【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)板作為新興的高科技行業(yè),外界一直對其抱有較大期望,但是實(shí)際財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)卻差強(qiáng)人意,考慮到其成立時(shí)間尚短,市場風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大,財(cái)務(wù)績效波動(dòng)較大,此時(shí)公司效率更能反映創(chuàng)業(yè)板的發(fā)展實(shí)質(zhì)�；谥袊蓹�(quán)集中的現(xiàn)狀,公司的控制權(quán)往往掌握在大股東手中,金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)的出現(xiàn),使公司的決策權(quán)由直接控股股東轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)殡[藏在金字塔鏈條后的終極控制人,此時(shí)終極控制人的治理動(dòng)機(jī)成為影響公司效率的主導(dǎo)因素。以往對于終極控制人的固有印象大多是對于公司的“侵占”行為,本文基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司較好的發(fā)展前景以及終極控制人創(chuàng)始高管身份等特征,通過研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對于公司效率的影響,來探究終極控制人對于公司的治理動(dòng)機(jī),對于創(chuàng)業(yè)板未來的發(fā)展具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文以終極控制為視角,從金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)類型和金字塔股權(quán)終極控制特征兩方面,通過對終極控制人與管理層、中小股東以及利益相關(guān)者之間的代理問題進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)地梳理,來研究其對于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司效率的影響,在已有研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的特點(diǎn),提出了本文的模型構(gòu)建和研究假設(shè)。首先,根據(jù)金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)類型、兩類代理成本與公司效率的概念模型,分析了金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)類型中的縱向?qū)蛹壓蜋M向跨度對于公司效率的影響,并驗(yàn)證了在其對公司效率影響過程中,兩類代理成本所起的中介作用。研究結(jié)論表明,金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)類型中的縱向?qū)蛹壓蜋M向跨度的增大均顯著抑制兩類代理成本的上升,促進(jìn)公司效率的提高,兩類代理成本提高的同時(shí)會顯著抑制公司效率的提升,在金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)類型影響公司效率的過程中,兩類代理成本發(fā)揮顯著的中介作用。其次,根據(jù)金字塔股權(quán)終極控制特征、企業(yè)社會責(zé)任與公司效率的概念模型,分析了金字塔股權(quán)終極控制權(quán)、現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和兩權(quán)分離度對于公司效率的影響,并驗(yàn)證了在其對公司效率的影響過程中,企業(yè)社會責(zé)任所起的中介作用。研究結(jié)論表明,金字塔股權(quán)終極控制權(quán)、現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和兩權(quán)分離度的增大會顯著促進(jìn)企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的履行,進(jìn)而促進(jìn)公司效率的提高,同時(shí)也驗(yàn)證了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的履行對于公司效率的促進(jìn)作用,在金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征影響公司效率的過程中,企業(yè)社會責(zé)任發(fā)揮顯著的中介作用。最后,提出在金字塔組織結(jié)構(gòu)下優(yōu)化創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司終極股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的管理啟示,以期能有效防止終極控制人的自利行為,為提高創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司效率提供一定的理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:As a new high-tech industry, gem has been expected by the outside world, but its actual financial performance is not satisfactory. Considering its short time, market risk and management risk, financial performance fluctuates greatly. At this time, the efficiency of the company can better reflect the essence of the gem development. Based on the present situation of Chinese ownership concentration, the control of the company is often held in the hands of the major shareholders. The emergence of the pyramid structure changes the decision-making power of the company from the direct controlling shareholder to the ultimate controller hidden behind the pyramid chain. At this time, the ultimate controlling person's governance motive becomes the dominant factor that affects the company's efficiency. In the past, the traditional impression of ultimate controller is "encroachment" on the company. This paper is based on the characteristics of gem listed companies' better development prospects and the identity of the ultimate controller's founding executives, and so on. By studying the influence of pyramid ownership structure on the efficiency of the listed companies on the gem, this paper explores the governance motivation of the ultimate controller for the company and has important theoretical and practical significance for the future development of the gem. From the perspective of ultimate control, this paper systematically combs the agency problems between ultimate controller and management, minority shareholders and stakeholders from two aspects of pyramid ownership structure type and pyramid ownership ultimate control characteristics. On the basis of the existing research, combined with the characteristics of gem listed companies, this paper puts forward the model construction and research hypothesis. Firstly, according to the type of pyramid ownership structure, the conceptual model of two kinds of agency cost and company efficiency, the influence of vertical level and horizontal span of pyramid ownership structure on corporate efficiency is analyzed. It also verifies the intermediary function of the two kinds of agency cost in the process of its influence on the company efficiency. The results show that the increase of vertical level and horizontal span in pyramid structure type can significantly inhibit the increase of agency cost and promote the improvement of company efficiency, while the increase of agency cost of two types will significantly inhibit the improvement of company efficiency. In the process of pyramid ownership structure type affecting corporate efficiency, two types of agency cost play a significant intermediary role. Secondly, according to the characteristics of ultimate control of pyramid equity, the conceptual model of corporate social responsibility and corporate efficiency, this paper analyzes the influence of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights on corporate efficiency. It also verifies the intermediary role of corporate social responsibility in the process of its influence on corporate efficiency. The research results show that the increase of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights of pyramid equity will significantly promote the performance of corporate social responsibility, and then promote the improvement of corporate efficiency. At the same time, it also verifies the promotion of corporate social responsibility to corporate efficiency. Corporate social responsibility plays a significant intermediary role in the process of pyramid ownership structure affecting corporate efficiency. Finally, the paper puts forward the management enlightenment of optimizing the ultimate equity structure of gem listed companies under the pyramid organization structure, in order to effectively prevent the self-interest behavior of ultimate controllers, and to provide certain theoretical basis for improving the efficiency of gem listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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