私募股權基金對民營中小企業(yè)公司治理的影響
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-13 08:45
【摘要】：民營中小企業(yè)作為經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的引擎,在促進國民經(jīng)濟增長、擴大就業(yè)、增加財政收入等多個方面發(fā)揮著舉足輕重的作用。黨的十八大明確定位了市場與政府的角色,再次重申了“兩個毫不動搖”,并提出“提高大中型企業(yè)核心競爭力,支持小微企業(yè)特別是科技型小微企業(yè)發(fā)展”。伴隨著改革不斷深入,社會制度與經(jīng)濟體制不斷完善,民營中小企業(yè)的先鋒和引導作用將體現(xiàn)的更為淋漓盡致,地位也將加強。 民營經(jīng)濟的意義不言而喻,但其功能的發(fā)揮建立在企業(yè)財務、公司治理等各方面健康完善的基礎上。毋庸諱言,我國的民營企業(yè),特別是民營中小企業(yè)自身還存在許多問題,如財務信息不透明、不準確,管理制度不健全、不合理,經(jīng)營決策隨意化、關系化等等。這些問題的存在,導致資金約束瓶頸、規(guī)模發(fā)展瓶頸,制約了企業(yè)長久可持續(xù)發(fā)展。 對于民營中小企業(yè)來說,公司治理有其特殊性,家族化集權與關系治理特征顯著。集權化與關系化的公司治理結構對中小企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展弊大于利,在信息不對稱及多股東的情況下,企業(yè)家決策權力和經(jīng)營收益不對稱,其決策基礎是基于家族利益最大化而非企業(yè)利益最大化,存在利用關系交易以損害小股東和其他利益相關者權益的傾向。不完善的內(nèi)部經(jīng)營管理機制難以承諾可預期的未來,也就難以向市場投資者傳遞積極明確的信號,純粹寄希望銀行信貸和證券市場解決企業(yè)融資約束,無異于隔靴搔癢,治標不治本。若要實現(xiàn)民營中小企業(yè)長久發(fā)展,完善公司治理迫在眉睫。不過,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立不僅僅需要企業(yè)家的自覺意識,也需要外部政策、法律環(huán)境和其他金融機構、投資者的良性推動。 私募股權,特別是風險創(chuàng)業(yè)基金的到來,不僅拓寬了中國民營企業(yè)的籌資渠道,其先進的管理理念對推動公司治理理念的改革亦是不容小覷。解救處于“融資”和“治理”雙重困境的中小企業(yè),私募股權機構無疑是個理想選擇。正是基于上述背景和認知,本文綜合運用文獻梳理、博弈模型推導方法,展開了私募股權基金對民營中小企業(yè)公司治理影響的研究。 基于本文的研究主體和研究目的,文章從四個方面展開文獻回顧：民營中小企業(yè)、私募股權、公司治理、關聯(lián)分析。首先,通過梳理民營中小企業(yè)在經(jīng)濟體系中的地位、對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的作用及發(fā)展中的問題,進一步明確改善公司治理結構的必要性及意義；其次,在簡要概述公司治理領域研究框架和結構的基礎上,分析了民營企業(yè)治理特殊性——關系治理及其特征,從而確定改善公司治理結構的突破口；再次,回溯了私募股權基金發(fā)展影響因素、代理問題及退出問題三個方面的研究狀況；最后,學習了以往研究文獻中分析私募股權基金和公司治理關系的研究方法及視角,以便為本文后續(xù)寫作提供借鑒。 接下來聚焦民營中小企業(yè),通過分析其治理現(xiàn)狀及特征,指出管理資源集中化、封閉化導致企業(yè)家(決策者)權、責、利不對稱,而這種失衡增強了企業(yè)家關聯(lián)交易的沖動,容易造成對小股東權益的侵害。進一步的,建立博弈模型,并從單一股東的分析擴展到多個股東的分析,得出：只要不改變決策結構,企業(yè)家股權份額越低,關聯(lián)交易發(fā)生的可能性就越大。 隨后介紹了私募股權基金的發(fā)展狀況、運作特征,并分析其投資趨勢,得出：私募股權投資行業(yè)集中在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、消費醫(yī)療等領域,而從民營中小企業(yè)覆蓋領域來看,私募股權基金與其有著天然的耦合性；另外,近年私募股權基金有投資階段“前移”傾向,在這種趨勢下,基金投資機構必然會在目標公司的治理問題上投注更多精力。 在分析私募股權基金如何影響被投資企業(yè)公司治理之前,我們首先探究了私募機構愿意參與目標公司運作的動因——雙重委托代理關系,并通過分析進一步指出：第一層委托代理關系(投資者與基金管理者之間)是促使基金管理者監(jiān)督企業(yè)運營的根本原因；而第二層委托代理關系(風險投資機構與目標企業(yè)之間)的存在,是促使風險投資機構參與到企業(yè)運營的直接原因。接下來,在博弈模型的分析中,逐步引入“不作為”風險投資機構、懲罰機制、董事會機制,分析企業(yè)家與合作伙伴支付矩陣的變化,得出：懲罰機制沒有改變原有的決策結構,但能在一定程度上降低關聯(lián)交易發(fā)生的可能性,但其抑制作用的大小與懲罰成本大小相關。董事會機制則徹底打破原有決策管理資源的封閉狀態(tài),形成多方參與的制衡結構,在企業(yè)家提議關聯(lián)交易時,能夠有效降低關系交易的發(fā)生,維護企業(yè)整體及小股東利益。不過,董事會的有效性受到董事會決策效率及準確性的影響。 風險投資機構的參與能夠推動民營中小企業(yè)治理機制的完善,然而需要明確的是,風險投資機構并非天使,它所有的行動基礎是自身利益而非企業(yè)利益,經(jīng)營決策權利的開放不是出讓,將企業(yè)運營完全寄托在風險投資機構身上,也是極不明智的。 這篇文章的最主要的創(chuàng)新在于將關系治理作為一個變量,引入了博弈模型,實證和理論相得益彰；當然,所有論述都是在前人研究基礎上的淺顯分析,如能拋磚引玉,則不勝惶恐。另外,出于博弈分析的需要,文章將企業(yè)內(nèi)部復雜的治理關系簡化為“決策者”企業(yè)家和小股東這兩個主體,同時,籠統(tǒng)的將民營中小企業(yè)公司治理的弊病歸結為“關聯(lián)交易”,具有一定的片面性。
[Abstract]:As the engine of economic development, private small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting national economic growth, expanding employment, increasing fiscal revenue and other aspects. With the deepening of reform, the improvement of social system and economic system, the pioneering and guiding role of private SMEs will be more vivid and their status will be strengthened.
The significance of private economy is self-evident, but its function is based on the sound and perfect financial and corporate governance. Needless to say, there are still many problems in private enterprises, especially private SMEs themselves, such as financial information is not transparent, inaccurate, management system is not perfect, unreasonable, and business decisions follow. These problems lead to the bottleneck of capital constraints, the bottleneck of scale development, and restrict the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.
For private small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate governance has its particularity. Family centralization and relationship governance have remarkable characteristics. Centralized and relational corporate governance structure has more disadvantages than advantages for the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of asymmetric information and multi-shareholders, entrepreneurs'decision-making power and operating income are asymmetric, and their decision-making basis is basic. There is a tendency to use relational transactions to damage the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in order to maximize the interests of the family rather than the business. Imperfect internal management mechanisms are difficult to promise a predictable future, and it is difficult to send positive and clear signals to market investors, purely hoping for bank credit and securities markets. To solve the financing constraints of enterprises on the market is tantamount to curing the symptoms without curing the root cause.To achieve the long-term development of private SMEs, it is urgent to improve corporate governance.However, the establishment of modern enterprise system needs not only the conscious awareness of entrepreneurs, but also external policies, legal environment and other financial institutions, and the benign promotion of investors.
The advent of private equity, especially venture capital funds, not only broadens the financing channels of private enterprises in China, but also promotes the reform of corporate governance ideas with advanced management concepts. Based on the above background and cognition, this paper combs the literature and deduces the game model to study the impact of private equity funds on the corporate governance of private SMEs.
Based on the research subject and research purpose of this paper, the article starts from four aspects: private small and medium-sized enterprises, private equity, corporate governance, correlation analysis. Firstly, through combing the status of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the economic system, the role of economic development and development problems, further clarify the need to improve corporate governance structure. Necessity and significance; secondly, on the basis of a brief overview of the research framework and structure in the field of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the particularity of private enterprise governance - Relationship Governance and its characteristics, so as to determine the breakthrough point to improve corporate governance structure; thirdly, it retrospects the development of private equity funds influencing factors, agency issues and exit issues. Finally, the research methods and perspectives of the relationship between private equity funds and corporate governance in the previous literature are studied, so as to provide reference for the follow-up writing of this paper.
Then focus on the private SMEs, through the analysis of their governance status and characteristics, pointed out that the centralization of management resources, closed entrepreneurs (decision makers) rights, responsibilities, benefits asymmetry, and this imbalance enhanced the impulse of entrepreneurs related transactions, easy to cause infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Further, establish a game model, and from a single share. East's analysis extends to the analysis of multiple shareholders, and draws the conclusion that as long as the decision-making structure is not changed, the lower the entrepreneur's share, the greater the possibility of related party transactions.
Then it introduces the development and operation characteristics of private equity funds, and analyzes their investment trends, and draws the following conclusions: private equity investment industry is concentrated in the Internet, consumer health and other fields, and from the coverage of private SMEs, private equity funds and its natural coupling; in addition, in recent years, private equity funds have investment levels. In this trend, fund investment institutions will inevitably devote more energy to the governance of target companies.
Before analyzing how private equity funds affect the corporate governance of the invested firms, we first explore the motivation of private equity firms'willingness to participate in the operation of the target firms - the dual principal-agent relationship, and further point out that the first principal-agent relationship (between investors and fund managers) is to urge fund managers to supervise. The basic reason for supervising the operation of enterprises is the existence of the second-level principal-agent relationship (between venture capital institutions and target enterprises), which is the direct reason for the participation of venture capital institutions in the operation of enterprises. The change of payment matrix between entrepreneurs and partners shows that the penalty mechanism does not change the original decision-making structure, but can reduce the possibility of related party transactions to a certain extent, but the size of its inhibition is related to the penalty cost. Participatory checks and balances structure can effectively reduce the occurrence of relationship transactions and protect the interests of the whole enterprise and minority shareholders when entrepreneurs propose affiliated transactions.
The participation of venture capital institutions can promote the perfection of the governance mechanism of private SMEs. However, it needs to be clear that venture capital institutions are not angels. All their actions are based on their own interests rather than enterprise interests. The opening of management decision-making rights is not transferring. It is also extremely important to place the operation of enterprises entirely on venture capital institutions. Unwise.
The main innovation of this article is that the relationship governance is introduced as a variable into the game model, which is complementary to the empirical and theoretical analysis. Of course, all the discussions are based on previous studies of shallow analysis, if you can throw a brick to attract jade, you can not be afraid. It is simplified as "decision maker" entrepreneurs and small shareholders. At the same time, it is one-sided to generalize the drawbacks of private SMEs'corporate governance into "related party transactions".
【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51
本文編號：2240645
[Abstract]:As the engine of economic development, private small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting national economic growth, expanding employment, increasing fiscal revenue and other aspects. With the deepening of reform, the improvement of social system and economic system, the pioneering and guiding role of private SMEs will be more vivid and their status will be strengthened.
The significance of private economy is self-evident, but its function is based on the sound and perfect financial and corporate governance. Needless to say, there are still many problems in private enterprises, especially private SMEs themselves, such as financial information is not transparent, inaccurate, management system is not perfect, unreasonable, and business decisions follow. These problems lead to the bottleneck of capital constraints, the bottleneck of scale development, and restrict the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.
For private small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate governance has its particularity. Family centralization and relationship governance have remarkable characteristics. Centralized and relational corporate governance structure has more disadvantages than advantages for the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of asymmetric information and multi-shareholders, entrepreneurs'decision-making power and operating income are asymmetric, and their decision-making basis is basic. There is a tendency to use relational transactions to damage the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in order to maximize the interests of the family rather than the business. Imperfect internal management mechanisms are difficult to promise a predictable future, and it is difficult to send positive and clear signals to market investors, purely hoping for bank credit and securities markets. To solve the financing constraints of enterprises on the market is tantamount to curing the symptoms without curing the root cause.To achieve the long-term development of private SMEs, it is urgent to improve corporate governance.However, the establishment of modern enterprise system needs not only the conscious awareness of entrepreneurs, but also external policies, legal environment and other financial institutions, and the benign promotion of investors.
The advent of private equity, especially venture capital funds, not only broadens the financing channels of private enterprises in China, but also promotes the reform of corporate governance ideas with advanced management concepts. Based on the above background and cognition, this paper combs the literature and deduces the game model to study the impact of private equity funds on the corporate governance of private SMEs.
Based on the research subject and research purpose of this paper, the article starts from four aspects: private small and medium-sized enterprises, private equity, corporate governance, correlation analysis. Firstly, through combing the status of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the economic system, the role of economic development and development problems, further clarify the need to improve corporate governance structure. Necessity and significance; secondly, on the basis of a brief overview of the research framework and structure in the field of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the particularity of private enterprise governance - Relationship Governance and its characteristics, so as to determine the breakthrough point to improve corporate governance structure; thirdly, it retrospects the development of private equity funds influencing factors, agency issues and exit issues. Finally, the research methods and perspectives of the relationship between private equity funds and corporate governance in the previous literature are studied, so as to provide reference for the follow-up writing of this paper.
Then focus on the private SMEs, through the analysis of their governance status and characteristics, pointed out that the centralization of management resources, closed entrepreneurs (decision makers) rights, responsibilities, benefits asymmetry, and this imbalance enhanced the impulse of entrepreneurs related transactions, easy to cause infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Further, establish a game model, and from a single share. East's analysis extends to the analysis of multiple shareholders, and draws the conclusion that as long as the decision-making structure is not changed, the lower the entrepreneur's share, the greater the possibility of related party transactions.
Then it introduces the development and operation characteristics of private equity funds, and analyzes their investment trends, and draws the following conclusions: private equity investment industry is concentrated in the Internet, consumer health and other fields, and from the coverage of private SMEs, private equity funds and its natural coupling; in addition, in recent years, private equity funds have investment levels. In this trend, fund investment institutions will inevitably devote more energy to the governance of target companies.
Before analyzing how private equity funds affect the corporate governance of the invested firms, we first explore the motivation of private equity firms'willingness to participate in the operation of the target firms - the dual principal-agent relationship, and further point out that the first principal-agent relationship (between investors and fund managers) is to urge fund managers to supervise. The basic reason for supervising the operation of enterprises is the existence of the second-level principal-agent relationship (between venture capital institutions and target enterprises), which is the direct reason for the participation of venture capital institutions in the operation of enterprises. The change of payment matrix between entrepreneurs and partners shows that the penalty mechanism does not change the original decision-making structure, but can reduce the possibility of related party transactions to a certain extent, but the size of its inhibition is related to the penalty cost. Participatory checks and balances structure can effectively reduce the occurrence of relationship transactions and protect the interests of the whole enterprise and minority shareholders when entrepreneurs propose affiliated transactions.
The participation of venture capital institutions can promote the perfection of the governance mechanism of private SMEs. However, it needs to be clear that venture capital institutions are not angels. All their actions are based on their own interests rather than enterprise interests. The opening of management decision-making rights is not transferring. It is also extremely important to place the operation of enterprises entirely on venture capital institutions. Unwise.
The main innovation of this article is that the relationship governance is introduced as a variable into the game model, which is complementary to the empirical and theoretical analysis. Of course, all the discussions are based on previous studies of shallow analysis, if you can throw a brick to attract jade, you can not be afraid. It is simplified as "decision maker" entrepreneurs and small shareholders. At the same time, it is one-sided to generalize the drawbacks of private SMEs'corporate governance into "related party transactions".
【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51
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