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  本文選題：上市公司兼并收購　切入點：主并方　出處：《華東師范大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：兼并收購作為社會資源有效配置和企業(yè)完成低成本對外擴張的重要途徑,二十多年來在我國資本市場中日益活躍,在調(diào)整經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)、淘汰落后產(chǎn)能、提升行業(yè)集中度、深化國有企業(yè)改革和加快民營企業(yè)發(fā)展等方面發(fā)揮著重要作用。一方面,交易方式的日漸豐富和監(jiān)管政策的逐步完善,為兼并收購的快速發(fā)展提供了沃土;另一方面,我國IPO業(yè)務(wù)的幾次暫停迫使許多排隊上市的企業(yè)選擇了被上市公司收購這一路徑來實現(xiàn)間接上市,這也為并購熱情的持續(xù)高漲起到了助推作用。然而,事實卻表明兼并收購并未能夠達到應(yīng)有的預期,在兼并收購完成后相當多的上市公司出現(xiàn)了不同程度的業(yè)績下滑。兼并收購中可能存在的盈余管理行為引起了學者們的注意,認為其可能對并購后的業(yè)績產(chǎn)生影響。因此,本文認為對上市公司兼并收購前主并方的盈余管理行為進行研究具有重要意義。本文從兼并收購和盈余管理的概念出發(fā),回顧了國內(nèi)外學者對兼并收購中盈余管理問題的研究現(xiàn)狀,并闡述了相關(guān)理論成果。隨后,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了兩個研究假設(shè),采用理論分析和實證檢驗相結(jié)合的方式對我國上市公司兼并收購發(fā)生前主并方的盈余管理行為進行了研究。理論研究部分,本文站在博弈論的視角下對兼并收購中盈余管理決策的納什均衡進行分析,得出無論在何種情況下作為"理性人"的兼并收購雙方都會在自身利益最大化的驅(qū)動下選擇進行盈余管理;隨后通過進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在股份支付并購發(fā)生前主并方存在正向盈余管理動機,而在現(xiàn)金支付并購發(fā)生前主并方則存在反向盈余管理動機。而實證研究部分,本文首先在橫截面修正Jones模型中加入兩個變量對其進行改良,然后用改良后的該模型和真實盈余管理模型對2014-2015年度我國A股市場上發(fā)生重大資產(chǎn)重組事項的主并方進行實證研究,結(jié)果表明主并方在兼并收購發(fā)生前同時進行了真實和應(yīng)計兩種盈余管理,且支付方式對盈余管理方向產(chǎn)生影響。最后,通過對比橫截面修正Jones模型改良前后的檢驗效力,證實了改良后的模型效果略優(yōu)。
[Abstract]:As an important way for the effective allocation of social resources and the completion of low-cost external expansion of enterprises, mergers and acquisitions have become increasingly active in China's capital market for more than 20 years. They are adjusting the economic structure, eliminating backward production capacity, and promoting industry concentration.Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and speeding up the development of private enterprises play an important role.On the one hand, the increasing enrichment of trading methods and the gradual improvement of regulatory policies provide fertile ground for the rapid development of mergers and acquisitions; on the other hand,Several suspensions of IPO business in China have forced many listed enterprises to choose the way of being acquired by listed companies in order to achieve indirect listing, which has also contributed to the continued upsurge of M & A enthusiasm.However, the facts show that mergers and acquisitions have not been able to meet their expectations. After the completion of mergers and acquisitions, quite a number of listed companies have seen their performance decline to varying degrees.The possible earnings management behavior in mergers and acquisitions has attracted the attention of scholars that it may have an impact on the performance of mergers and acquisitions.Therefore, it is of great significance to study the earnings management behavior of listed companies before merger and acquisition.Based on the concepts of mergers and acquisitions and earnings management, this paper reviews the current research situation of earnings management in mergers and acquisitions, and expounds the relevant theoretical results.Then, two hypotheses are put forward, and the earnings management behavior of listed companies before merger and acquisition in China is studied by combining theoretical analysis and empirical test.In the theoretical research part, this paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium of earnings management decision in mergers and acquisitions from the perspective of game theory.It is concluded that both sides of merger and acquisition as "rational people" will choose to carry out earnings management under the drive of maximizing their own interests under any circumstances; subsequently, through further research, it is found that,Before the merger and acquisition of share payment, there is a positive earnings management motive for the principal and merge party, and a reverse earnings management motive for the main and joint party before the cash payment merger and acquisition.In the empirical research part, this paper first adds two variables to the cross-section modified Jones model to improve it.Then, using the improved model and the real earnings management model, the empirical research on the major asset restructuring events occurred in China's A-share market in 2014-2015 is carried out.The results show that both real and accrual earnings management are carried out before merger and acquisition, and the way of payment has an impact on the direction of earnings management.Finally, the effectiveness of the modified Jones model is verified by comparing the effectiveness of the modified model before and after modification.
【學位授予單位】：華東師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F271;F275

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