本文選題：公司金融　切入點(diǎn)：債務(wù)融資　出處：《南方金融》2016年06期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：委托代理關(guān)系是公司治理的核心問題。本文以公司負(fù)債為視角,運(yùn)用我國2009-2014年A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù),從負(fù)債期限和負(fù)債來源兩個(gè)方面,對負(fù)債融資與經(jīng)理人代理成本的關(guān)系進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。研究結(jié)果表明:公司負(fù)債融資能夠降低代理成本并產(chǎn)生治理效應(yīng);短期負(fù)債對代理成本的抑制作用好于長期負(fù)債,商業(yè)信用對代理成本的抑制作用強(qiáng)于銀行借款。為此,為緩解公司治理中的委托—代理問題,應(yīng)當(dāng)優(yōu)化公司債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu),提高短期負(fù)債融資比例,加強(qiáng)對長期債務(wù)的有效監(jiān)督和管理,提升債務(wù)治理功能;同時(shí)還要強(qiáng)化商業(yè)銀行對公司經(jīng)營管理的監(jiān)督機(jī)制,減少經(jīng)理人的無效和低效投資,提升公司負(fù)債對經(jīng)理人的約束作用。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent relationship is the core problem of corporate governance. This paper, from the perspective of corporate liabilities, applies the data of A-share listed companies in 2009-2014, from the two aspects of debt maturity and debt source. The empirical test on the relationship between debt financing and agent cost of managers shows that corporate debt financing can reduce agency cost and produce governance effect, and short-term debt can restrain agency cost better than long-term debt. In order to alleviate the principal-agent problem in corporate governance, it is necessary to optimize the debt maturity structure and increase the proportion of short-term debt financing. Strengthen the effective supervision and management of long-term debt, enhance the function of debt management, and at the same time, strengthen the supervision mechanism of commercial banks on the management of companies, and reduce the ineffective and inefficient investment of managers. Enhance the company's liabilities on the managers of the constraints.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)政治與公共管理學(xué)院社會保障研究中心;國泰君安證R倒煞縈邢薰窘鞣止，

本文編號：1639727