本文選題：管理層權(quán)力　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),上市公司高管薪酬高但業(yè)績(jī)平平的現(xiàn)象比比皆是,那些與業(yè)績(jī)不匹配的“天價(jià)薪酬”早已闖入大眾視線(xiàn)。在西方國(guó)家,管理層權(quán)力已經(jīng)成為解釋那些高薪酬低業(yè)績(jī)現(xiàn)象的重要依據(jù),在我國(guó)關(guān)于強(qiáng)化高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)聯(lián)度的主張深得人心的背景下,管理層權(quán)力理論漸漸獲得我國(guó)專(zhuān)家學(xué)者的重視。本文在此背景下拓寬思路,加入管理層權(quán)力理論作補(bǔ)充,深入探討管理層權(quán)力引起的薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的變化。本文以委托代理理論、最優(yōu)契約論和管理層權(quán)力理論為基礎(chǔ),選擇2013年至2015年三年間深滬兩市A股主板的上市公司數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,以?xún)陕毢弦弧⒐蓹?quán)制衡度、董事會(huì)規(guī)模及三者的綜合變量衡量管理層權(quán)力,先檢驗(yàn)管理層權(quán)力對(duì)高管薪酬的影響,再檢驗(yàn)管理層權(quán)力對(duì)高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系即薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的影響,最后探究我國(guó)上市公司高管業(yè)績(jī)薪酬粘性問(wèn)題。通過(guò)研究發(fā)現(xiàn):管理層權(quán)力與高管薪酬顯著正相關(guān);管理層權(quán)力降低了薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性;管理層權(quán)力大的企業(yè)高管薪酬與盈利、虧損業(yè)績(jī)存在更為明顯的非對(duì)稱(chēng)性。為了更深入地進(jìn)行研究,本文進(jìn)一步從不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境展開(kāi)實(shí)證。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):在國(guó)有企業(yè)中,管理層權(quán)力與高管薪酬顯著正相關(guān),管理層權(quán)力降低了薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性,管理層權(quán)力使高管薪酬對(duì)盈利業(yè)績(jī)和虧損業(yè)績(jī)反應(yīng)的非對(duì)稱(chēng)性顯著。而在非國(guó)有企業(yè)中,管理層權(quán)力與高管薪酬不相關(guān),管理層權(quán)力降低了薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性,且管理層權(quán)力使高管薪酬對(duì)盈利業(yè)績(jī)和虧損業(yè)績(jī)反應(yīng)的非對(duì)稱(chēng)效果不明顯;壟斷行業(yè)上市公司管理層權(quán)力與高管薪酬顯著正相關(guān),管理層權(quán)力降低了高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性,且高管薪酬對(duì)盈利業(yè)績(jī)和虧損業(yè)績(jī)反應(yīng)的非對(duì)稱(chēng)性顯著。而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行業(yè)上市公司管理層權(quán)力與高管薪酬不相關(guān),管理層權(quán)力提高了薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性,管理層權(quán)力使高管薪酬對(duì)盈利業(yè)績(jī)和虧損業(yè)績(jī)反應(yīng)的非對(duì)稱(chēng)性效果不明顯。最后,根據(jù)本文的實(shí)證結(jié)果總結(jié)本文的研究結(jié)論,進(jìn)一步提出建議:設(shè)計(jì)科學(xué)高效的薪酬契約,在完善內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制同時(shí)建立健全外部治理機(jī)制,讓上市公司高管薪酬暴露在陽(yáng)光下。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the phenomenon of high executive pay but mediocre performance of listed companies has been widespread, and "sky-high compensation", which does not match performance, has long been in the public eye. In western countries, Management power has become an important basis for explaining the phenomenon of high pay and low performance. The theory of management power has been paid more and more attention by experts and scholars in our country. This paper is based on principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory. From 2013 to 2015, the data of listed companies listed on the main A-share board of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets were selected as a sample, and the management power was measured by the combination of two positions, equity checks and balances, board size and the combined variables of the three. First, the influence of executive power on executive compensation is examined, and then the influence of management power on executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, the sensitivity of compensation performance, is examined. Finally, the paper probes into the stickiness of executive performance compensation of listed companies in China. Through the research, it is found that management power and executive compensation are significantly positively correlated; management power reduces the sensitivity of compensation performance; executive compensation and profitability of enterprises with great management power. There is a more obvious asymmetry in the performance of loss. In order to further study, this paper further carries out empirical research from different property rights and market competition environment. The results show that: in state-owned enterprises, There is a significant positive correlation between executive power and executive compensation. Management power reduces pay performance sensitivity, and management power makes executive compensation significantly asymmetric to profit performance and loss performance. Management power is not related to executive compensation, management power reduces the sensitivity of compensation performance, and the asymmetric effect of executive compensation on profit performance and loss performance is not obvious. There is a significant positive correlation between executive power and executive compensation in monopolistic listed companies. Management power reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Moreover, the asymmetric response of executive compensation to profit performance and loss performance is significant. However, the executive power of listed companies in competitive industries is not related to executive compensation, and management power increases the sensitivity of compensation performance. Management power makes the asymmetric effect of executive compensation on profit performance and loss performance is not obvious. Finally, according to the empirical results of this paper, the conclusion of this paper is summarized, and further suggestions are put forward: to design a scientific and efficient compensation contract. In perfecting the internal governance mechanism and establishing a sound external governance mechanism, so that the executive compensation of listed companies exposed to the sun.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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