基于博弈理論的證券監(jiān)管效率研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-08-15 13:09
【摘要】:隨著中國證券市場的發(fā)展演進(jìn),證券投資在金融市場上的地位也日益顯著。而近年來的事實(shí)證明,證券市場中的違規(guī)現(xiàn)象屢有發(fā)生,其中以中介機(jī)構(gòu)的違規(guī)為主,,更有甚者,是出現(xiàn)監(jiān)管庇護(hù),監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)與中介機(jī)構(gòu)狼狽為奸。在證券市場中,投資者參與市場均需要某種程度上依賴于中介機(jī)構(gòu),而中介機(jī)構(gòu)憑借其專業(yè)性以及排他性,有時(shí)會(huì)做出有損投資者利益的行為。因此,近年來監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管必要性屢被提及,關(guān)于監(jiān)管政策的討論也百家爭鳴。如何通過監(jiān)管政策的設(shè)計(jì),降低中介機(jī)構(gòu)違規(guī)概率,提高監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管效率,成為證券市場監(jiān)管的一大議題。 本文旨在通過對中介機(jī)構(gòu)的違規(guī)行為分析,討論在一定監(jiān)管制度框架下,中介機(jī)構(gòu)的自律機(jī)制如何發(fā)揮作用,試圖探討如何通過對監(jiān)管政策的完善,創(chuàng)建一個(gè)健康良好的市場氛圍,促進(jìn)中介機(jī)構(gòu)自律,在監(jiān)管與自律的相輔相成之下,達(dá)到監(jiān)管效率最大化的最佳目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:With the development and evolution of China's securities market, the position of securities investment in the financial market is becoming increasingly prominent. The facts in recent years have proved that there are frequent irregularities in the securities market, in which the intermediary organizations mainly violate the rules, and what is more, there is a regulatory asylum, and the regulatory agencies work in concert with the intermediary organizations. In the securities market, investors' participation in the market needs to depend on the intermediary to some extent, and the intermediary, by virtue of its specialization and exclusiveness, sometimes acts against the interests of the investors. Therefore, the regulatory necessity of regulators has been repeatedly mentioned in recent years, and the debate on regulatory policy has been controversial. How to reduce the probability of agency violation and improve the efficiency of supervision has become a major issue in the regulation of securities market through the design of regulatory policy. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how to exert the self-discipline mechanism of intermediary institutions under the framework of a certain regulatory system, and try to explore how to perfect the regulatory policy by analyzing the illegal behavior of intermediary organizations. To create a healthy and good market atmosphere, promote intermediary self-discipline, and achieve the best goal of maximization of regulatory efficiency under the complementary of supervision and self-regulation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F832.51
[Abstract]:With the development and evolution of China's securities market, the position of securities investment in the financial market is becoming increasingly prominent. The facts in recent years have proved that there are frequent irregularities in the securities market, in which the intermediary organizations mainly violate the rules, and what is more, there is a regulatory asylum, and the regulatory agencies work in concert with the intermediary organizations. In the securities market, investors' participation in the market needs to depend on the intermediary to some extent, and the intermediary, by virtue of its specialization and exclusiveness, sometimes acts against the interests of the investors. Therefore, the regulatory necessity of regulators has been repeatedly mentioned in recent years, and the debate on regulatory policy has been controversial. How to reduce the probability of agency violation and improve the efficiency of supervision has become a major issue in the regulation of securities market through the design of regulatory policy. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how to exert the self-discipline mechanism of intermediary institutions under the framework of a certain regulatory system, and try to explore how to perfect the regulatory policy by analyzing the illegal behavior of intermediary organizations. To create a healthy and good market atmosphere, promote intermediary self-discipline, and achieve the best goal of maximization of regulatory efficiency under the complementary of supervision and self-regulation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F832.51
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4 劉t
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