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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：康得新公司股權(quán)激勵有效性及影響因素研究　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 康得新公司 股權(quán)激勵 有效性 影響因素

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的相分離引發(fā)了管理者和所有者在公司經(jīng)營決策時產(chǎn)生代理矛盾。股權(quán)激勵在西方被認(rèn)為能夠削弱代理成本,使得管理者和所有者目標(biāo)趨于一致。在借鑒國外經(jīng)驗后,我國很多公司也采用授予公司雇員特別是管理人員股票期權(quán)的方式來對其進(jìn)行激勵。然而不少國內(nèi)的經(jīng)驗研究表明,我國不少上市公司的股權(quán)激勵并沒有達(dá)到預(yù)期的效果,其原因在于股權(quán)激勵方案被設(shè)計成變相的利益輸送,或成為大股東與管理層合謀“掏空”上市公司的工具。因此,股權(quán)激勵對上市公司的業(yè)績影響迄今存在三種不同的假說：激勵假說、管理層福利假說和“掏空”假說。上市公司股權(quán)激勵方案效果如何,究竟是符合激勵假說,還是管理層福利或者“掏空”假說；上市公司在何種治理環(huán)境下股權(quán)激勵方案才能取得良好的激勵效果?這些問題的研究對于評判上市公司股權(quán)激勵方案的有效性,對于上市公司利益相關(guān)者的決策均具有重要意義。 康得新公司是2010年上市的高科技民營上市公司,自2011起連續(xù)推出三期面向企業(yè)高管和技術(shù)人員的股權(quán)激勵方案,引起市場廣泛關(guān)注。本文以康得新公司股票期權(quán)激勵方案為研究對象,對公司股權(quán)激勵方案的實施效果進(jìn)行評估,并從大股東、董事會和審計機(jī)構(gòu)三個方面研究影響公司股權(quán)激勵方案有效性的因素。 本文通過案例研究得出以下結(jié)論：康得新公司股權(quán)激勵方案從總體上符合激勵假說,對康得新公司的高管和核心技術(shù)人員實施了有效的激勵,企業(yè)財務(wù)業(yè)績顯著提升,股權(quán)激勵方案得到了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的廣泛認(rèn)同,市場反應(yīng)良好。本文認(rèn)為,康得新公司具有技術(shù)研發(fā)背景、擁有股權(quán)分享理念并能對上市公司實施穩(wěn)定控制的大股東對股權(quán)激勵方案的有效性具有決定性作用；康得新公司董事會的規(guī)模、知識結(jié)構(gòu)和能力結(jié)構(gòu)以及審計機(jī)構(gòu)的聲譽也對康得新公司股權(quán)激勵方案有效性產(chǎn)生了重要影響。 本文對于民營上市公司設(shè)計有效的股權(quán)激勵方案,營造良好的股權(quán)激勵環(huán)境具有重要的借鑒價值；對于上市公司的利益相關(guān)者評判股權(quán)激勵方案的有效性也能夠提供有意義的參考。
[Abstract]:The separation of lead managers and owners have problems of agency in the management decision of company ownership and management of modern enterprises. The equity incentive in the west is that can reduce agency cost, so the administrator and the owner are consistent. In reference to foreign experience, many companies in China are used to grant employees especially the management of stock option the way to incentive them. However, many domestic empirical research shows that equity incentive in China's many listed companies did not achieve the desired effect, the reason is that the equity incentive program is designed as a disguised transfer of benefits, or become a major shareholder and management collusion tunneling tool. Therefore, equity incentive effect on the performance of listed companies have three different hypotheses: incentive hypothesis, welfare management hypothesis and the "tunneling" hypothesis listed. The effect of equity incentive plan, what is in line with the incentive hypothesis, or the management of welfare or "tunneling" hypothesis; listed company governance environment in which the equity incentive plan in order to achieve a good incentive effect on the effectiveness of these problems? The incentive scheme for evaluation of shares of listed companies, listed companies for stakeholders in decision-making it is of great significance.
Kangdexin is 2010 listed high-tech private listed company, since 2011 consecutive three to launch equity for business executives and technical staff incentive scheme, caused widespread concern in the market. This paper kangdexin stock option incentive scheme as the research object, to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the company's equity incentive plan, and from large shareholders the factors of equity incentive effectiveness of the board of directors and audit three aspects to research the influence of the company.
Through the case study draws the following conclusions: equity incentive plan kangdexin companies in general in line with the incentive hypothesis, the implementation of effective incentive for kangdexin company executives and key technical personnel, enterprise financial performance significantly enhance the equity incentive program has been widely recognized by institutional investors, the market response is good. This paper argues that Kang Xin company has R & D background, ownership share ideas and can play a decisive role on the effectiveness of the implementation of the listed company shareholders stable control of equity incentive programs; director Kang Xin company will scale, knowledge structure and ability structure and audit the reputation of the institution on the equity incentive plan of kangdexin company has produced important effect.
This article has important reference value for private listed companies to design effective equity incentive programs and create a favorable stock incentive environment. It also provides meaningful reference for stakeholders of listed companies to evaluate the effectiveness of equity incentive programs.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F272.92;F426.72

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