本文選題：家族上市公司 + 股東代理��； 參考：《西北大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：進入新世紀以來,伴隨著中國經濟的復蘇,很多上市家族企業(yè)取得了巨大的發(fā)展。更多的家族通過采取上市融資的措施,企業(yè)開始不斷壯大,從而涌現(xiàn)出一大批規(guī)模龐大、實力雄厚的家族企業(yè)。對這些上市企業(yè)進行研究分析,可以發(fā)現(xiàn)一個相似的問題,那就是這些上市企業(yè)具有的股權都比較集中,即存在所謂家族控股的性質。由于家族企業(yè)的股東有權控制上市企業(yè),正是這些權利的存在導致了股東不斷地通過控制權力實現(xiàn)自身利益最大化,這樣無疑造成企業(yè)的經營決策與企業(yè)自身利益最大化相背離,因此造成嚴重的代理問題。 本文在總結學術界對該問題研究的基礎上,建立家族上市公司大股東與中小股東之間代理問題的回歸模型。中國家族上市公司一般是金字塔式的控股形式,現(xiàn)金流權和投票權在某種意義上具有分離性。其投票權和公司價值呈現(xiàn)出顯著的負相關,而現(xiàn)金流權與控制權的分離率與企業(yè)價值成顯著正相關。經過回歸模型的研究得出,雖然股權集中在某種意義上的可以減小代理成本,不過股權的高度集中會發(fā)生大股東侵害小股東權益的情況。家族控股股東在可以有效控制公司的同時,會盡可能的攫取他人利益,就有可能轉移公司內部資源,造成公司價值的下降,因此嚴重影響到小股東的利益。以上實證檢驗結果表明,在我國上市公司的大股東與中小股東之間確實存在小股東利益受大股東侵害的問題,而在家族企業(yè)中,實際控股股東是家族,從而造成更嚴重的權益侵占問題。 隨后,文章以委托代理理論和企業(yè)合約理論為基礎,分析了上市家族企業(yè)大股東權益侵害的表現(xiàn)方式和產生原因。最后針對這些問題提出了較為細致的解決措施,并總結了文章結論。
[Abstract]:Since entering the new century, with the recovery of Chinese economy, many listed family enterprises have made great progress. More families through the adoption of public financing measures, companies began to grow, resulting in the emergence of a large number of large, powerful family businesses. Through the research and analysis of these listed enterprises, we can find a similar problem, that is, the ownership of these listed enterprises is relatively concentrated, that is, there is the nature of so-called family holding. Because the shareholders of the family enterprises have the right to control the listed enterprises, it is the existence of these rights that leads the shareholders to realize the maximization of their own interests through the power of control. This no doubt causes the deviation between the enterprise's management decision and the enterprise's own benefit maximization, thus causes the serious agency problem. On the basis of summing up the academic research on this issue, this paper establishes a regression model of the agency problem between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders of the family listed companies. Chinese family listed companies are generally pyramid holding form, cash flow rights and voting rights are separated in a sense. There is a significant negative correlation between voting rights and corporate value, and a significant positive correlation between the separation rate of cash flow right and control right and firm value. Through the study of regression model, although the concentration of equity in a certain sense can reduce the agency costs, but the high concentration of equity rights and interests of large shareholders will be infringed on minority shareholders. While controlling the company effectively, the family controlling shareholder will seize the benefit of others as much as possible, which may transfer the internal resources of the company and cause the decline of the company value, thus seriously affecting the interests of the minority shareholders. The above empirical results show that there is a problem that the interests of minority shareholders are infringed by large shareholders in Chinese listed companies, but in family enterprises, the actual controlling shareholders are families. Thus causing a more serious problem of encroachment of rights and interests. Then, based on the principal-agent theory and the enterprise contract theory, this paper analyzes the manifestation and causes of the infringement of the rights and interests of the majority shareholders in the listed family enterprises. Finally, the author puts forward some detailed measures to solve these problems, and summarizes the conclusion of the paper.
【學位授予單位】：西北大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.5;F832.51

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 曹德駿;家族企業(yè)研究的幾個理論問題[J];財經科學;2002年06期

2 蘇啟林;創(chuàng)業(yè)投資與家族企業(yè)轉型[J];當代經濟管理;2005年04期

3 郭躍進;論家族企業(yè)上市后的三大利益強化效應[J];福建論壇(人文社會科學版);2004年03期

4 徐曉東,陳小悅;第一大股東對公司治理、企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響分析[J];經濟研究;2003年02期

5 蘇啟林,朱文;上市公司家族控制與企業(yè)價值[J];經濟研究;2003年08期

6 谷祺;鄧德強;路倩;;現(xiàn)金流權與控制權分離下的公司價值——基于我國家族上市公司的實證研究[J];會計研究;2006年04期

7 張雪瑩;淺析上市公司股利政策與中小股東利益受損[J];財會研究;2005年01期

8 周立新;;大股東治理與公司績效:來自于中國上市家族公司的實證[J];統(tǒng)計與決策;2006年12期

9 李春琦;影響我國家族企業(yè)績效的經驗證據——基于對家族上市公司控股比例和規(guī)模的考察[J];統(tǒng)計研究;2005年11期

10 余明桂,夏新平,吳少凡;公司治理研究新趨勢——控股股東與小股東之間的代理問題[J];外國經濟與管理;2004年02期

，

本文編號：1958298