期權(quán)契約下多競爭零售商的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) 期權(quán)契約 突發(fā)事件 出處:《上海交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:隨著全球生產(chǎn)與采購、精益生產(chǎn)、外包非核心業(yè)務(wù)成為全球生產(chǎn)的大趨勢,越來越多的企業(yè)在提高核心競爭力的同時,,應(yīng)對供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險的能力越來越弱,供應(yīng)鏈中斷風(fēng)險隨之加劇。本文運(yùn)用契約理論、博弈論、金融工程理論等,研究了期權(quán)契約下多競爭零售商的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題,并結(jié)合理論和數(shù)值分析討論協(xié)調(diào)性能。 本文的主要研究如下: (1)建立“單制造商-多零售商”單周期兩階段的期權(quán)契約基本模型。對比報童模型和期權(quán)契約模型下的最優(yōu)訂貨量和利潤。期權(quán)契約下的模型相比報童模型能增加供應(yīng)鏈的柔性,使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到較高的利潤水平。制造商應(yīng)制定合適的期權(quán)參數(shù)。并對參數(shù)進(jìn)行了敏感性分析。 (2)建立期權(quán)契約下“單制造商-多零售商”單周期兩階段供應(yīng)鏈應(yīng)對突發(fā)事件的基本模型。研究了未發(fā)生突發(fā)事件時,制造商和零售商的決策,通過設(shè)置期權(quán)契約參數(shù)使得分散供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到集成供應(yīng)鏈的水平。發(fā)生突發(fā)事件后,零售商會根據(jù)突發(fā)事件對市場的影響情況來決定是否要追加訂貨,制造商會根據(jù)零售商的決策來決定是否要追加生產(chǎn),以最大化自己的收益。并對參數(shù)進(jìn)行了敏感性分析。
[Abstract]:With the global production and procurement, lean production, outsourcing non-core business become a major trend of global production, more and more enterprises in improving their core competitiveness, the ability to cope with supply chain risks is becoming weaker and weaker. In this paper, the supply chain coordination problem of multi-competitive retailers under option contract is studied by using contract theory, game theory and financial engineering theory, and the coordination performance is discussed based on the theory and numerical analysis. The main research of this paper is as follows:. 1) the basic model of "single manufacturer-multi-retailer" option contract is established. The optimal order quantity and profit under newsboy model and option contract model are compared. The model under option contract can increase compared with newsboy model. Plus supply chain flexibility, In order to make the supply chain reach a higher profit level, the manufacturer should make appropriate option parameters, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed. The basic model of one-cycle two-stage supply chain response to emergencies under option contract is established. The decision of manufacturer and retailer in the absence of emergency is studied. By setting option contract parameters, the decentralized supply chain can reach the level of integrated supply chain. The manufacturer will decide whether to increase production according to the decision of the retailer in order to maximize its profit. The sensitivity analysis of the parameters is also given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F224;F274
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