本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng) + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)��； 參考：《江西理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代的到來,促進(jìn)了高成長(zhǎng)、高科技公司的快速發(fā)展,低準(zhǔn)入、高運(yùn)作、嚴(yán)披露的創(chuàng)業(yè)板崛起,美國納斯達(dá)克市場(chǎng)發(fā)展良好。相對(duì)于主板市場(chǎng),創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)為“三高一小”(高成長(zhǎng)、高科技、高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、小規(guī)模)的公司,創(chuàng)造了良好的融資平臺(tái)和有效的資本運(yùn)作方式。我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板2009年10月在深圳證券交易所上市,截止至2016年9月底就吸引了540家的公司加入,成為了自主創(chuàng)新的孵化地和產(chǎn)業(yè)園。但是創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)這些蘊(yùn)含巨大發(fā)展?jié)摿Φ墓久媾R著高風(fēng)險(xiǎn),稍有不慎就會(huì)被競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)淘汰出局。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司發(fā)展的最大動(dòng)力是核心技術(shù)人員的研發(fā)能力和高層管理人員的優(yōu)秀管理理念,如何吸引并留住這些優(yōu)秀人才是公司生存和發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為解決委托代理問題、激勵(lì)人才的有效方式,在西方國家得到了廣泛的運(yùn)用,我國在二十世紀(jì)九十年代引入。股權(quán)激勵(lì)以股權(quán)為標(biāo)的,使高管和核心技術(shù)人員享有公司決策參與權(quán)和利潤(rùn)分享權(quán),激勵(lì)對(duì)象和公司股東目標(biāo)一致、利益趨同,提高了他們的工作效率和積極性。本文對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了整理歸納,發(fā)現(xiàn)大部分學(xué)者是將這種激勵(lì)計(jì)劃當(dāng)作一個(gè)整體去研究,對(duì)其內(nèi)部的各個(gè)契約要素探討的不深入,本文將試圖彌補(bǔ)這一塊的欠缺和空白,并從創(chuàng)業(yè)板入手分析,這也是本文的創(chuàng)新之處。本文在介紹相關(guān)概念和理論的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的現(xiàn)狀,發(fā)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)比例普遍偏低、有效期較短、行權(quán)條件單一、模式簡(jiǎn)單的問題。為了更加深入的研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)契約要素和績(jī)效的關(guān)系,本文選取了181家公司作為樣本,用實(shí)證方法進(jìn)行分析。首先,為了避免單一指標(biāo)的片面性,本文選取了14個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo),用因子分析得出績(jī)效的綜合得分,績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果表明創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)公司的績(jī)效一般。接著,用獨(dú)立樣本T檢驗(yàn)分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)推行后的效果,發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)績(jī)效略有提升但不顯著。最后,通過回歸方法探究了契約要素中激勵(lì)比例、有效期、行權(quán)條件和企業(yè)績(jī)效的關(guān)系,并對(duì)比兩種主要模式的實(shí)施效果,得出以下結(jié)論:激勵(lì)比例和績(jī)效是弱正相關(guān)關(guān)系;有效期與績(jī)效無顯著性關(guān)系;行權(quán)條件個(gè)數(shù)越多,企業(yè)績(jī)效越好;限制性股票的激勵(lì)效果優(yōu)于股票期權(quán)。針對(duì)以上實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文提出了建議:股權(quán)激勵(lì)契約要素設(shè)計(jì)方面,要合理確定激勵(lì)比例、有效期和激勵(lì)模式,行權(quán)條件多元化。外部環(huán)境方面,需要培育良好的市場(chǎng)氛圍,優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),加強(qiáng)對(duì)管理層的監(jiān)督,完善內(nèi)部控制,健全相關(guān)法律法規(guī)。
[Abstract]:The arrival of knowledge economy era has promoted the rapid development of high-tech companies, low access, high operation, strict disclosure of the growth Enterprise Market (gem), the United States NASDAQ market has developed well. Compared with the main board market, the gem market has created a good financing platform and an effective capital operation mode for "three high and one small" companies (high growth, high technology, high risk, small scale). China's gem listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in October 2009. By the end of September 2016, it has attracted 540 companies to join, and has become the incubator and industrial park of independent innovation. However, the gem market which contains huge development potential companies are facing high risk, a little inadvertently will be eliminated from the competitive gem market. The biggest motive force for the development of gem listed companies is the research and development ability of core technicians and the excellent management concept of senior management personnel. How to attract and retain these outstanding talents is the key to the survival and development of the company. As an effective way to solve the problem of principal-agent and encourage talents, equity incentive has been widely used in western countries. Equity incentive takes equity as the target, which makes executives and core technicians enjoy the right to participate in decision-making and share profits. The objectives of incentive and shareholders are the same, the interests converge, and their working efficiency and enthusiasm are improved. This paper summarizes the relevant documents of equity incentive, and finds that most scholars study this incentive plan as a whole, and do not deeply discuss the various contractual elements within the incentive plan. This paper will try to make up for the lack and blank of this piece, and analyze from the gem, which is also the innovation of this paper. Based on the introduction of related concepts and theories, this paper analyzes the current situation of equity incentive in gem listed companies, and finds that the incentive ratio is generally low, the validity period is relatively short, the exercise condition is simple, and the mode is simple. In order to further study the relationship between equity incentive contract elements and performance, this paper selects 181 companies as a sample and uses empirical methods to analyze. First of all, in order to avoid the one-sidedness of a single index, this paper selects 14 financial indicators, using factor analysis to obtain a comprehensive score of performance, performance evaluation results show that the gem market equity incentive company performance is generally. Then, using independent sample T test to analyze the effect of equity incentive, we find that the enterprise performance is slightly improved but not significant. Finally, the relationship between incentive ratio, validity period, exercise condition and enterprise performance in contract elements is explored by regression method, and the following conclusions are drawn: incentive ratio and performance are weakly positive correlation; There is no significant relationship between validity and performance; the more the number of exercise conditions, the better the performance of the firm; the incentive effect of restricted stock is better than that of stock option. In view of the above empirical results, this paper puts forward some suggestions: in the aspect of designing the elements of equity incentive contract, we should reasonably determine the incentive ratio, the period of validity, the incentive mode, and the diversification of the exercise conditions. In terms of external environment, it is necessary to cultivate a good market atmosphere, optimize the corporate governance structure, strengthen the supervision of the management, perfect the internal control, and improve the relevant laws and regulations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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