本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度 + 貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度　； 參考：《東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：管理之道,惟在用人,企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槿瞬诺母?jìng)爭(zhēng)。理性的高級(jí)管理人員以自身利益最大化為目標(biāo),在經(jīng)營(yíng)管理過程中極有可能發(fā)生機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,降低投資效率和損害企業(yè)利益。因此,制定良好的激勵(lì)機(jī)制成為公司治理首要解決的問題,也是提升企業(yè)價(jià)值的重要舉措。然而,以往的研究大多將激勵(lì)機(jī)制作為一個(gè)整體研究,研究激勵(lì)方案契約要素激勵(lì)效果的文章相對(duì)較少,結(jié)論也不盡相同。激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度作為激勵(lì)方案最重要的契約要素,其對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值是否產(chǎn)生影響,以及如何提高影響程度以提升企業(yè)價(jià)值更加值得我們進(jìn)行深入探討。許多學(xué)者認(rèn)為在激勵(lì)機(jī)制影響企業(yè)價(jià)值的過程中會(huì)受到不同因素的作用導(dǎo)致研究結(jié)果出現(xiàn)偏差�；诖怂悸�,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)方案實(shí)施缺乏層次性,較少考慮高管特征權(quán)變因素,忽略由于不同的高管特征對(duì)激勵(lì)方案的偏好不同,導(dǎo)致激勵(lì)方案價(jià)值效應(yīng)不同。因此,在現(xiàn)有的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制下,何種激勵(lì)方案強(qiáng)度要素能夠有效激勵(lì)高管,以及何種特征的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)能夠進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響以此提高企業(yè)價(jià)值成為本文研究的重點(diǎn)。文章在激勵(lì)理論、高層梯隊(duì)理論與企業(yè)價(jià)值等相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行深入研究,首先機(jī)理分析高管激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值直接影響以及考慮不同高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征權(quán)變因素后,激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值影響的變化并提出相應(yīng)研究假設(shè);其次,選取2006-2015年深、上證交所主板公告的實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的上市企業(yè)作為研究樣本,采用多元回歸分析的方法檢驗(yàn)高管激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度(股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度和貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度)對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值直接影響,運(yùn)用層次回歸分析的方法,研究高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征對(duì)高管激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度影響企業(yè)價(jià)值的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng),即在考慮高管團(tuán)隊(duì)年齡、教育背景、任期特征權(quán)變因素后,高管激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值影響系數(shù)與直接影響系數(shù)進(jìn)行對(duì)比,二者顯著的差異表明高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征具有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用,通過高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征與高管激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度交互項(xiàng)系數(shù)進(jìn)一步分析不同高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng);最后根據(jù)研究成果得出提升企業(yè)價(jià)值的措施。研究表明:股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度顯著負(fù)向影響企業(yè)價(jià)值,薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度顯著正向影響企業(yè)價(jià)值;高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征表現(xiàn)出不同的調(diào)節(jié)作用,高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征對(duì)限制性股票激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度影響價(jià)值的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)于股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度影響企業(yè)價(jià)值的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng);高管團(tuán)隊(duì)年齡、高管團(tuán)隊(duì)教育背景和高管團(tuán)隊(duì)任期均減弱股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的負(fù)向影響;高管團(tuán)隊(duì)年齡弱化貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的正向影響,高管團(tuán)隊(duì)教育水平和高管團(tuán)隊(duì)任期均對(duì)貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度影響企業(yè)價(jià)值起到強(qiáng)化的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。研究認(rèn)為:企業(yè)應(yīng)該通過發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度價(jià)值效應(yīng)和貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度價(jià)值效應(yīng)來提升企業(yè)價(jià)值,主要措施為重視股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案強(qiáng)度要素價(jià)值效應(yīng)、充分利用高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征在股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制中調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)、廣泛運(yùn)用標(biāo)的物為限制性股票的激勵(lì)方式、突出貨幣薪酬強(qiáng)度要素的激勵(lì)作用、實(shí)施激勵(lì)的同時(shí)完善企業(yè)監(jiān)督機(jī)制、充分利用高管團(tuán)隊(duì)特征在貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制中調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。
[Abstract]:The way of management is to change the competition between people and enterprises into the competition of talents. The rational senior managers aim at the maximization of their own interests. In the process of management, it is very likely that opportunism will occur, reduce the efficiency of investment and damage the interests of the enterprises. Therefore, a good incentive mechanism has become the primary solution to the corporate governance. The problem is also an important measure to improve the value of the enterprise. However, most of the previous studies take incentive mechanism as a whole research. The research on incentive effect of incentive scheme contract factors is relatively small and the conclusion is different. Incentive intensity is the most important contract factor of incentive scheme, and it has an impact on the enterprise value. And how to improve the degree of impact to improve the value of the enterprise is worth further discussion. Many scholars believe that the effect of different factors on the impact of incentive mechanism on the enterprise value will lead to the deviation of the results. Based on this idea, we find that the incentive scheme is lack of hierarchy and less consideration of executive characteristic rights. Changing factors, ignoring the different preference of different executive characteristics to incentive schemes, leads to the different value effects of incentive schemes. Therefore, under the existing executive incentive mechanism, what incentive scheme intensity factors can effectively motivate executives and what characteristics of the executive team can further enhance the impact of incentive intensity on enterprise value. On the basis of the theory of incentive, the theory of top echelon and the value of enterprise, this paper makes an in-depth study. Firstly, it analyzes the direct impact of executive incentive intensity on the enterprise value and considering the factors of different executive team characteristics, and the intensity of incentive is reflected to the value of the enterprise. Secondly, select the listed enterprises of the equity incentive plan of Shanghai Shanghai stock exchange for 2006-2015 years as the research sample, and use multiple regression analysis to test the direct impact of executive incentive intensity (equity incentive intensity and monetary salary incentive intensity) on the enterprise value, and use the level. The method of regression analysis is used to study the regulation effect of executive team characteristics on executive incentive intensity affecting enterprise value. That is, after considering the senior management team age, educational background, and tenure characteristics, the executive incentive intensity is compared with the direct impact coefficient of the enterprise value impact coefficient. The significant difference between the two shows the characteristics of the executive team. With the significant adjustment function, the adjustment effect of the characteristics of different executive team is further analyzed through the interaction coefficient of senior executive team and executive incentive intensity. Finally, the measures to improve the enterprise value are obtained according to the research results. The research shows that the equity incentive intensity significantly negatively affects the enterprise value, and the salary incentive intensity has a significant positive effect. Corporate value, executive team characteristics show different regulatory roles. The regulation effect of executive team characteristics on the impact value of limited stock incentive intensity is stronger than the effect of stock option incentive intensity on the adjustment effect of enterprise value; senior executive team age, executive team education background and executive team term weaken equity incentive intensity to enterprises The negative influence of the business value; the age of the executive team weakens the positive influence of the monetary salary incentive intensity on the enterprise value, the level of executive team education and the tenure of the executive team all have a strengthening effect on the influence of the monetary incentive intensity on the value of the enterprise. The main measures are to pay attention to the value effect of the strength factor of the equity incentive scheme, make full use of the regulation effect of the executive team characteristics in the equity incentive mechanism, and widely use the subject matter as the incentive mode of the restricted stock, highlight the incentive effect of the monetary remuneration intensity factors and implement the incentive. At the same time, we should improve the supervision mechanism and make full use of the moderating effect of the TMT characteristics in the monetary compensation incentive mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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