本文選題：謹(jǐn)慎性 + 董事會(huì)特征�。� 參考：《西南石油大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),上市公司虛假賬簿、管理者操縱利潤(rùn),以謀私利的案例時(shí)有發(fā)生。投資者與管理者的信息不對(duì)稱,對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)真實(shí)、可靠性的質(zhì)疑等問(wèn)題引起廣泛關(guān)注。這些問(wèn)題的核心在于會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性。會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性是會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量重要的特征之一,而董事會(huì)作為上市公司內(nèi)部治理重要因素,是對(duì)監(jiān)督管理者行為的有效砝碼。因此,本文將通過(guò)對(duì)A股深交所上市公司數(shù)據(jù)的整合分析,結(jié)合統(tǒng)計(jì)處理方法,系統(tǒng)地研究董事會(huì)特征與會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性的關(guān)系,驗(yàn)證我國(guó)上市公司董事會(huì)能否通過(guò)發(fā)揮其監(jiān)督職能對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性的影響力,并針對(duì)實(shí)證結(jié)果,提出相關(guān)的建議,完善董事會(huì)制度提高管理層經(jīng)營(yíng)管理效率,實(shí)現(xiàn)會(huì)計(jì)盈余的謹(jǐn)慎性。 本文在A股上市公司2008-2012年所有上市公司中,隨機(jī)選取150家上市公司樣本數(shù)據(jù),采用Basu的改良模型,并結(jié)合Khan與Watts的"C-score"方法對(duì)公司的會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性進(jìn)行計(jì)量。首先驗(yàn)證了謹(jǐn)慎性在我國(guó)上市公司的存在,進(jìn)一步選取董事會(huì)特征中董事會(huì)規(guī)模、兩職分離情況、獨(dú)立董事比例、審計(jì)委員會(huì)的設(shè)立及董事會(huì)年度會(huì)議次數(shù)等五方面特征變量,采用多元線性回歸的方法將五個(gè)董事會(huì)特征與會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性相結(jié)合來(lái)研究相關(guān)關(guān)系,并得出結(jié)論,兩職分離情況、審計(jì)委員會(huì)的設(shè)立與會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性呈正向顯著關(guān)系；獨(dú)立董事比例與會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性的關(guān)系不顯著；董事會(huì)規(guī)模、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性呈正向相關(guān)關(guān)系,但不顯著。最后,根據(jù)檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果得出研究結(jié)論,結(jié)合我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)狀提出完善董事會(huì)制度的建議,達(dá)到提高會(huì)計(jì)盈余謹(jǐn)慎性的目的。
[Abstract]:In recent years, false accounting books of listed companies, managers manipulate profits, in order to seek private profit cases occur from time to time. The asymmetric information between investors and managers has aroused widespread concern about the authenticity and reliability of accounting data. The core of these problems is the caution of accounting earnings. Accounting earnings prudence is one of the important characteristics of accounting information quality, and the board of directors, as an important factor in the internal governance of listed companies, is an effective weight to supervise the behavior of managers. Therefore, this paper will systematically study the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the caution of accounting earnings through the integration and analysis of the data of the listed companies in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange of A shares, combined with the statistical processing method. This paper verifies whether the board of directors of listed companies in our country can exert the influence of its supervisory function on the caution of accounting earnings, and puts forward some relevant suggestions to improve the efficiency of management management by perfecting the board of directors system. Realize the caution of accounting surplus. In this paper, the sample data of 150 listed companies from 2008 to 2012 are selected randomly, and the modified model of Basu is used to measure the accounting earnings prudence of the companies with the combination of Khan and Watts's "C-score" method. Firstly, it verifies the existence of caution in listed companies in China, and further selects five characteristic variables, such as the size of board of directors, the separation of two positions, the proportion of independent directors, the establishment of audit committee and the number of annual meetings of the board of directors. Using the method of multiple linear regression to study the correlation between the characteristics of the five boards of directors and the caution of accounting earnings, and draw the conclusion that the establishment of the audit committee is positively and significantly related to the accounting earnings prudence in the case of separation of two posts; The relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the caution of accounting earnings is not significant, while the size of the board of directors, the number of meetings of the board of directors and the caution of accounting earnings are positively correlated, but not significant. Finally, according to the results of the study, the author puts forward the suggestion of perfecting the board of directors system according to the present situation of market economy in China, so as to improve the caution of accounting earnings.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南石油大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F271;F275

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