本文選題：有限合伙制 + 激勵(lì)　； 參考：《清華大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：本文以博弈論和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論為主要方法,從有限合伙人(基金主要出資人)和普通合伙人(基金管理人)的博弈結(jié)構(gòu)出發(fā),研究股權(quán)投資基金的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。隨后結(jié)合宏觀增長(zhǎng)理論的分析框架,研究股權(quán)投資基金與技術(shù)進(jìn)步率之間的關(guān)系,對(duì)政府如何干預(yù)基金市場(chǎng)給出相應(yīng)的政策建議與機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)建議。從實(shí)踐與理論研究?jī)蓚�(gè)方面做背景鋪墊后,本文先從微觀上研究組織機(jī)制、分配機(jī)制二者與激勵(lì)的關(guān)系,再?gòu)暮暧^角度研究政府政策與激勵(lì)的關(guān)系。微觀分析從擁有貨幣資本的有限合伙人與擁有人力資本(無(wú)形資產(chǎn))的普通合伙人的博弈出發(fā),首先建立有限合伙制模型,給出與公司制Mirrlees-Holmstrom-Rogerson條件對(duì)應(yīng)的有限合伙制最優(yōu)契約條件。有限合伙制下,人力資本將貨幣資本反向并購(gòu),從而將貨幣資本所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離產(chǎn)生的委托代理問(wèn)題內(nèi)部化。有限合伙制相比公司制而言,激勵(lì)程度更高,代理成本更低。隨后進(jìn)一步放寬模型假設(shè),同時(shí)考慮隱藏信息與隱藏行動(dòng),即使?jié)M足契約因子分離等技術(shù)假設(shè),也能避免兩種組織機(jī)制下激勵(lì)程度可能相等的情形,從理論上進(jìn)一步證明有限合伙制的優(yōu)越性。對(duì)優(yōu)秀的普通合伙人而言,應(yīng)采用有限合伙制。但對(duì)一般的普通合伙人而言,可采用公司制。兩種機(jī)制優(yōu)勢(shì)的相互融合,是未來(lái)發(fā)展的主流趨勢(shì)。本文還從合作博弈與Nash討價(jià)還價(jià)角度研究股權(quán)投資基金分配機(jī)制與激勵(lì)的關(guān)系,二者能夠?qū)τ邢藓匣飬f(xié)議中常用的二八分配給出理論解釋。鑒于有限合伙人在博弈中的弱勢(shì)地位,可設(shè)計(jì)回補(bǔ)機(jī)制保護(hù)其利益。分配機(jī)制隨機(jī)化也有助于提高激勵(lì)并降低代理成本。本文最后研究政府與股權(quán)投資基金的關(guān)系。從實(shí)驗(yàn)室的研發(fā)技術(shù)到企業(yè)的實(shí)用技術(shù)這一技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)化路徑中,股權(quán)投資基金,尤其是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金,能夠發(fā)揮重要作用。政府除從稅收、監(jiān)管等宏觀政策干預(yù)外,微觀上應(yīng)以間接干預(yù)為主,政府僅作為有限合伙人,通過(guò)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)引導(dǎo)股權(quán)投資基金市場(chǎng)的良性發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Based on the game theory and mechanism design theory, this paper studies the incentive mechanism of equity investment funds from the game structure of limited partners (fund main investors) and general partners (fund managers). Then the relationship between equity investment funds and the rate of technological progress is studied in the light of the analytical framework of macro-growth theory and the corresponding policy recommendations and mechanism design suggestions on how the government intervene in the fund market are given. After laying the groundwork from the two aspects of practice and theory, this paper first studies the organization mechanism, the relationship between distribution mechanism and incentive, and then studies the relationship between government policy and incentive from the macroscopic angle. Starting from the game between the limited partner with monetary capital and the general partner with human capital (intangible assets), a limited partnership model is established. The optimal contract conditions of limited partnership corresponding to Mirrlees-Holmstrom-Rogerson condition are given. Under limited partnership, human capital acquires money capital in reverse direction, thus internalizing the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of ownership and management of monetary capital. Compared with the corporate system, limited partnership has higher incentive and lower agency cost. Then the model hypothesis is further relaxed, and the hidden information and hidden actions are considered. Even if the technical assumptions such as the separation of contract factors are satisfied, it can also avoid the situation that the incentive degree may be equal under the two organizational mechanisms. The superiority of limited partnership is further proved in theory. For a good general partner, a limited partnership should be adopted. For general partners, however, a corporate system can be adopted. The integration of the advantages of the two mechanisms is the mainstream trend of future development. This paper also studies the relationship between the allocation mechanism of equity investment funds and incentives from the perspective of cooperative game and Nash bargaining. They can give a theoretical explanation of the two-eighth distribution commonly used in limited partnership agreements. In view of the weak position of limited partners in the game, compensation mechanism can be designed to protect their interests. Randomization of allocation mechanism also helps to increase incentives and reduce agency costs. Finally, this paper studies the relationship between the government and equity investment funds. Equity investment funds, especially venture capital funds, can play an important role in the transformation from laboratory R & D technology to practical technology. In addition to the macro policy intervention such as taxation and supervision, the government should take indirect intervention as the main intervention, and the government, as a limited partner, should guide the healthy development of the equity investment fund market through the mechanism design.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F831.51

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