本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 方案設(shè)計　； 參考：《安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵作為公司管理的一種長期激勵手段,在有效減少委托代理成本、激勵高管努力工作以及提高公司業(yè)績水平等方面擁有不可替代的重要作用。然而西方的理論和實踐已經(jīng)表明股權(quán)激勵實施會存在問題。2006年《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》的出臺拉開了我國股權(quán)激勵的序幕,越來越多的企業(yè)開始實施股權(quán)激勵。當(dāng)前國內(nèi)的相關(guān)研究大多基于股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系的檢驗,很少從方案設(shè)計角度考察股權(quán)激勵有效性。如果設(shè)計不合理,必定會影響到實施效果。 有鑒于此,本文以國資控股公司的激勵方案特征為對象展開研究。選擇了從2006年至今的400多家上市公司,通過大樣本的統(tǒng)計分析和國企生益科技、民企得潤電子的具體方案比較分析,來研究股權(quán)激勵的有效性。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)我國國資控股企業(yè)在激勵方案設(shè)計上存在以下問題：(1)激勵模式單一,大多使用股票期權(quán)和限制性股票,其他模式很少涉及。(2)激勵對象集中,國企主要是高管居多,核心技術(shù)人員少,民企比較平均。(3)有效期較短,國企一般3到5年,民營多數(shù)5年以上。(4)行權(quán)價格偏低,國企平均價格低于民營企業(yè)。(5)考核指標(biāo)單一,基本是凈資產(chǎn)收益率、凈利潤增長率等財務(wù)指標(biāo),很少選取非財務(wù)指標(biāo)。這些問題都表明國資控股企業(yè)存在的治理結(jié)構(gòu)和內(nèi)部人控制問題使股權(quán)激勵成為高管謀取私利的手段。 本文研究結(jié)果意味著要想讓國有企業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵更加有效,我們必須關(guān)注和強化激勵方案設(shè)計的重要性。并通過完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、健全法律法規(guī)和市場機制以及改進設(shè)計方法等措施來優(yōu)化國資控股公司股權(quán)激勵的發(fā)展。這樣才能使股權(quán)激勵方案效果更加明顯。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive in corporate management, equity incentive plays an irreplaceable role in reducing the cost of principal-agent, encouraging executives to work hard and improving the level of corporate performance. However, the western theory and practice have shown that there will be problems in the implementation of equity incentive. In 2006, the introduction of "Stock incentive Management measures of listed companies" opened the prologue of equity incentive in China, and more and more enterprises began to implement equity incentive. At present, most of the domestic researches are based on the test of the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and rarely investigate the effectiveness of equity incentive from the point of view of scheme design. If the design is not reasonable, will certainly affect the implementation effect. In view of this, this paper focuses on the characteristics of incentive schemes of state-owned holding companies. More than 400 listed companies from 2006 to now have been selected to study the effectiveness of equity incentive through statistical analysis of large samples and comparative analysis of the specific schemes of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. The results show that there are the following problems in the incentive scheme design of state-owned holding enterprises in China: (1) the incentive model is single, most of them use stock options and restricted stocks, and the other models rarely involve the concentration of incentive objects. The majority of state-owned enterprises are senior executives. The number of core technicians is small, the average validity period of private enterprises is relatively short, the state-owned enterprises are generally three to five years old, the private majority of them are more than five years old, the price of exercising power is on the low side, the average price of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of the private enterprises, and the assessment index is single, and basically is the rate of return on net assets. Net profit growth rate and other financial indicators, rarely select non-financial indicators. These problems indicate that the governance structure and insider control of state-owned holding enterprises make equity incentive a means for executives to seek personal benefits. The result of this paper means that in order to make the equity incentive of state-owned enterprises more effective, we must pay attention to and strengthen the importance of incentive scheme design. Through perfecting the corporate governance structure, perfecting the laws, regulations and market mechanism, and improving the design method to optimize the development of the equity incentive of the state-owned holding company. Only in this way can the effect of equity incentive scheme be more obvious.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F276.6

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