創(chuàng)業(yè)板控股股東減持研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-13 10:09
【摘要】：2009年10月23日創(chuàng)業(yè)板在深交所成立，從此正式中國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)舞臺(tái)。2012年10月開(kāi)始，尤其是從2013年開(kāi)始創(chuàng)業(yè)板迎來(lái)大量限售期為36個(gè)月的首發(fā)原始股東限售股解禁，使得2013年創(chuàng)業(yè)板限售股解禁市值一下子暴增至兩千六百多億元，數(shù)值超過(guò)了前三年創(chuàng)業(yè)板解禁市值的總和。從減持公告公布的情況來(lái)看，2013年的上半年創(chuàng)業(yè)板減持的解禁股市值達(dá)一百五十多億元，占上半年解禁市值的16.5％，然而2012年的占比僅為13.6％。2013年8月份和9月份是創(chuàng)業(yè)板開(kāi)板以來(lái)限售股解禁的最高峰。這些股票限售期為36個(gè)月的股東一般都是公司的控股股東或?qū)嶋H控制人，不僅持股比例大，解禁股數(shù)多，而且對(duì)于公司的信息披露和決策有較強(qiáng)的控制能力，，因而這些股東股票的解禁會(huì)對(duì)市場(chǎng)造成更大的沖擊，對(duì)小股東和廣大投資者的利益造成更大的威脅。 本文以2012年10月31日起截止到2013年10月31日的一年內(nèi)發(fā)生的30家公司的90起控股股東減持事件（基本集中在2013年）為研究對(duì)象，應(yīng)用理論分析、統(tǒng)計(jì)分析以及案例研究等方法，對(duì)30家公司控股股東減持前的行為總體分析或逐個(gè)探討。研究分為兩個(gè)部分，第一部分針對(duì)30家發(fā)生減持的公司整體從減持比例、減持前公司消息的釋放、減持時(shí)的股價(jià)特征及減持后的股價(jià)走勢(shì)、減持時(shí)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)和減持前的盈余管理等方面展開(kāi)；第二部分則從30家公司中選擇了一家公司從減持前消息的釋放和減持前的盈余管理方面做了具體分析。 本研究針對(duì)已經(jīng)發(fā)生減持的30家公司的分析得出了以下結(jié)論：創(chuàng)業(yè)板控股股東減持比例較大且自然人股東的減持比例遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于機(jī)構(gòu)股東；創(chuàng)業(yè)板控股股東如果減持可能更傾向于在解禁后的短期內(nèi)（一至三個(gè)月）進(jìn)行減持；5月份發(fā)生的創(chuàng)業(yè)板控股股東減持事件最多；在控股股東減持前的一個(gè)月內(nèi)公司傾向于披露好消息，而在減持后的一個(gè)月里傾向于披露壞消息，自然人控股股東相比于機(jī)構(gòu)控股股東來(lái)說(shuō)更傾向于在減持前前披露好消息來(lái)推高股價(jià)；創(chuàng)業(yè)板控股股東限售股解禁的短期內(nèi)（一天至一周）內(nèi)市場(chǎng)并未如以往文獻(xiàn)所總結(jié)的那樣做出負(fù)面反應(yīng)；減持后的一至三天內(nèi)市場(chǎng)做出了負(fù)面反應(yīng)；而減持公告日后的短期（一天至一周）內(nèi)市場(chǎng)也并未有以往文獻(xiàn)所述的負(fù)面反應(yīng)；減持后的長(zhǎng)期（1至3個(gè)月）股價(jià)相對(duì)于減持時(shí)的股價(jià)有明顯上升；有些公司有利用銷售費(fèi)用、管理費(fèi)用和營(yíng)業(yè)外收入在減持前進(jìn)行盈余管理從而推高股價(jià)的嫌疑。 通過(guò)對(duì)賽為智能控股股東減持的具體案例分析，分析出賽為智能有利用提前披露業(yè)績(jī)靚麗的年報(bào)、減持前發(fā)布“高送轉(zhuǎn)”利潤(rùn)分配消息以及減持前一季度進(jìn)行盈余管理抬高股價(jià)從而在高位套現(xiàn)的嫌疑。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, the gem was established in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and from then on, China's capital market stage was formalized. In October 2012, especially since 2013, the gem has ushered in a large number of initial restricted shares of initial shareholders for 36 months, which have been restricted for a period of 36 months. This led to a market value of more than 2600 billion yuan in 2013, more than the total market value of the gem in the previous three years. Judging from the announcement of the reduction notice, in the first half of 2013, the value of the gem's lifting of the ban on the stock market reached more than 150 billion yuan, accounting for 16.5 percent of the market value of the lifting of the ban in the first half of the year. However, the share in 2012 was only 13.6. August and September 2013 were the highest peaks since the gem opened. The shareholders who hold the shares for 36 months are generally the controlling shareholders or actual controllers of the company. They not only hold large shares, but also have a strong ability to control the information disclosure and decision-making of the company. As a result, the lifting of these shareholder shares will have a greater impact on the market and a greater threat to the interests of minority shareholders and investors. In this paper, 90 cases of controlling shareholder reduction (mainly concentrated in 2013) that occurred in 30 companies during the year from October 31, 2012 to October 31, 2013 are used as the research objects. The methods of theoretical analysis, statistical analysis and case study are used in this paper. 30 controlling shareholders before the reduction of the behavior of the overall analysis or individual discussion. The study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the reduction ratio of 30 companies, the release of the news before the reduction, the characteristics of the stock price during the reduction and the stock price trend after the reduction. The second part selects a company from 30 companies to make a concrete analysis from the release of news before reduction and earnings management before reduction. Based on the analysis of 30 companies that have already reduced their holdings, this study draws the following conclusions: the proportion of holding reduction of gem controlling shareholders is large and the proportion of natural shareholders is much larger than that of institutional shareholders; If the gem controlling shareholders reduce their holdings, they may be more inclined to reduce their holdings in the short term (one to three months) after the lifting of the ban. The company tends to disclose good news in the month before the reduction of the controlling shareholder and the bad news in the month after the reduction. Compared with the institutional controlling shareholders, the natural person controlling shareholders tend to disclose good news before the reduction to push up the stock price; In the short term (from one day to one week), the market has not made the negative reaction as summarized in the previous literature, and the market has made the negative reaction within one to three days after the reduction. In the short term (from one day to one week) after the announcement of the reduction, the market did not have the negative reaction described in the previous literature; the long-term (one to three months) share price after the reduction was significantly higher than the stock price at the time of the reduction; some companies had utilization sales expenses. Management fees and non-operating income before the reduction of earnings management, driving up the stock price suspicion. Through the analysis of the specific cases in which the game is reduced by the intelligent controlling shareholders, the paper analyzes that the competition is the annual report of smart people who make use of early disclosure of their beautiful performance. The sell-off follows the announcement of a "high transfer" profit distribution and the suspicion that earnings management will drive up the share price to cash in at a high level in the quarter before the sale.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51
本文編號(hào)：2268220
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, the gem was established in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and from then on, China's capital market stage was formalized. In October 2012, especially since 2013, the gem has ushered in a large number of initial restricted shares of initial shareholders for 36 months, which have been restricted for a period of 36 months. This led to a market value of more than 2600 billion yuan in 2013, more than the total market value of the gem in the previous three years. Judging from the announcement of the reduction notice, in the first half of 2013, the value of the gem's lifting of the ban on the stock market reached more than 150 billion yuan, accounting for 16.5 percent of the market value of the lifting of the ban in the first half of the year. However, the share in 2012 was only 13.6. August and September 2013 were the highest peaks since the gem opened. The shareholders who hold the shares for 36 months are generally the controlling shareholders or actual controllers of the company. They not only hold large shares, but also have a strong ability to control the information disclosure and decision-making of the company. As a result, the lifting of these shareholder shares will have a greater impact on the market and a greater threat to the interests of minority shareholders and investors. In this paper, 90 cases of controlling shareholder reduction (mainly concentrated in 2013) that occurred in 30 companies during the year from October 31, 2012 to October 31, 2013 are used as the research objects. The methods of theoretical analysis, statistical analysis and case study are used in this paper. 30 controlling shareholders before the reduction of the behavior of the overall analysis or individual discussion. The study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the reduction ratio of 30 companies, the release of the news before the reduction, the characteristics of the stock price during the reduction and the stock price trend after the reduction. The second part selects a company from 30 companies to make a concrete analysis from the release of news before reduction and earnings management before reduction. Based on the analysis of 30 companies that have already reduced their holdings, this study draws the following conclusions: the proportion of holding reduction of gem controlling shareholders is large and the proportion of natural shareholders is much larger than that of institutional shareholders; If the gem controlling shareholders reduce their holdings, they may be more inclined to reduce their holdings in the short term (one to three months) after the lifting of the ban. The company tends to disclose good news in the month before the reduction of the controlling shareholder and the bad news in the month after the reduction. Compared with the institutional controlling shareholders, the natural person controlling shareholders tend to disclose good news before the reduction to push up the stock price; In the short term (from one day to one week), the market has not made the negative reaction as summarized in the previous literature, and the market has made the negative reaction within one to three days after the reduction. In the short term (from one day to one week) after the announcement of the reduction, the market did not have the negative reaction described in the previous literature; the long-term (one to three months) share price after the reduction was significantly higher than the stock price at the time of the reduction; some companies had utilization sales expenses. Management fees and non-operating income before the reduction of earnings management, driving up the stock price suspicion. Through the analysis of the specific cases in which the game is reduced by the intelligent controlling shareholders, the paper analyzes that the competition is the annual report of smart people who make use of early disclosure of their beautiful performance. The sell-off follows the announcement of a "high transfer" profit distribution and the suspicion that earnings management will drive up the share price to cash in at a high level in the quarter before the sale.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51
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