本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司　切入點：高管　出處：《沈陽理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司于2009年10月30日在深圳證券交易所正式啟動,與A股主板市場相比,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司發(fā)展呈現(xiàn)高股價和高市盈率以及高風(fēng)險的特點。同時創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在資產(chǎn)要求、高管勝任能力的要求、籌集資金用途方面以及信息披露等方面條件較低,但是它的運作要求以及審核程序比較嚴格。同時,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管大規(guī)模地增減持活動的現(xiàn)象,引起不少人的關(guān)注。本文以委托代理理論、內(nèi)部人交易理論、信息不對稱理論、剩余控制權(quán)理論為基礎(chǔ)來研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增減持對盈余管理的影響。本文以2014年12月31日以前上市的創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司為樣本,以2012年至2015年發(fā)生高管增減持的1054個增減持事件為研究窗口,從增減持規(guī)模、增減持市值、市盈率的角度檢驗了盈余管理的存在性以及增減持時盈余管理的方向性、盈余管理程度以及盈余管理動機,實證結(jié)果表明:(1)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增減持時,前期存在盈余管理的現(xiàn)象,增持時進行向下的盈余管理,減持時進行向上的盈余管理。(2)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增持規(guī)模與盈余管理的關(guān)系不顯著,減持規(guī)模越大,向上進行盈余管理的程度越大。(3)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增減持市值與綜合真實活動盈余管理負相關(guān),增持市值越大,高管進行向下盈余管理的程度越大;由于本文減持市值用負數(shù)表示,減持市值越大,企業(yè)進行向上的綜合真實活動盈余管理程度越大。(4)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增減持時,市盈率與綜合真實盈余管理負相關(guān)。增持時,市盈率越大,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司進行向下盈余管理的動機越大;減持時,市盈率越小,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司進行向上盈余管理的動機越大。本文為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管增減持與盈余管理的關(guān)系提供一定的理論基礎(chǔ)。該項研究的政策意義包括監(jiān)管部門需要從制度上降低上市公司操縱盈余的空間、盡快建立高管減持的預(yù)披露制度和對投資者加強教育,使創(chuàng)業(yè)板的股價逐步回歸到合理水平,以便從根本上消除高管人員急于套現(xiàn)的問題。
[Abstract]:The gem listed companies were officially launched on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on October 30, 2009. The development of gem listed companies presents the characteristics of high stock price, high price-earnings ratio and high risk. At the same time, gem listed companies have lower requirements in terms of asset requirements, executive competency requirements, use of fund-raising funds and information disclosure, etc. However, its operational requirements and audit procedures are relatively strict. At the same time, the phenomenon of large scale increase and decrease of holding activities by executives of listed companies on the gem has attracted many people's attention. In this paper, the principal-agent theory, insider trading theory, Based on information asymmetry theory and residual control theory, this paper studies the influence of growth and decrease of gem executives on earnings management. This paper takes gem listed before December 31, 2014 as a sample. Taking 1054 increasing and decreasing events of senior management from 2012 to 2015 as the window of study, this paper tests the existence of earnings management and the directivity of earnings management when increasing or decreasing holdings, from the perspective of increasing or decreasing holding scale, increasing or decreasing holding market value, and price-earnings ratio. The empirical results show that there is a phenomenon of earnings management in the early stage when executives increase or decrease their holdings on the gem, and the earnings management is downward when they increase their holdings. There is no significant relationship between the scale of the increase of the senior executives' holding and the earnings management, and the larger the scale of the reduction, the larger the scale of the reduction. The greater the degree of upward earnings management is, the greater is the negative correlation between the increase and decrease of senior executives' holding on the gem and the earnings management of comprehensive real activities, the greater the increase in the holding of market value, the greater the degree of downward earnings management; Because this article reduces market value to express in a negative number, the bigger the reduction of market value, the bigger the earnings management degree of the enterprise carries on the upward synthesis real activity. (4) when the gem listed company executives increase or decrease, the price-earnings ratio is negatively correlated with the comprehensive real earnings management. The bigger the price-earnings ratio, the greater the motivation of downward earnings management for gem listed companies, and the smaller the price-earnings ratio of listed companies is when they reduce their holdings. The motivation of upward earnings management for gem listed companies is greater. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the relationship between the increase and decrease of gem executives' holdings and earnings management. The policy significance of this study includes the need for regulatory authorities to. It is necessary to reduce the scope for listed companies to manipulate earnings from an institutional perspective. As soon as possible, we will establish a pre-disclosure system for senior executives to reduce their holdings and strengthen the education of investors, so that the share prices of the gem will gradually return to a reasonable level, so as to fundamentally eliminate the problem of executives eager to cash in.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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