民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-23 13:43
【摘要】：從控制權(quán)的概念被提出以來,控制權(quán)配置問題就一直作為公司治理的核心議題被廣泛關(guān)注。然而,盡管學(xué)者們一直致力于控制權(quán)研究,但是從現(xiàn)實角度來看,企業(yè)經(jīng)營控制權(quán)在各利益相關(guān)者之間的有效配置問題仍然解決。在許多高科技公司中,控制權(quán)配置問題變得更加復(fù)雜。作為人力資本的重要持有者——創(chuàng)始人,如何維持適度的組織權(quán)力,防止控制權(quán)旁落,這也正是本文要討論的核心議題。本研究在梳理了現(xiàn)有控制權(quán)相關(guān)研究成果和當(dāng)前我國民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)配置特征的基礎(chǔ)上,通過探索性案例研究,初步提出在外部制度和技術(shù)環(huán)境下,創(chuàng)始人如何利用自身資源維持公司控制權(quán)這一民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制。外部環(huán)境是制約組織內(nèi)部主體資源分配和主體行為的基礎(chǔ),公司章程是控制權(quán)主體之間博弈的有效工具,關(guān)鍵性資源配置決定著控制權(quán)配置結(jié)構(gòu)。為防止控制權(quán)旁落,創(chuàng)始人分別從財產(chǎn)性資源、關(guān)系性資源、知識性資源三方面保持自身的優(yōu)勢地位。本文采用了實證研究方法,選取2007-2012期間IPO的中國民營高科技上市公司作為研究樣本,對上述民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制進(jìn)行實證檢驗。實證研究證明:(1)民營高科技上市企業(yè),創(chuàng)始人持股水平(財產(chǎn)性資源)越高,創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)維持效果(IPO后創(chuàng)始人是否繼續(xù)留任關(guān)鍵職位)越好;(2)民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始成員團(tuán)隊占董事會席位比例(關(guān)系性資源)越大,越有利于創(chuàng)始人留任關(guān)鍵職位;(3)在民營高科技企業(yè)中,學(xué)歷(知識性資源)越高的創(chuàng)始人獲取和維持控制權(quán)的概率越高;(4)在公司章程中累積投票制和絕大多數(shù)條款的設(shè)置在創(chuàng)始人資源與控制權(quán)關(guān)系中起正向調(diào)節(jié)作用。本文提出了在外部制度和技術(shù)環(huán)境約束下,創(chuàng)始人如何管理和利用自身資源維持控制權(quán)的民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制,豐富了公司治理和控制權(quán)理論及公司控制權(quán)配置模式的研究。從資源觀視角出發(fā),將影響企業(yè)生產(chǎn)的三大資本(即物質(zhì)資本、社會資本和人力資本)一起納入到企業(yè)控制權(quán)配置研究領(lǐng)域,在此基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步將企業(yè)權(quán)力資源區(qū)分為財產(chǎn)性資源、關(guān)系性資源和知識性資源三種類型,較為深入和全面地探討了民營高科技企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)保護(hù)路徑。本研究彌補(bǔ)了傳統(tǒng)契約理論的不足,同時,也對中國民營高科技企業(yè)的控制權(quán)配置問題提供參考路徑。
[Abstract]:Since the concept of control was put forward, the allocation of control rights has been the core issue of corporate governance. However, although scholars have been devoting themselves to the study of control right, the problem of effective allocation of control rights among stakeholders is still solved from the practical point of view. In many high-tech companies, the allocation of control becomes more complicated. As an important holder of human capital, how to maintain moderate organizational power and prevent the fall of control right is the core issue to be discussed in this paper. On the basis of combing the existing research results of control rights and the characteristics of the allocation of the control rights of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in China, this study, through exploratory case studies, proposes that under the external system and the technological environment, How do founders use their own resources to maintain the protection mechanism of corporate control in private high-tech enterprises? The external environment is the basis of restricting the resource allocation and behavior of the main body within the organization. The articles of association is an effective tool for the game between the control bodies, and the allocation of the key resources determines the configuration structure of the control rights. In order to prevent the right of control from falling, the founders maintain their dominant position from three aspects: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources. This paper adopts the empirical research method, selects the Chinese private high-tech listed companies in the IPO period from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample, carries on the empirical test to the above private high-tech enterprise founder control protection mechanism. The empirical research proves that: (1) Private high-tech listed enterprises, the higher the level of founder holding shares (property resources), The better the effect of maintaining founder control (whether the founder will continue to hold the key post after IPO); (2) the larger the proportion of board seats (relational resources) of the founding members of private high-tech enterprises. The more favorable it is for founders to remain in key positions; (3) in private high-tech enterprises, The higher the education (knowledge resources), the higher the probability of obtaining and maintaining the control rights; (4) the cumulative voting system and the setting of most clauses in the articles of association play a positive role in the relationship between the founder resources and the control rights. Under the restriction of external system and technological environment, this paper puts forward the protection mechanism of the founder's right of control of the private high-tech enterprise how to manage and utilize his own resources to maintain the control right of the founder of the private high-tech enterprise. It enriches the theory of corporate governance and control rights and the research of corporate control allocation model. From the perspective of resource view, the three major capital (material capital, social capital and human capital) which affect the enterprise's production are brought into the field of corporate control rights allocation together, and on this basis, This paper further divides enterprise power resources into three types: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources, and probes into the path of protecting the right of control of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in depth and in an all-round way. This study makes up for the deficiency of the traditional contract theory and provides a reference for the allocation of the control rights of the private high-tech enterprises in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.44;F832.51
本文編號：2199245
[Abstract]:Since the concept of control was put forward, the allocation of control rights has been the core issue of corporate governance. However, although scholars have been devoting themselves to the study of control right, the problem of effective allocation of control rights among stakeholders is still solved from the practical point of view. In many high-tech companies, the allocation of control becomes more complicated. As an important holder of human capital, how to maintain moderate organizational power and prevent the fall of control right is the core issue to be discussed in this paper. On the basis of combing the existing research results of control rights and the characteristics of the allocation of the control rights of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in China, this study, through exploratory case studies, proposes that under the external system and the technological environment, How do founders use their own resources to maintain the protection mechanism of corporate control in private high-tech enterprises? The external environment is the basis of restricting the resource allocation and behavior of the main body within the organization. The articles of association is an effective tool for the game between the control bodies, and the allocation of the key resources determines the configuration structure of the control rights. In order to prevent the right of control from falling, the founders maintain their dominant position from three aspects: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources. This paper adopts the empirical research method, selects the Chinese private high-tech listed companies in the IPO period from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample, carries on the empirical test to the above private high-tech enterprise founder control protection mechanism. The empirical research proves that: (1) Private high-tech listed enterprises, the higher the level of founder holding shares (property resources), The better the effect of maintaining founder control (whether the founder will continue to hold the key post after IPO); (2) the larger the proportion of board seats (relational resources) of the founding members of private high-tech enterprises. The more favorable it is for founders to remain in key positions; (3) in private high-tech enterprises, The higher the education (knowledge resources), the higher the probability of obtaining and maintaining the control rights; (4) the cumulative voting system and the setting of most clauses in the articles of association play a positive role in the relationship between the founder resources and the control rights. Under the restriction of external system and technological environment, this paper puts forward the protection mechanism of the founder's right of control of the private high-tech enterprise how to manage and utilize his own resources to maintain the control right of the founder of the private high-tech enterprise. It enriches the theory of corporate governance and control rights and the research of corporate control allocation model. From the perspective of resource view, the three major capital (material capital, social capital and human capital) which affect the enterprise's production are brought into the field of corporate control rights allocation together, and on this basis, This paper further divides enterprise power resources into three types: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources, and probes into the path of protecting the right of control of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in depth and in an all-round way. This study makes up for the deficiency of the traditional contract theory and provides a reference for the allocation of the control rights of the private high-tech enterprises in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.44;F832.51
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 鄭志剛;鄒宇;崔麗;;合伙人制度與創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊控制權(quán)安排模式選擇——基于阿里巴巴的案例研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2016年10期
2 徐煒;王超;;民營高科技公司創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)與公司業(yè)績[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2016年09期
3 王春艷;林潤輝;袁慶宏;李婭;李飛;;企業(yè)控制權(quán)的獲取和維持——基于創(chuàng)始人視角的多案例研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2016年07期
4 胡波;王驁然;;互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人控制權(quán)對企業(yè)長期業(yè)績的影響探究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題;2016年07期
5 石曉飛;;創(chuàng)始人非正式權(quán)力、正式權(quán)力對公司價值的影響——基于民營上市公司的實證研究[J];中國人力資源開發(fā);2016年11期
6 吳義爽;盛亞;蔡寧;;基于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+的大規(guī)模智能定制研究——青島紅領(lǐng)服飾與佛山維尚家具案例[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2016年04期
7 武立東;丁昊杰;王凱;;民營企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人特質(zhì)與公司治理機(jī)制完善程度對職業(yè)經(jīng)理人引入影響研究[J];管理學(xué)報;2016年04期
8 易陽;宋順林;謝新敏;譚勁松;;創(chuàng)始人專用性資產(chǎn)、塹壕效應(yīng)與公司控制權(quán)配置——基于雷士照明的案例分析[J];會計研究;2016年01期
9 周嘉南;段宏;黃登仕;;投資者與創(chuàng)始人的爭斗:沖突來源及演化路徑——基于我國公司公開沖突事件的案例分析[J];管理世界;2015年06期
10 王玨;祝繼高;;基金參與公司治理:行為邏輯與路徑選擇——基于上海家化和格力電器的案例研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2015年05期
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條
1 魯銀梭;風(fēng)投引入后的主體行為與創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)成長[D];浙江工商大學(xué);2013年
2 潘清;中國國有企業(yè)控制權(quán)的權(quán)能配置研究[D];浙江工商大學(xué);2010年
，本文編號：2199245
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/jinrongzhengquanlunwen/2199245.html
最近更新
教材專著
