本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 股利分配　； 參考：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)兩權(quán)分離的制度背景下,由于利益相關(guān)者之間存在嚴(yán)重的利益沖突以及信息不對(duì)稱性,便產(chǎn)生了委托代理問題,如何平衡好委托人與代理人之間的關(guān)系以及降低代理成本是各大公司重點(diǎn)關(guān)注的問題,也是國內(nèi)外學(xué)者致力于研究的問題之一。根據(jù)股利代理成本理論,實(shí)施高股利支付率政策有利于降低因經(jīng)理人與股東之間代理沖突而引發(fā)的代理成本;而股權(quán)激勵(lì)通過向公司經(jīng)理人賦予一定的公司股權(quán),使其與股東共享利益、共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),從而使二者利益目標(biāo)趨同,降低代理成本。那么,同樣是解決代理問題的兩種途徑,股利分配政策是否會(huì)因?yàn)楣蓹?quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施發(fā)生變化呢?本文以2006年1月1日《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》正式實(shí)施以來,截止2013年12月31日首次披露股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃并實(shí)施的A股上市公司為研究對(duì)象,采用實(shí)證方法研究分析了中國上市公司中實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的公司,其股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案推出前和股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案推出后對(duì)股利支付水平有何影響?不同的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式對(duì)股利政策的影響有何不同?在中國上市公司特殊治理環(huán)境的下,公司高管是否會(huì)為了爭取自身期權(quán)價(jià)值最大化而在股利分配政策制定過程中產(chǎn)生某種機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?本文從上述幾個(gè)角度出發(fā),對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)和股利分配政策二者之間的關(guān)系展開探討。本文共分六章:第一章為緒論,主要介紹里研究背景與研究意義,研究方法與研究框架以及創(chuàng)新之處;第二章為文獻(xiàn)綜述,從國內(nèi)外角度對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與股利分配的關(guān)系、管理層權(quán)力與股權(quán)激勵(lì)和股利分配關(guān)系的研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行梳理;第三章為相關(guān)理論,首先介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)概念,并介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ),包括委托代理理論、不完全契約理論、管理層權(quán)力理論;其次介紹了股利分配的相關(guān)理論,包括代理理論、信號(hào)理論、一鳥在手理論、稅差理論、客戶效應(yīng)理論;第四章為研究設(shè)計(jì),該部分主要是為下一章的實(shí)證分析提供準(zhǔn)備,主要包括研究假設(shè)的提出、樣本選擇和數(shù)據(jù)來源、研究設(shè)計(jì);第五章為實(shí)證分析,該部分采用線性回歸分析法,進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),并作出實(shí)證分析。第六章為實(shí)證結(jié)論以及相關(guān)建議,主要是對(duì)前文實(shí)證分析的結(jié)論進(jìn)行概括總結(jié),并提出相關(guān)建議。本文通過對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃推出前后、股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式、管理層權(quán)力這三個(gè)因素進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,得出如下結(jié)論:(1)在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司中,相對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案推出前,股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案推出后有更低的股利支付水平;(2)相對(duì)于激勵(lì)方案中采用限制性股票模式的公司,采用股票期權(quán)模式的公司更傾向于降低股利支付水平;(3)管理層權(quán)力越大,股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)股利分配的影響越小,越傾向于提高股利支付水平,以獲取眼前利益。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn):(1)研究了不同的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式對(duì)股利政策的影響。(2)從縱向分析的視角來研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)與股利分配政策的關(guān)系。(3)豐富了研究樣本,對(duì)樣本進(jìn)行了更加詳細(xì)的篩選。通過本文的實(shí)證研究,對(duì)中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與股利政策的制定和監(jiān)管具有一定的參考價(jià)值:(1)設(shè)計(jì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí),應(yīng)將股利支付行為納入考慮,選擇合理的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式。(2)為了保護(hù)其他股東的切身利益,應(yīng)防止股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)象過度的操縱股利政策,加強(qiáng)對(duì)股利分配的監(jiān)管和披露。(3)加強(qiáng)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)機(jī)制的建設(shè),保證董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性,切勿使得管理層利用權(quán)力控制董事會(huì)決策制定。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the separation of two rights in modern enterprises, due to the serious conflict of interests and information asymmetry among the stakeholders, the problem of principal-agent is produced. How to balance the relationship between the principal and the agent and reduce the agency cost is the focus of the major companies, and also the scholars at home and abroad are devoted to research. One of the problems, according to the theory of the agency cost of dividend, the implementation of the high dividend payment rate policy is beneficial to reduce the agency cost caused by the agent conflict between the manager and the shareholders, and the equity incentive can share the interests with the shareholders and share the risk by giving the company managers a certain share of the company's equity, thus making the two party's interest goal. The same, reduce the agency cost. Then, the same is the two way to solve the agency problem, whether the dividend distribution policy will change because of the implementation of equity incentive? This paper, since the January 1, 2006 "listed company equity incentive management method >" since the formal implementation, the deadline for the first disclosure of equity incentive plan and the implementation of the A shares listed in December 31, 2013. The company is the research object and uses an empirical method to analyze the influence of the equity incentive scheme on the dividend payment level before the introduction of equity incentive scheme and the introduction of equity incentive scheme in Chinese listed companies. In order to control the environment, will the company executives produce some opportunistic behavior in the process of dividend distribution policy in order to maximize the value of their own options? From the above points, this paper discusses the relationship between the two parties. This article is divided into six chapters: the first chapter is the introduction. The research background and significance of research, research methods and research framework and innovation are introduced. The second chapter is literature review, the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution, the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution, the relationship between management power and equity incentive and dividend distribution, and the third chapter is related theory, first of all, the equity incentive is introduced. Related concepts, and introduce the theoretical basis of equity incentive, including principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory, management level power theory. Secondly, it introduces the related theories of dividend distribution, including agency theory, signal theory, one bird in hand theory, tax difference theory, customer effect theory, and the fourth chapter is the research and design, this part is the main part It is to provide preparation for the empirical analysis of the next chapter, mainly including research hypothesis, sample selection and data sources, research and design; the fifth chapter is empirical analysis, this part uses linear regression analysis, empirical test, and empirical analysis. The sixth chapter is the empirical conclusion and related suggestions, mainly to the previous empirical analysis. The conclusions are summarized and some suggestions are put forward. Through the empirical study on the three factors of equity incentive model and management power, the following conclusions are made: (1) in the listed companies carrying out the equity incentive plan, the equity incentive scheme is more than before the introduction of the equity incentive scheme. Low dividend payment level; (2) the company adopting the stock option model is more inclined to lower the dividend payment level relative to the incentive scheme adopting the restrictive stock mode. (3) the greater the power of the management, the smaller the influence of the equity incentive to the dividend distribution, the more inclined to raise the dividend payment level, in order to gain the immediate interest. New points: (1) study the influence of different equity incentive modes on dividend policy. (2) study the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution policy from the perspective of vertical analysis. (3) enrich the research samples and make more detailed screening of samples. Through this empirical study, the ownership incentive and dividend policy of Chinese listed companies is made. Definite and supervision have certain reference value: (1) when designing the equity incentive scheme, we should take the dividend payment behavior into consideration and choose reasonable equity incentive mode. (2) in order to protect the interests of other shareholders, it is necessary to prevent the excessive manipulation of dividend policy by the shareholders and strengthen the supervision and disclosure of the dividend distribution. (3) strengthen the corporate governance. To ensure the independence of the board of directors, we should not make management use the power to control the decision-making of the board of directors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.92

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