本文選題：企業(yè)金融化 + 高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)��； 參考：《科技進(jìn)步與對(duì)策》2017年22期

【摘要】：以2010-2015年滬深584家A股上市公司為樣本,從產(chǎn)權(quán)異質(zhì)性角度考察企業(yè)金融化、高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)投資關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)非貨幣金融資產(chǎn)持有比例與研發(fā)投資呈負(fù)相關(guān),反映企業(yè)金融化對(duì)研發(fā)投資具有擠出效應(yīng),且高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)能弱化企業(yè)金融化與研發(fā)投資的負(fù)向關(guān)系。擠出效應(yīng)和弱化效應(yīng)在投資性金融資產(chǎn)上體現(xiàn)非常明顯,而在交易類(lèi)金融資產(chǎn)上體現(xiàn)不明顯;(2)與非國(guó)有企業(yè)相比,非貨幣金融資產(chǎn)的擠出效應(yīng)和高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的弱化效應(yīng)在國(guó)有企業(yè)中表現(xiàn)更為顯著。投資性金融資產(chǎn)的擠出效應(yīng)在國(guó)有企業(yè)中較為顯著,而在非國(guó)有企業(yè)中不太顯著,但高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的抑制作用在國(guó)有或非國(guó)有企業(yè)均較為明顯。不論產(chǎn)權(quán)異質(zhì)性,交易類(lèi)金融資產(chǎn)的擠出效應(yīng)和高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的抑制作用均不顯著。
[Abstract]:Taking 584 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2015 as a sample, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate financialization, executive equity incentive and R & D investment from the perspective of property heterogeneity. It is found that the proportion of non-monetary and financial assets is negatively correlated with R & D investment, which reflects that enterprise financialization has crowding out effect on R & D investment, and executive equity incentive can weaken the negative relationship between enterprise financialization and R & D investment. The crowding-out effect and the weakening effect are very obvious in the investment financial assets, but not obvious in the transaction financial assets.) compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the crowding-out effect and the weakening effect are very obvious. The crowding out effect of non-monetary financial assets and the weakening effect of executive equity incentive are more obvious in state-owned enterprises. The crowding out effect of investment financial assets is more significant in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises, but the inhibition effect of executive equity incentive is obvious in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Regardless of the heterogeneity of property rights, the crowding-out effect of transaction financial assets and the inhibition of executive equity incentive are not significant.
【作者單位】： 合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71273082)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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