本文選題：CEO權(quán)力 + 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)�。� 參考：《管理評(píng)論》2017年10期

【摘要】：本文對(duì)我國(guó)A股上市公司CEO權(quán)力、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)與公司成長(zhǎng)性之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):CEO權(quán)力與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)正相關(guān);與非國(guó)有上市公司相比,CEO集權(quán)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響在國(guó)有上市公司中更加突出;進(jìn)一步,公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)性具有顯著的拖累效應(yīng),即風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高,公司成長(zhǎng)性越差;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的這種拖累效應(yīng)在國(guó)有上市公司中表現(xiàn)地更為顯著。本研究對(duì)于制約上市公司尤其是國(guó)有上市公司CEO集權(quán)、合理控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、提高公司成長(zhǎng)性等問題提供了一定的理論支持和解決思路。
[Abstract]:This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between CEO power, risk taking and corporate growth of A-share listed companies. The study found that CEO power is positively related to corporate risk-taking; compared with non-state-owned listed companies, the influence of CEO centralization on risk-taking is more prominent in state-owned listed companies. Corporate risk-taking has a significant drag on corporate growth, that is, the higher the level of risk-taking, the worse the corporate growth, and the more significant this drag effect of risk-taking is in state-owned listed companies. This study provides some theoretical support and solutions for restricting the centralization of the CEO of listed companies, especially for state-owned listed companies, reasonably controlling risks, and improving the growth of companies.
【作者單位】： 大連理工大學(xué)城市學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(14CJY073) 遼寧省社科規(guī)劃基金項(xiàng)目(L16BGL009)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.3;F272.91;F832.51

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