本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于產(chǎn)權(quán)“漂移”視角下的專業(yè)合作社可持續(xù)信用合作研究　出處：《安徽財經(jīng)大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 專業(yè)合作社 產(chǎn)權(quán)漂移 信用合作 組織場域

【摘要】：通過發(fā)展專業(yè)合作社將農(nóng)民組織起來合作生產(chǎn)是基于農(nóng)村地區(qū)經(jīng)濟不發(fā)達情況下解決“三農(nóng)”問題的有益嘗試,在合作社發(fā)展過程中開展信用合作是農(nóng)村金融市場不發(fā)達條件下的現(xiàn)實選擇,基于合作社開展信用合作有助于實現(xiàn)農(nóng)村現(xiàn)代化、農(nóng)業(yè)機械化和農(nóng)民城鎮(zhèn)化。但在合作社發(fā)展過程中,由于初始資源稟賦不同導致合作社社員異質(zhì)差距較大,導致合作社發(fā)生了不同程度的產(chǎn)權(quán)“漂移”,影響了合作社信用合作的可持續(xù)性。 本文通過對回顧相關(guān)文獻和對問卷調(diào)查進行數(shù)據(jù)分析的研究表明,普遍存在的合作社社員異質(zhì)性影響了合作社產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的“漂移”,導致合作社信用合作過程中普遍存在的普通社員農(nóng)戶投入不足,而普通農(nóng)戶社員對合作社的投入不足不僅使其難以分享合作社發(fā)展紅利,更加劇了合作社產(chǎn)權(quán)向核心社員“漂移”的進程,又進一步影響合作社信用合作的發(fā)展。 普通農(nóng)戶社員通過增加對合作社的投入能夠改變與核心社員在合作社產(chǎn)權(quán)博弈過程中相對議價能力,能夠遲滯合作社產(chǎn)權(quán)向核心社員“漂移”的趨勢,但其效果取決于核心社員在普通農(nóng)戶社員投入過程中的配合。對普通農(nóng)戶社員與核心社員的的產(chǎn)權(quán)演化博弈分析的結(jié)果表明,普通農(nóng)戶社員選擇投入而核心社員選擇“攫取”的博弈能夠達到ESS穩(wěn)定,即能夠保證合作社及其信用合作的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,前提是普通農(nóng)戶社員與核心社員的產(chǎn)權(quán)演化博弈是正和的,即普通農(nóng)戶社員投入與核心社員“攫取”的收益大于其作出其它選擇的收益。 本文通過以合作社組織為中心構(gòu)建一個組織場域,將合作社納入一個充滿制度性規(guī)范的組織場域,組織中實存的其它組織、正式的政策法規(guī)及與合作社有關(guān)的“鄉(xiāng)規(guī)習俗”都會內(nèi)化為影響合作社及其信用合作可持續(xù)發(fā)展的強制性、模仿性和規(guī)范性力量。其中合作社自身、中央政府和地方政府的政策規(guī)范及資金支持、以農(nóng)商(合)行、農(nóng)業(yè)銀行、郵政儲蓄銀行和政策性銀行對合作社的金融支持,其它農(nóng)村抵押擔保公司、保險公司和小額貸款公司與合作社的交易關(guān)系,以及農(nóng)村地區(qū)廣泛存在的傳統(tǒng)的互助合作意識、熟人的關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)及合作社“制度企業(yè)家”的模范作用都會影響合作社信用合作的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:To organize farmers cooperative production through the development of cooperatives is a beneficial attempt to solve the "three rural" problem of rural economic underdeveloped situation based on development credit cooperation in the development of cooperatives is the realistic choice of rural financial market is developed under the condition of credit cooperatives to carry out cooperation helps to realize rural modernization based on agricultural mechanization and urbanization. But in the development of cooperatives, the initial endowment leads to different cooperative heterogeneous gap, resulting in different degrees of property "drift" affects the sustainability of cooperatives, credit cooperatives cooperation.
Based on the review of the relevant literature and the questionnaire data analysis shows that cooperative heterogeneity exists influence cooperative ownership structure of "drift", resulting in the lack of credit cooperatives cooperation in the process of ordinary members of farmers' investment, rather than ordinary household members into cooperatives not only make it difficult to share development the dividend of cooperatives, exacerbated by the cooperative property rights to the core members of "drift" process, and further influence the development of credit cooperatives cooperation.
Ordinary members of the cooperatives of farmers by increasing investment can change with the core members in the cooperative game of property rights in the process of relative bargaining power, property rights to the core members of cooperatives can delay "drift" trend, but its effect depends on the core members in the ordinary farmer members cast into the process. With the evolution of the core members of the members and ordinary farmers the results show that the property of game analysis, ordinary farmer members chose to invest and core members choose "grab" the game can reach ESS, which can guarantee the credit cooperatives and their cooperation in sustainable development, is the premise and the core members of the ordinary farmer members property is positive and the evolutionary game theory, namely member input and core members "ordinary farmers catch" yields greater than their income. Make other choice
Based on the cooperative organization as the center to build a cooperative organization field, will be incorporated into a full system of standardized organizational field, other organizations exist in the organization, formal and relevant policies and regulations and cooperatives "rural custom" will be internalized into the mandatory influence cooperative and credit cooperation for sustainable development. Imitation and normative power. The cooperative itself, the central government and the local government policy and financial support to agriculture, (a), the Agricultural Bank, bank, postal savings bank and the policy of cooperative financial support and other rural mortgage Guarantee Corporation, insurance companies and small loan companies and cooperatives trading relationship widespread in rural areas and traditional mutual cooperation consciousness, role relationship network and cooperative acquaintance of institutional entrepreneurs will affect the credit cooperatives The sustainable development of cooperation.

【學位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F321.42

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張娟;;農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社內(nèi)部成員的異質(zhì)性分析[J];安徽農(nóng)業(yè)科學;2008年29期

2 姜柏林;;資金互助破解農(nóng)村金融改革難題[J];銀行家;2006年04期

3 楊志強;;農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社內(nèi)部資金互助模式探討——兼析泉州市專業(yè)合作社組建資金互助社的必然性[J];福建金融;2011年04期

4 王文獻;董思杰;;新型農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社產(chǎn)權(quán)融資模式的演變研究[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟;2008年12期

5 蔡文芬;崔寶玉;;農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社“資本控制”研究述評[J];華東經(jīng)濟管理;2012年08期

6 劉勇;;西方農(nóng)業(yè)合作社理論文獻綜述[J];華南農(nóng)業(yè)大學學報(社會科學版);2009年04期

7 逄玉靜;任大鵬;;歐美農(nóng)業(yè)合作社的演進及其對我國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社發(fā)展的啟示[J];經(jīng)濟問題;2005年12期

8 張曉山;一種獨特的企業(yè)制度:蒙德拉貢合作社紀實[J];經(jīng)濟學動態(tài);1995年09期

9 崔寶玉;劉峰;楊模榮;;內(nèi)部人控制下的農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社治理——現(xiàn)實圖景、政府規(guī)制與制度選擇[J];經(jīng)濟學家;2012年06期

10 王建英;陳東平;;內(nèi)生于農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社的資金互助社運行機制分析——基于不同經(jīng)濟發(fā)展程度的考察[J];金融理論與實踐;2011年02期

，

本文編號：1378685