本文選題：在職消費 + 政治關(guān)聯(lián)�。� 參考：《廣西大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,上市公司在職消費頗受公眾爭議,尤其是國有企業(yè)奢靡的在職消費更是引起公眾的強烈抨擊。根據(jù)已有文獻研究,過度的在職消費是對企業(yè)資源的浪費,從而損害企業(yè)價值,不利于企業(yè)業(yè)績的提高。那么,為了掩蓋在職消費對企業(yè)績效的不利影響,高管是否會為此進行盈余管理呢?這是本文研究的主要問題。在此基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合當前上市公司中普遍存在的政治關(guān)聯(lián)現(xiàn)象,本文進一步研究不同政治背景下,在職消費對盈余管理的差異性影響。本文的研究對完善高管薪酬激勵機制、抑制企業(yè)盈余管理行為、提高企業(yè)會計信息質(zhì)量、保護外部投資者具有一定的理論意義和現(xiàn)實意義。 已有相關(guān)文獻主要關(guān)注在職消費對企業(yè)績效的影響,有關(guān)在職消費與盈余管理兩者間相關(guān)關(guān)系的研究比較少,且目前的研究普遍忽略在職消費與盈余管理之間的內(nèi)生性問題,使得研究結(jié)論存在一定的片面性,缺乏可靠性。本文回顧了以往研究文獻,并分析現(xiàn)有文獻的不足,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出本文的幾點創(chuàng)新：(1)深入研究在職消費對盈余管理的影響；(2)考慮兩者間的內(nèi)生性問題,控制滯后期在職消費對研究結(jié)論的影響；(3)創(chuàng)新性地研究不同政治背景下,在職消費與盈余管理的差異性影響。然后,綜合分析相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)后構(gòu)建出本文的研究框架,并以8837家深滬兩市A股上市公司的2008——2012年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,對本文提出的假設(shè)進行實證檢驗。實證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),從總體上看,上市公司滯后一期和當前期的在職消費均與當期盈余管理顯著正相關(guān)。將樣本分類為國有企業(yè)和非國有企業(yè)后,研究顯示：相比非國有企業(yè),國有企業(yè)的在職消費越要,盈余管理程度更高,且不同政治背景下,在職消費對盈余管理的影響存在一定差異：相對政治關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè),非政治關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)的在職消費越要,盈余管理程度更高。根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)論,分別從企業(yè)和政府的角度,提出完善高管薪酬體制、建立健全會計準則制度,強化外部監(jiān)督,完善薪酬披露制度等建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the public debate on public consumption of listed companies, especially the extravagant consumption of state-owned enterprises, has aroused strong public criticism. According to the existing literature, excessive on-the-job consumption is a waste of enterprise resources, which damages the value of enterprises and is not conducive to the improvement of enterprise performance. So, in order to cover up the adverse impact of in-service consumption on corporate performance, will executives do earnings management for this purpose? This is the main problem studied in this paper. On the basis of this, this paper further studies the different influence of in-service consumption on earnings management under different political background, combined with the political connection phenomenon that exists widely in the listed companies at present. The research of this paper has certain theoretical and practical significance to consummate the incentive mechanism of executive compensation, restrain the behavior of enterprise earnings management, improve the quality of enterprise accounting information, and protect external investors. There are some related literatures mainly concerned about the impact of on-the-job consumption on corporate performance. There are few studies on the relationship between in-service consumption and earnings management, and the current research generally ignores the endogenous problem between in-service consumption and earnings management. The conclusion of the study is one-sidedness and lack of reliability. This paper reviews the previous research literatures, and analyzes the shortcomings of the existing ones. On the basis of this, it puts forward several innovations of this paper: 1) deeply studying the effect of active consumption on earnings management. (2) considering the endogenous problem between the two. The influence of controlling late working consumption on the conclusion of the study the difference between active consumption and earnings Management under different political background is studied innovatively. Then, the research frame of this paper is constructed by synthetically analyzing the relevant theoretical basis, and taking the data of 8837 A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2012 as a sample, the hypothesis proposed in this paper is tested empirically. The empirical results show that, on the whole, the in-service consumption of listed companies is significantly positively correlated with earnings management in the current period. After classifying the samples into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the study shows that: compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the more state-owned enterprises on the job consumption, the higher the degree of earnings management, and under different political background, There are some differences in the influence of in-service consumption on earnings management: compared with political affiliated enterprises, the higher the in-service consumption of non-political affiliated enterprises, the higher the degree of earnings management. According to the conclusion of this paper, from the point of view of enterprise and government, this paper puts forward some suggestions, such as perfecting executive compensation system, establishing and perfecting accounting standard system, strengthening external supervision, perfecting compensation disclosure system and so on.
【學位授予單位】：廣西大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275;D630.9

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