本文選題：終極控制人 + 內(nèi)部人交易　； 參考：《西安財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)》2017年06期

【摘要】：擁有優(yōu)勢(shì)信息的內(nèi)部人通過知情交易牟利,損害了外部投資者特別是中小投資者的利益。內(nèi)部人交易問題成為監(jiān)管者和投資者關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)問題。本文以2012-2016年深圳證券交易所上市公司為樣本,追溯上市公司控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),研究了終極控制人的行為動(dòng)機(jī)與能力對(duì)內(nèi)部人交易行為的影響。研究表明,當(dāng)終極控制人為政府時(shí),監(jiān)管內(nèi)部人的動(dòng)機(jī)和能力較低,內(nèi)部人交易發(fā)生的可能性更大;當(dāng)現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離程度較高時(shí),終極控制人具備侵占上市公司的動(dòng)機(jī)和能力,與內(nèi)部人合謀進(jìn)而縱容內(nèi)部人交易的可能性更大;終極控制人至上市公司之間的層級(jí)越多,委托代理成本越高,監(jiān)管動(dòng)機(jī)和能力越弱,越容易導(dǎo)致內(nèi)部人交易行為的發(fā)生。
[Abstract]:Insiders with advantage information make profits through informed transactions, which impair the interests of external investors, especially small and medium-sized investors. Insider trading has become a hot issue for regulators and investors. Based on the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016, this paper traces the control structure of listed companies and studies the influence of ultimate controller's behavior motivation and ability on insider's trading behavior. Studies have shown that when the ultimate controller is the government, the motivations and abilities of the insiders are lower and the insider transactions are more likely to occur; when the separation of cash flow rights and control rights is higher, The ultimate controller has the motive and ability to occupy the listed company, and is more likely to connive with the insider to connive at the insider transaction. The more layers between the ultimate controller and the listed company, the higher the principal-agent cost. The weaker the regulatory motivation and ability, the more likely to lead to insider trading behavior.
【作者單位】： 西安外國語大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“圈際政治關(guān)系、宏觀調(diào)控政策與企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)決策”(17YJA790073) 西安外國語大學(xué)校級(jí)重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(12XWA03)
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51
，

本文編號(hào)：1821594