(jì)質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生不利影響。國(guó)內(nèi)外的許多專家和學(xué)者對(duì)這一熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題給予了充分關(guān)注,分別采用不同的研究方法進(jìn)行了深入研究并將研究結(jié)果發(fā)表在學(xué)術(shù)刊物中,促進(jìn)了相關(guān)研究的進(jìn)一步深入。但這些研究大多數(shù)停留在會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)重要客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴與審計(jì)質(zhì)量關(guān)系的研究上,未考慮到和審計(jì)相關(guān)的一系列機(jī)制環(huán)境對(duì)兩者關(guān)系的影響。外部審計(jì)作為公司治理外部機(jī)制中的重要一環(huán),它與審計(jì)質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系肯定會(huì)受到公司治理內(nèi)部治理水平的影響。如果被審計(jì)單位的公司治理內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制比較完善,各委員會(huì)設(shè)置比較全面,則當(dāng)審計(jì)師與被審計(jì)單位管理層之間存在意見(jiàn)分歧時(shí),董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)等機(jī)構(gòu)人員能夠支持審計(jì)師堅(jiān)持自己的職業(yè)判斷而不會(huì)犧牲審計(jì)獨(dú)立性從而不會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生不利影響。反之,如果被審計(jì)單位的公司治理內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制比較混亂,各委員會(huì)的影響力有限,則不能在審計(jì)師與被審計(jì)單位管理層之間存在意見(jiàn)分歧時(shí)給予充分的支持,從而可能會(huì)造成審計(jì)師屈服于被審計(jì)單位管理層而造成審計(jì)質(zhì)量下降。因此,本文擬考察被審計(jì)單位的公司治理內(nèi)部治理水平對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)重要客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的影響。 首先,本文回顧了現(xiàn)有的研究成果,主要包括客戶重要性與審計(jì)質(zhì)量關(guān)系的研究文獻(xiàn)回顧和公司治理對(duì)客戶重要性與審計(jì)質(zhì)量關(guān)系的影響文獻(xiàn)回顧；其次,分別介紹了公司治理的含義、客戶重要性的含義和審計(jì)質(zhì)量的含義及評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),并將會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所經(jīng)濟(jì)主體理論、準(zhǔn)租理論、獨(dú)立審計(jì)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和系統(tǒng)理論作為研究本文的理論基礎(chǔ)；再次,通過(guò)假設(shè)演繹推理法推導(dǎo)出本文的研究假設(shè)；然后以客戶重要性是否影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量為起點(diǎn),引入公司治理因子,以我國(guó)2012年上市公司為數(shù)據(jù)樣本,根據(jù)假設(shè)建立模型并進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明相對(duì)于同一會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所而言,客戶重要性較高,被審計(jì)單位的可操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)的絕對(duì)值越大,這意味著客戶重要性越高,盈余管理程度越高,審計(jì)質(zhì)量越低。這意味著對(duì)重要客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴影響了審計(jì)師執(zhí)業(yè)的基石——獨(dú)立性。引入公司治理因子以后,客戶重要性與可操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)的絕對(duì)值仍呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,但統(tǒng)計(jì)上不顯著；公司治理與操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)的絕對(duì)值呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,也不顯著；但是客戶重要性與公司治理交叉項(xiàng)與操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)的絕對(duì)值呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系。這表明當(dāng)公司治理水平較低時(shí),客戶重要性與審計(jì)質(zhì)量關(guān)系的負(fù)相關(guān)性更加明顯。這意味著當(dāng)公司治理水平較低時(shí),會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所為了防止被重要客戶解約,做出了讓步與妥協(xié),導(dǎo)致審計(jì)質(zhì)量下降。最后,根據(jù)中國(guó)實(shí)際情況提出研究不足、研究展望及政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the economic strength of China has been increasing and the development of the capital market is changing every day. In the process of melting a large amount of capital from the capital market, the audit of the accounting firm has played an important role in the process of financing. For a certain degree of reasonable guarantee, it can reduce the possibility of false statements in financial statements, reduce the information cost of the investors to master the business management situation, reduce the cost of financing, help the healthy development of China's capital market and protect the stable growth of China's economy.
Accounting firms, with their own professional knowledge and brand reputation, provide audit services to the audited units and collect audit fees to obtain economic benefits. Therefore, whether the accounting firm's economic dependence on important customers will damage the audit quality has become the focus of academic and practical circles. The audit failure cases of a large number of domestic and foreign listed companies not only attract people's attention to audit failure, but also arouse people's attention to whether auditors or accounting firms' economic dependence on auditors will damage the auditor's independence and damage audit quality. The corporate audit failure scandal makes people have no reason to doubt that auditors or accounting firms' economic dependence on auditors will have a negative impact on audit independence and audit quality. Many experts and scholars at home and abroad have given full attention to this hot issue, and the different research methods have been studied in depth. The research results are published in the academic journal, which promotes the further research. However, most of these studies remain in the study of the relationship between the economic dependence of the accounting firms and the audit quality of the important clients, and the influence of a series of mechanisms related to the audit is not considered. The relationship between the audit quality and the audit quality will certainly be affected by the internal governance level of the corporate governance. If the internal governance mechanism of the corporate governance of the audited units is more perfect and the various committees are more comprehensive, when the auditor and the audited unit management are disagreed, the auditor has a disagreement between the auditor and the audited unit management. Agencies such as the board of affairs and the audit committee can support auditors' insisting on their professional judgment without sacrificing audit independence and do not have a negative impact on audit quality. On the other hand, if the internal governance mechanism of the corporate governance of the audited units is confused and the influence of the committees is limited, the auditors can not be audited and tried. It is possible that the auditor will yield to the audit unit management and cause the audit quality to fall. Therefore, this paper intends to examine the economic dependence and audit quality of the internal governance level of the corporate governance of the audited units on the accounting firm for the important clients. The influence of the relationship.
First, this paper reviews the existing research results, including the literature review of the relationship between customer importance and audit quality and the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between customer importance and audit quality. Secondly, it introduces the meaning of corporate governance, the meaning of customer importance and the meaning and evaluation criteria of audit quality. The theory of the economic subject of the accounting firm, the quasi rent theory, the independent audit reputation mechanism and the system theory are used as the theoretical basis of this paper. Thirdly, the hypothesis of this paper is deduced by the hypothetical deductive reasoning method; then the corporate governance factor is introduced with the effect of the importance of the customer's importance on the audit quality as a starting point, and in 2012 of China. The listed companies are the data samples, and the model is built on the basis of the hypothesis. The empirical results show that the more important the customer is, the greater the absolute value of the maneuverability of the audited units is relative to the same accounting firm, which means that the higher the customer's importance, the higher the earnings management, the lower the audit quality. After introducing corporate governance factors, the customer importance and the absolute value of the maneuverability are still positively correlated, but the statistics are not significant; the corporate governance and the absolute value of the maneuverability are negatively related, but not significant; but customers There is a significant positive correlation between the importance and the absolute value of the maneuverability accruals. This indicates that the negative correlation between the customer importance and the audit quality is more obvious when the corporate governance level is low. Step and compromise lead to the decline of audit quality. Finally, according to the actual situation of China, we put forward research deficiencies, research prospects and policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F275;F239.4

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本文編號(hào)：2042988