發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-23 18:01

  本文選題：高管薪酬 + 內(nèi)部控制　； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著現(xiàn)代公司制的發(fā)展，股東將公司的經(jīng)營權(quán)委托給經(jīng)理人，并根據(jù)其對(duì)公司的貢獻(xiàn)程度確定高管薪酬。但是，由于信息不對(duì)稱的存在，股東很難了解到經(jīng)理人真正的貢獻(xiàn)程度，因此，直觀可量的會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績指標(biāo)就成為高管薪酬契約的訂立依據(jù)。不過，這就可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)高管人員有基于薪酬契約動(dòng)機(jī)的盈余管理行為。這種盈余管理行為可能會(huì)不利于高管薪酬契約激勵(lì)作用的發(fā)揮，損害股東的利益，，還可能會(huì)降低財(cái)務(wù)信息質(zhì)量。于是，如何抑制高管人員的這種自利行為愈發(fā)受到關(guān)注。 國內(nèi)外的諸多學(xué)者研究了管理層激勵(lì)與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系，部分學(xué)者還關(guān)注了管理層權(quán)力、股權(quán)激勵(lì)等因素對(duì)二者相互關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的影響。我們認(rèn)為內(nèi)部控制制度既能在限制管理層進(jìn)行盈余管理的空間和程度方面發(fā)揮一定的作用，也能促進(jìn)企業(yè)管理層受托責(zé)任的有效履行。所以，將內(nèi)部控制變量引入上述關(guān)系的研究之中有著重要的意義。 本文基于委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論和信號(hào)傳遞理論，選取2008-2012年A股上市公司作為研究樣本，考察內(nèi)部控制對(duì)企業(yè)盈余管理程度的影響，同時(shí)研究它將如何影響高管薪酬與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系，運(yùn)用多元線性回歸模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：高管人員有為追求高額薪酬而進(jìn)行盈余管理行為的動(dòng)機(jī)；內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量良好的企業(yè)通常來說盈余管理程度較低；內(nèi)部控制會(huì)在高管薪酬誘發(fā)盈余管理的管理層自利行為中發(fā)揮積極的作用，內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量越高越能有效地抑制管理層的這種機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。本文的結(jié)論充實(shí)了盈余管理與高管薪酬相關(guān)性的研究，同時(shí)也為內(nèi)部控制的相關(guān)規(guī)范指引發(fā)揮的積極作用提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the development of the modern company system, the shareholders entrust the management of the company to the manager and determine the executive compensation according to the degree of its contribution to the company. However, because of the existence of information asymmetry, it is difficult for the shareholders to understand the real contribution of the manager. Therefore, the direct and measurable accounting performance index becomes the conclusion of the executive compensation contract. However, it may lead to the earnings management behavior based on compensation contract motivation. The earnings management behavior may not help the executive compensation contract incentive function to play, damage the interests of shareholders, and may also reduce the quality of financial information. Hair is concerned.
Many scholars at home and abroad have studied the relationship between management motivation and earnings management. Some scholars also pay attention to the influence of management power and equity incentive on the relationship between the two. We think that the internal control system can play a certain role in restricting the management level and the extent of earnings management. Therefore, it is of great significance to introduce internal control variables into the study of the above relations.
Based on the principal-agent theory, the information asymmetry theory and the signal transmission theory, the 2008-2012 year A shares listed companies are selected as the research samples to investigate the influence of internal control on the degree of earnings management, and how it affects the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management, and the multiple linear regression model is used to carry out empirical research. The results show that the executives have the motivation to pursue the earnings management behavior for the high salary, and the enterprises with good internal control quality usually have low earnings management, and the internal control will play an extremely important role in the management self-interest of the executive compensation earnings management, and the higher the internal control quality, the more effective it can be. The conclusion of this paper enriches the research on the relevance of earnings management to executive compensation, and provides empirical evidence for the positive role of the guidelines for internal control.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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