【摘要】：投資為經(jīng)濟的高速發(fā)展提供了巨大的動力,其效率的高低也成為國民經(jīng)濟快速增長的重要制約因素。然而,由于委托代理問題和市場信息不對稱的存在,上市公司中存在著大量的投資意愿偏誤和操作失誤,資源分配無法達到帕累托最優(yōu)狀態(tài),導致了上市公司非效率投資的發(fā)生。為了減少非效率投資行為的發(fā)生,我國不斷加強公司治理的力度,并在2001年將獨立董事制度引入公司治理體系。獨立董事治理主要通過監(jiān)督機制和政策建議機制對公司管理層的投資行為加以影響,降低因委托代理增加的成本,減少因信息不對稱導致的逆向選擇的發(fā)生,不斷提高公司的投資效率。但是,學者的研究結(jié)論大相徑庭,部分學者甚至認為上市公司中存在著部分“花瓶董事”。對此,本文首先從理論層面分析了獨立董事治理對非效率投資的抑制作用以及獨立董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置對于這一抑制作用的調(diào)節(jié)作用;其次,本文對2006-2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)進行了實證分析,對上述理論分析的結(jié)論進行了驗證。研究表明,獨立董事治理可以有效地抑制公司的投資不足,而且獨立董事越處于網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心位置,該抑制作用越強;獨立董事對于公司的過度投資影響并不明顯,而且獨立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置的調(diào)節(jié)作用也不明顯。最后,本文從信息保障機制、權(quán)責制度和激勵機制等方面提出了對策建議,期望可以進一步降低公司的非效率投資行為。
[Abstract]:Investment provides a huge impetus for the rapid development of economy, and its efficiency also becomes an important factor restricting the rapid growth of national economy. However, due to the existence of principal-agent problem and market information asymmetry, there are a large number of errors in investment intention and operational errors in listed companies, and the allocation of resources cannot reach Pareto optimal state. This leads to the occurrence of inefficient investment of listed companies. In order to reduce the occurrence of the inefficient investment behavior, our country strengthens the corporate governance continuously, and introduces the independent director system into the corporate governance system in 2001. The independent director's governance mainly influences the investment behavior of the management through the supervision mechanism and the policy recommendation mechanism, reduces the increased cost due to the principal-agent, and reduces the adverse selection caused by the asymmetric information. Continuously improve the investment efficiency of the company. However, the research conclusions of scholars are quite different, some scholars even think that there are some "vase directors" in listed companies. In view of this, this paper firstly analyzes the inhibition effect of independent director governance on non-efficiency investment and the moderating effect of independent director's network position on this inhibition. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2015, and verifies the conclusions of the above theoretical analysis. The research shows that the independent director governance can effectively restrain the underinvestment of the company, and the more the independent director is in the center of the network, the stronger the restraining effect is, and the influence of independent director on the overinvestment of the company is not obvious. And the independent director network position adjustment function is not obvious. Finally, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions from the aspects of information guarantee mechanism, power and responsibility system and incentive mechanism, hoping to further reduce the inefficient investment behavior of the company.
【學位授予單位】：青島大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F832.51;F275

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