本文選題：審計(jì)質(zhì)量 + 政府監(jiān)管　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2008年博士論文

【摘要】：審計(jì)質(zhì)量一直以來都是審計(jì)領(lǐng)域研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)對(duì)于保證上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量、提高資本市場(chǎng)配置效率的作用顯而易見。但是,由于審計(jì)行業(yè)自身的特點(diǎn),現(xiàn)實(shí)中審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下、審計(jì)師和上市公司“共謀”的現(xiàn)象卻屢見不鮮。例如,在震驚全球的“安然事件”中,安達(dá)信會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所長(zhǎng)期為其隱瞞虧損的事實(shí),并在安然事件東窗事發(fā)前大量銷毀相關(guān)審計(jì)資料。此后,“世界通訊”、“環(huán)球電訊”、“施樂”等愈演愈烈的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞也將當(dāng)時(shí)的“五大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所全部牽涉其中。在國(guó)內(nèi),從著名的“老三案(深圳原野、海南中水國(guó)際、長(zhǎng)城機(jī)電)”、“新三案(瓊民源、紅光實(shí)業(yè)、東方鍋爐)”,到“藍(lán)田股份”、“億安科技”、“秦豐農(nóng)業(yè)”、“科龍電器”,上市公司財(cái)務(wù)丑聞陸續(xù)被曝光的同時(shí),幕后總有一個(gè)“合謀者”的影子:大大小小的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所。類似浮出水面的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞,上市公司造假案例也清晰地呈現(xiàn)出“十假九同謀”的特點(diǎn),屢屢上演“警察”與“大盜”沆瀣一氣的丑劇。這一系列涉及審計(jì)師的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞的相繼出現(xiàn),使得審計(jì)質(zhì)量問題變得更加引人注目。 然而,國(guó)內(nèi)外系列財(cái)務(wù)丑聞的出現(xiàn)并非偶然,暴露的問題相當(dāng)多,但審計(jì)行業(yè)監(jiān)管不力卻是眾多問題中最為突出的。如何加強(qiáng)對(duì)審計(jì)行業(yè)的政府監(jiān)管以提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量因此成為理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界共同關(guān)注的一個(gè)焦點(diǎn)問題。本文正是從這一角度來研究審計(jì)質(zhì)量問題的,研究思路如下:首先,在分析審計(jì)市場(chǎng)失靈的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、政府規(guī)制等相關(guān)理論,系統(tǒng)分析了政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的作用機(jī)制;其次,分析目前國(guó)際上典型的三類審計(jì)監(jiān)管模式及其適用條件,得出我國(guó)的監(jiān)管模式應(yīng)是“政府監(jiān)管為主、行業(yè)自律為輔”的結(jié)論,并對(duì)我國(guó)目前審計(jì)監(jiān)管體系存在的不足進(jìn)行了深入剖析;再次,以我國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師出具的處罰公告為樣本,從政府監(jiān)管的視角考察審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素,并從政府規(guī)則與政府懲戒兩個(gè)角度考察了我國(guó)政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的效果;最后,基于本文研究的結(jié)果,提出了相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議。 本文共分八章,各章的主要內(nèi)容如下: 第1章導(dǎo)論,引出研究問題,對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量與政府監(jiān)管的有關(guān)概念重新進(jìn)行了界定,并提出本文的研究路徑和框架。本章將審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素分為直接影響因素和間接影響因素兩個(gè)層次,政府監(jiān)管作為間接影響因素,通過對(duì)審計(jì)師自身因素或公司治理的影響實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的改進(jìn);而對(duì)于審計(jì)質(zhì)量的直接影響因素,除了傳統(tǒng)的專業(yè)技能和獨(dú)立性以外,提出審計(jì)師職業(yè)謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度是影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量的第三個(gè)直接因素。 第2章文獻(xiàn)綜述。在對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究領(lǐng)域中關(guān)于審計(jì)質(zhì)量的實(shí)證研究成果進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者將現(xiàn)有研究文獻(xiàn)中關(guān)于政府監(jiān)管和審計(jì)質(zhì)量的研究分為兩大類:(1)以監(jiān)管結(jié)果作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),(2)政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響效果分析。前者主要是以審計(jì)師遭受的法律訴訟或處罰結(jié)果作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下的替代指標(biāo),研究審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素;后者主要是關(guān)于我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)某些監(jiān)管政策的效力檢驗(yàn)與處罰公告的分析性統(tǒng)計(jì)研究。 第3章政府監(jiān)管與審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的理論分析。本章目的主要是為本文的研究主題提供理論框架,首先運(yùn)用受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任理論揭示審計(jì)的本質(zhì)在于“控制”,并從價(jià)值增值角度認(rèn)為審計(jì)增值功能的實(shí)現(xiàn)需要高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的保證;緊接著,分析了現(xiàn)有審計(jì)委托模式對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響,認(rèn)為其造成了我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的失靈——高質(zhì)量需求不足與低質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的供給;然后,結(jié)合管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論,在對(duì)三大管制理論進(jìn)行分析評(píng)價(jià)后,認(rèn)為公共利益理論能更好地為我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管提供理論依據(jù);最后,從理論上詳細(xì)分析了我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的政府監(jiān)管措施對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的作用機(jī)制。 第4章我國(guó)審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式與監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀。本章在對(duì)三種審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式分析評(píng)價(jià)之后,指出我國(guó)目前的審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式;然后,針對(duì)我國(guó)各監(jiān)管主體的監(jiān)管實(shí)踐,指出當(dāng)前監(jiān)管體系中存在的問題,為實(shí)證分析埋下伏筆。 第5章政府監(jiān)管視角的審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響因素分析。本章以證監(jiān)會(huì)2002-2006再次,以我國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師出具的處罰公告為樣本,從政府監(jiān)管的視角考察審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素,并從政府規(guī)則與政府懲戒兩個(gè)角度考察了我國(guó)政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的效果;最后,基于本文研究的結(jié)果,提出了相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議。 本文共分八章,各章的主要內(nèi)容如下: 第1章導(dǎo)論,引出研究問題,對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量與政府監(jiān)管的有關(guān)概念重新進(jìn)行了界定,并提出本文的研究路徑和框架。本章將審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素分為直接影響因素和間接影響因素兩個(gè)層次,政府監(jiān)管作為間接影響因素,通過對(duì)審計(jì)師自身因素或公司治理的影響實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的改進(jìn);而對(duì)于審計(jì)質(zhì)量的直接影響因素,除了傳統(tǒng)的專業(yè)技能和獨(dú)立性以外,提出審計(jì)師職業(yè)謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度是影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量的第三個(gè)直接因素。 第2章文獻(xiàn)綜述。在對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究領(lǐng)域中關(guān)于審計(jì)質(zhì)量的實(shí)證研究成果進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者將現(xiàn)有研究文獻(xiàn)中關(guān)于政府監(jiān)管和審計(jì)質(zhì)量的研究分為兩大類:(1)以監(jiān)管結(jié)果作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),(2)政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響效果分析。前者主要是以審計(jì)師遭受的法律訴訟或處罰結(jié)果作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下的替代指標(biāo),研究審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素;后者主要是關(guān)于我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)某些監(jiān)管政策的效力檢驗(yàn)與處罰公告的分析性統(tǒng)計(jì)研究。 第3章政府監(jiān)管與審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的理論分析。本章目的主要是為本文的研究主題提供理論框架,首先運(yùn)用受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任理論揭示審計(jì)的本質(zhì)在于“控制”,并從價(jià)值增值角度認(rèn)為審計(jì)增值功能的實(shí)現(xiàn)需要高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的保證;緊接著,分析了現(xiàn)有審計(jì)委托模式對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響,認(rèn)為其造成了我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的失靈——高質(zhì)量需求不足與低質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的供給;然后,結(jié)合管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論,在對(duì)三大管制理論進(jìn)行分析評(píng)價(jià)后,認(rèn)為公共利益理論能更好地為我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管提供理論依據(jù);最后,從理論上詳細(xì)分析了我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的政府監(jiān)管措施對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的作用機(jī)制。 第4章我國(guó)審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式與監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀。本章在對(duì)三種審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式分析評(píng)價(jià)之后,指出我國(guó)目前的審計(jì)質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式;然后,針對(duì)我國(guó)各監(jiān)管主體的監(jiān)管實(shí)踐,指出當(dāng)前監(jiān)管體系中存在的問題,為實(shí)證分析埋下伏筆。 第5章政府監(jiān)管視角的審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響因素分析。本章以證監(jiān)會(huì)2002-2006接因素進(jìn)而實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響。 第三,本文修正創(chuàng)新了審計(jì)質(zhì)量衡量指標(biāo)與有關(guān)模型。在檢驗(yàn)審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響因素時(shí),以證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師的行政處罰作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量替代變量,較好地將政府監(jiān)管與審計(jì)質(zhì)量聯(lián)系起來;并且,通過引入“審計(jì)師強(qiáng)制輪換”變量創(chuàng)新了Lennox審計(jì)意見估計(jì)模型,以檢驗(yàn)強(qiáng)制輪換制對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的效果。
[Abstract]:The quality of audit has always been a hot issue in the field of audit. The effect of high quality audit service on guaranteeing the quality of information disclosure of listed companies and improving the efficiency of capital market allocation is obvious. However, due to the characteristics of the audit industry itself, the quality of audit is low in reality and the phenomenon of "conspiracy" between auditors and listed companies is a phenomenon. For example, in the "Enron incident" that shocked the world, Andersen's accounting firm has long been the fact that it was concealing the loss and destroyed a lot of audit information before the Enron incident. Since then, the "world newsletter", "global telecommunications", "Xerox" and other growing financial scandals are also the "five big". Accounting firms are all involved. In China, from the famous "old case (Shenzhen field, Hainan medium water international, the Great Wall Mechatronics)", "the new three cases (Qiong Minyuan, Hongguang industry, Oriental boiler)", "Lantian shares", "100 million an Technology", "Qin Fengnong", "kologne", the financial scandals of listed companies have been exposed in succession. Behind the scenes, there is always a "conspire" behind the scenes: large and small accounting firms, similar to the financial scandals that come out of the water, and the listed company's counterfeiting cases are clearly showing the characteristics of "ten false nine conspirators", and the series of "police" and "robber" scandals. Audit quality has become more noticeable.
However, the emergence of a series of financial scandals at home and abroad is not accidental, and there are quite a lot of problems exposed, but the poor supervision of the audit industry is the most prominent among many problems. How to strengthen the government supervision of the audit industry to improve the audit quality has become a focal point in both the theoretical and practical circles. This paper is from this angle. The research ideas are as follows: first, on the basis of the analysis of the failure of the audit market, combined with the related theories of regulation economics and government regulation, this paper systematically analyzes the mechanism of government regulation on the improvement of audit quality. Secondly, it analyzes the typical three types of audit supervision modes and their applicable conditions in the world. The supervision mode of our country should be the conclusion that "the government supervision is the main, the industry self-discipline is supplemented", and the shortcomings of the current audit supervision system in our country are deeply analyzed. Again, the impact factors of the audit quality are investigated from the angle of government supervision and the government regulations. The effect of government supervision on the improvement of audit quality is examined from two angles of government discipline. Finally, based on the results of this study, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.
This article is divided into eight chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research problems, redefines the concept of audit quality and government supervision, and puts forward the research path and framework of this paper. This chapter divides the factors of audit quality into two levels, the direct influence factor and the indirect influence factor, the government supervision is the indirect influence factor, through the auditor self cause In addition to the traditional professional skills and independence, the third direct factors that affect the audit quality are the direct influence factors of the audit quality, except for the traditional professional skills and independence.
The second chapter is a literature review. On the basis of a systematic review of the results of the empirical research on audit quality in the existing research fields, the author divides the research on government supervision and audit quality into two categories: (1) taking the regulatory results as the audit quality standard, and (2) the effect of government supervision on audit quality. The former mainly takes the auditor's legal action or the result of punishment as an alternative to the low audit quality, and studies the influencing factors of the audit quality; the latter is mainly about the analysis of the analysis of the effectiveness and punishment bulletins of some regulatory policies in the securities market of our country.
The third chapter is the theoretical analysis of government supervision and audit quality improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the subject of this paper. First, the essence of audit is "control" by using the theory of trustee economic responsibility. This paper analyzes the influence of the existing audit entrustment mode on the audit quality, and thinks that it causes the failure of the audit market in our country - the shortage of high quality demand and the supply of low quality audit services; then, after the analysis and evaluation of the three major control theories, the theory of public interest can better be audited for our country after the analysis and evaluation of the theory of control economics. The theoretical basis for market regulation is provided. Finally, the mechanism of government regulation in China's audit market is analyzed theoretically.
The fourth chapter of China's audit quality supervision mode and supervision status. After the analysis and evaluation of the three audit quality supervision modes, this chapter points out the current audit quality supervision mode of our country; then, it points out the existing problems in the current regulatory system in accordance with the supervision practice of various regulatory bodies in our country, and buries the positive analysis for the empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter analysis of the influence factors of audit quality from the perspective of government supervision. This chapter takes the CSRC 2002-2006 again, taking the punishments issued by the CSRC as the sample, inspects the influence factors of the audit quality from the perspective of government supervision and inspects the audit quality of our government supervision from the two angles of government rules and government punishment. Finally, based on the results of this study, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.
This article is divided into eight chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research problems, redefines the concept of audit quality and government supervision, and puts forward the research path and framework of this paper. This chapter divides the factors of audit quality into two levels, the direct influence factor and the indirect influence factor, the government supervision is the indirect influence factor, through the auditor self cause In addition to the traditional professional skills and independence, the third direct factors that affect the audit quality are the direct influence factors of the audit quality, except for the traditional professional skills and independence.
The second chapter is a literature review. On the basis of a systematic review of the results of the empirical research on audit quality in the existing research fields, the author divides the research on government supervision and audit quality into two categories: (1) taking the regulatory results as the audit quality standard, and (2) the effect of government supervision on audit quality. The former mainly takes the auditor's legal action or the result of punishment as an alternative to the low audit quality, and studies the influencing factors of the audit quality; the latter is mainly about the analysis of the analysis of the effectiveness and punishment bulletins of some regulatory policies in the securities market of our country.
The third chapter is the theoretical analysis of government supervision and audit quality improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the subject of this paper. First, the essence of audit is "control" by using the theory of trustee economic responsibility. This paper analyzes the influence of the existing audit entrustment mode on the audit quality, and thinks that it causes the failure of the audit market in our country - the shortage of high quality demand and the supply of low quality audit services; then, after the analysis and evaluation of the three major control theories, the theory of public interest can better be audited for our country after the analysis and evaluation of the theory of control economics. The theoretical basis for market regulation is provided. Finally, the mechanism of government regulation in China's audit market is analyzed theoretically.
The fourth chapter of China's audit quality supervision mode and supervision status. After the analysis and evaluation of the three audit quality supervision modes, this chapter points out the current audit quality supervision mode of our country; then, it points out the existing problems in the current regulatory system in accordance with the supervision practice of various regulatory bodies in our country, and buries the positive analysis for the empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter analyzes the influencing factors of audit quality from the perspective of government regulation. This chapter takes 2002-2006 factors of the SFC to achieve the impact on audit quality.
Third, this article revises the audit quality measurement index and the related model. In the test of the audit quality influence factors, the administrative punishment of the CSRC to the auditor is the substitute variable of audit quality, and the government supervision and audit quality are connected well. And the Lennox trial is innovated by introducing the "auditor's forced rotation" variable. The model of opinion estimation is used to test the effect of mandatory rotation system on audit quality improvement.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 李奇峽;;基于政府指導(dǎo)價(jià)的審計(jì)溢價(jià)研究——基于A股2003-2012年研究數(shù)據(jù)[J];商業(yè)會(huì)計(jì);2014年12期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 孫婷;政府審計(jì)治理功能研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

2 段特奇;低價(jià)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、價(jià)格管制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2012年

3 謝柳芳;政府審計(jì)、政府信息披露與政府治理效率研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

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