本文選題：IPO破發(fā) + 詢價制　； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：“新股不敗”曾經(jīng)是我國IPO發(fā)行市場永恒的定律,但2009年IPO重啟之后,這一神話一次次被打破,并且有愈演愈烈的趨勢。在此背景下,新股破發(fā)現(xiàn)象開始引起學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注。 本文則主要從承銷商追求利益最大化行為出發(fā)解釋我國IPO破發(fā)現(xiàn)象。本文從理論和實證兩個方面對承銷商利益最大化行為對IPO是否破發(fā)和IPO破發(fā)程度的影響進行了研究。本文首先基于理性經(jīng)濟人假設(shè),從理論層面分析承銷商在權(quán)衡自身直接收益成本,發(fā)行人、機構(gòu)投資者對其利益影響的基礎(chǔ)上選擇的行為如何影響IPO破發(fā)。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文選取2010-2012年深證中小板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO首日破發(fā)的116只股票與1：1配對的非破發(fā)股作為樣本,運用Logistic回歸模型,檢驗承銷商利益最大化行為對IPO是否破發(fā)的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示：承銷商定價時會關(guān)注自身短期利益(發(fā)行費用)、發(fā)行人(IPO發(fā)行規(guī)模)的影響,而忽視長期利益(承銷商聲譽)和機構(gòu)投資者(網(wǎng)下有效配售比例)的影響。這一權(quán)衡結(jié)果會促使承銷商最終選擇推高發(fā)行價格,進而引起IPO破發(fā)。接著本文選取2010-2012年深證中小板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO首日相對破發(fā)的99只股票作為樣本,運用普通多元回歸模型,檢驗承銷商利益最大化行為對IPO破發(fā)程度的影響,結(jié)果和IPO是否破發(fā)一致。 這一結(jié)果說明目前我國一級市場定價制度還不完善,存在承銷商“短視機會主義行為”,發(fā)行人和承銷商勾結(jié),聲譽對承銷商機會主義行為制約有限,詢價中機構(gòu)投資者制衡功能缺位等問題。最后本文對改善這些問題提出了一些政策建議。
[Abstract]:"New shares undefeated" was once the eternal law of China's IPO market, but after the IPO restarted in 2009, this myth was broken again and again, and there was a tendency to get worse. In this context, the phenomenon of new share break began to attract the attention of the academic community. This paper mainly explains the IPO break in China from the underwriter's pursuit of profit maximization. In this paper, the influence of underwriter's profit maximization on IPO breakage and IPO breaking degree is studied theoretically and empirically. Firstly, based on the rational economic man hypothesis, this paper analyzes how the underwriters' behavior on the basis of weighing their own direct income costs, issuers and institutional investors' influence on their interests will affect the IPO break. On this basis, this paper selects 116 stocks of Shenzhen small and medium Stock Market and gem IPO as samples, and uses Logistic regression model to test the influence of underwriter's benefit maximization behavior on IPO break or not. The results show that the underwriters pay more attention to the short-term interest (the cost of the issue, the size of the IPO) than the long-term interest (the reputation of the underwriter) and the institutional investor (the proportion of the effective placing). This tradeoff will prompt underwriters to eventually choose to push up the offering price, which in turn leads to an IPO break. Then this paper selects 99 stocks of Shenzhen small and medium Stock Market and gem IPO as samples from 2010-2012 to test the influence of underwriter's benefit maximization behavior on IPO break degree by using ordinary multiple regression model. The results are consistent with the IPO. This result shows that the pricing system of primary market in our country is not perfect at present, there is underwriter "short-sighted opportunism behavior", the issuer and underwriter collude, and reputation restricts the underwriter's opportunism behavior. Inquiry in institutional investors check and balance function and other issues. Finally, some policy suggestions are put forward to improve these problems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：2033528