本文選題：現(xiàn)金股利 + 信息不對稱�。� 參考：《上海外國語大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)金股利作為上市公司回饋股東的方式傳遞著公司業(yè)績的信號,但是長久以來這種信號傳遞的有效性一直困擾著學界。前輩學者對股利信號理論的實證研究一直是“喜憂參半”,支持與否定股利信號理論的結論各占半壁江山,股利信號傳遞作用存在失靈的情況。本文首先了分析了我國上市公司現(xiàn)金分紅的現(xiàn)狀,認為在現(xiàn)行分紅法規(guī)日趨完善,監(jiān)管日益嚴格的背景下,A股上市公司分紅狀況趨于良好,分紅公司數(shù)量、占比、分紅金額都在穩(wěn)定上升,為研究股利信號傳遞打下了良好的環(huán)境基礎。本文認為在不對稱信息的環(huán)境中,起到信號傳遞作用的行為必須是清晰可辨并且具有難以模仿性的,而現(xiàn)金股利支付率的高低水平往往是由諸多因素共同作用的結果,傳遞公司業(yè)績的信號本身存在著諸多信息不對稱。單以股利支付率的高低來看公司業(yè)績會就會導致股利信號失靈。在深入分析了現(xiàn)金股利本質(zhì)后,本文認為要讓股利起到信號傳遞作用必須結合股利支付“三要素”即披露時間點,股利支付率的可模仿性,公司外部融資行為一起分析。一般來說,能做到股利預披露的公司往往是對自己業(yè)績非常有信心,想要吸引市場關注的公司。預披露降低了投資者搜索信息的成本,讓市場有更多時間研究公司經(jīng)營狀況,進而主動降低了信息不對稱,因此現(xiàn)金股利預披露是一個有效的傳遞公司經(jīng)營狀況良好信息的信號;本文用Bhattacharya模型描述了高現(xiàn)金股利的股票對股東價值帶來的影響。只有業(yè)績出色的公司能支付難以模仿的高股利。對于業(yè)績不佳的公司來說,高股利將對公司第二年的經(jīng)營造成極大的壓力,成本過大。因此難以模仿的高股利也是傳遞公司上佳業(yè)績的信號;對于其余的公司需要通過外部融資行為來解決現(xiàn)金股利中存在的信息不對稱,本文認為公司保留利潤主要是用于公司未來發(fā)展,外部融資可以有效解決投資者不清楚公司的未來的投資項目收益率是否大于必要收益率這個問題,所以本文創(chuàng)新性建立了三個“股價收益率—股利支付率模型”以表現(xiàn)外部融資對股利信號傳遞起到的作用。在實證部分,本文將選取了A股2015年上市公司作為樣本,將樣本分為五組:現(xiàn)金股利預披露組、高現(xiàn)金股利組、無外部融資公司中等現(xiàn)金股利組、無外部融資低現(xiàn)金股利組、有外部融資中等及低現(xiàn)金股利組。基于事件研究法研究了五組數(shù)據(jù)在股利宣告的事件窗口期內(nèi)的股價平均超額收益率和累計超額收益率的表現(xiàn)。其中無外部融資低現(xiàn)金股利組顯著存在負的超額收益率,股利預披露組、高現(xiàn)金股利組、有外部融資中等及低現(xiàn)金股利組均存在正的超額收益率,無外部融資中等現(xiàn)金股利組不存在明顯的超額收益率,這與本文理論部分得出的結論相一致,說明結合披露時間點,股利支付率的可模仿性,公司外部融資行為的現(xiàn)金股利能有效起到信號傳遞作用。最后本文針對現(xiàn)金股利信號傳遞有效性問題從投資者、上市公司和監(jiān)管層的角度提出了對策建議,認為投資者應樹立現(xiàn)金股利甄別意識,多角度考察股利,深入思考現(xiàn)金股利支付“三要素”來判別股票的價值。業(yè)績出色的上市公司應當主動預披露股利信息,吸引更多非知情投資者,降低信息不對稱,提升自身價值;監(jiān)管層應當重視中小股東的話語權,給予中小股東否決明顯不合理的現(xiàn)金股利分配方案的權利,促使公司分配合理的高股利;監(jiān)管層還應當加強投資項目持續(xù)監(jiān)管,保障外部融資的利益,增強資金提供者的信心,讓更多外部融資參與到公司投資項目中去,增強現(xiàn)金股利信號傳遞作用的有效性。
[Abstract]:The cash dividend signal as a listed company shareholders to deliver a company's performance, but the effectiveness for a long time the signal has been plagued by academic circles. An empirical study of senior scholars of dividend signal theory is "mixed", support and negative dividend signal theory conclusion each accounted for half of the country, the dividend signaling effect of failure the situation. This paper analyzed the current situation of the cash dividend of Listed Companies in China, that is becoming more and more perfect in the current dividend policy under the background of increasingly stringent regulation, A shares of Listed Companies Dividend situation tends to be good, the number of companies accounted for dividends, the dividend amount is rising, stable, and lay a good foundation for the environment study on the dividend signal. This paper argues that in the asymmetric information environment, play a role in signaling the behavior must be legible and is difficult to imitate The cash dividend payment rate level is often composed of many factors, the signal transmission performance of the company itself, there are a lot of information asymmetry. In the dividend payment rate will look at the level of performance of the company will lead to dividend signal failure. In the in-depth analysis of the nature of the cash dividend, to make the dividend signaling role of dividend payment must be combined with the "three elements" that the disclosure of the time, the dividend payment rate of replicability, together with the analysis of external financing behavior. In general, the dividend can do pre disclosure of the company is very confident of their own performance, want to attract market attention. To reduce the pre disclosure investors search for information on the cost, let the market have more time management research company, and then take the initiative to reduce the information asymmetry, the cash dividend is an effective pre disclosure Signal transmission in good company information; this paper describes the influence of the high cash dividend stocks on shareholder value by Bhattacharya model. The outstanding performance of the company can only pay high dividends to imitate. For the poor performance of the company, the high dividend will be the company's second years of operation caused great pressure, cost large signal. So the high dividend is also difficult to imitate the transfer company good performance; for the rest of the company needs to solve the information asymmetry in the cash dividend by external financing behavior, this paper argues that the company retained profits is mainly used for the future development of the company, external financing can effectively solve the investors do not know the future of the company's investment rate of return greater than the required rate of return this problem, so this paper established three "price earnings ratio - dividend payment rate model To show the external financing of dividend signaling plays a role. In the empirical part, this paper will select the A shares of Listed Companies in 2015 as samples, the samples were divided into five groups: cash dividend pre disclosure group, high cash dividend group, no external medium Finance Companies cash dividend group, no external financing low cash dividend group. External financing of medium and low cash dividend group. The event study method is studied based on the data of the five groups in the dividend declared the event window period average abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return performance. With no external financing low cash dividend was significantly negative abnormal returns, high cash dividend pre disclosure group. Dividend group, positive excess returns are external financing medium and low cash dividend group, no external financing medium cash dividend group had no obvious abnormal returns, and the theoretical part of this paper a knot The theory is consistent with the note disclosure time, the dividend payment rate of replicability, behavior of corporate external financing cash dividend can effectively play the role of signal transduction. Finally, according to the cash dividend signaling effectiveness from investors, listed companies and regulators of the angle and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions, investors should set up cash dividend screening investigates consciousness, dividend, cash dividend payment in-depth thinking of "three elements" to determine the value of the stock. The outstanding performance of the listed companies should take the initiative to pre disclosure of dividend information, attract non informed investors more, reduce information asymmetry, enhance their own value; regulators should pay attention to the medium and small shareholders the right to speak, to give minority shareholders veto cash dividend distribution plan is obviously not reasonable rights, leading to the high dividend reasonable distribution company; regulators should also strengthen the supervision for investment projects In order to enhance the effectiveness of cash dividend signaling, we should protect the interests of external financing, enhance the confidence of fund providers, and allow more external financing to participate in company investment projects.

【學位授予單位】：上海外國語大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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