管理者情緒對上市公司并購重組驅動效應的研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-03-13 17:06
本文選題:行為公司金融 切入點:管理層情緒 出處:《復旦大學》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
【摘要】:在剛剛過去的2013年,國內(nèi)金融市場上發(fā)生了許多重大調整,其中一件大事就是IPO的暫停。2014年1月,IPO重啟,但此次發(fā)行制度的改革和監(jiān)管力度的加強,已讓國內(nèi)許多欲上市融資的企業(yè)感到一股涼意;與此同時,并購重組審核分道制等鼓勵政策頻出,使得去年國內(nèi)并購市場的宣布交易規(guī)模達到了近7年來的最大值。自1994年國內(nèi)開啟并購第一單,并購重組在中國資本市場上經(jīng)歷了近20年的發(fā)展。然而,它在為企業(yè)帶來資本擴張、資產(chǎn)結構調整、資源優(yōu)化配置的同時,也帶來了一定的風險;并購重組市場表面紅火,但內(nèi)部存在著大量的異常資本配置和低效、無效,甚至負效應的并購重組決策。早在20世紀末期,國外學者就已經(jīng)捕捉到了這種有悖于“股東利益最大化”的金融異象。然而,在“理性人假設”條件下,傳統(tǒng)的公司金融理論無法對這種有損于股東價值的低效并購行為做出很好的解釋;而隨著行為公司金融學的興起,市場參與者在進行金融決策行為時的“黑箱”被打開,曾經(jīng)被簡化、弱化,甚至機械化的“人”的行為和心理被提升到一個新的高度,人們逐漸了解并相信:市場參與者是非理性的;趪鴥(nèi)上市公司在并購重組后并未取得企業(yè)長期績效改善的現(xiàn)實、以及行為公司金融學在解釋“企業(yè)無效并購行為”這一異象時的獨特性,本文試圖從更加微觀的“管理者非理性”角度,探究管理者情緒與A股上市公司并購重組決策之間的關系。這對幫助投資者了解上市公司運作模式、強化投資風險意識,以及幫助監(jiān)管者施行更加有效的市場監(jiān)督機制,具有實際的意義。本文得出的主要結論包括:(1)在其他條件相同的情況下,高管過度自信的情緒將顯著驅動公司并購重組的決策,而高管悲觀的情緒將顯著抑制公司并購重組的決策;(2)當目標公司的規(guī)模相對于收購公司較大時,并購重組的交易更容易發(fā)生,并且當管理者對公司前景看淡時,這種關系更加明顯;(3)高管情緒對施行并購重組決策的影響在資產(chǎn)收購這一交易類型中表現(xiàn)得更加明顯;(4)在目前的A股上市公司中,獨立董事比例對公司并購重組的決策沒有顯著影響。
[Abstract]:In 2013, there were many major adjustments in the domestic financial market, one of which was the suspension of the IPO. In January 2014, the IPO resumed, but the reform of the issuance system and the strengthening of the supervision were strengthened. At the same time, the merger and reorganization review and separation system and other incentive policies have frequently emerged. The scale of announced transactions in the domestic M & A market last year reached the highest level in nearly seven years. Since 1994, the first order of M & A in China, mergers and acquisitions have experienced nearly 20 years of development in China's capital market. However, It not only brings about capital expansion, asset structure adjustment and resource optimization allocation for enterprises, but also brings certain risks. The M & A market is booming on the surface, but there are a lot of abnormal capital allocation and low efficiency inside, which are ineffective. In the end of 20th century, as early as the end of 20th century, foreign scholars had captured this kind of financial vision contrary to "maximization of shareholders' interests." however, under the condition of "rational man hypothesis", The traditional corporate finance theory can not explain this inefficient merger and acquisition behavior which is harmful to shareholders' value. However, with the rise of behavioral corporate finance, the "black box" of market participants in financial decision-making has been opened. Once simplified, weakened, and even mechanized, the behavior and psychology of "people" were raised to a new level. People have come to understand and believe that market participants are irrational. Based on the fact that domestic listed companies have not achieved long-term performance improvement after mergers and acquisitions, As well as the uniqueness of behavioral corporate finance in explaining the vision of "invalid mergers and acquisitions", this paper attempts to take a more microscopic view of "manager irrationality". To explore the relationship between manager sentiment and M & A decisions of A-share listed companies, which helps investors understand the operating mode of listed companies, strengthens investment risk awareness, and helps regulators implement more effective market supervision mechanism. The main conclusions in this paper include: 1) under other conditions, the mood of executive overconfidence will significantly drive the decision of M & A. The pessimism of executives will significantly inhibit the decision to make mergers and acquisitions.) when the target company is larger than the acquisition company, M & A transactions are more likely to occur, and when managers are bearish about the company's prospects, This relationship is even more evident) the impact of executive sentiment on the decision to implement mergers and acquisitions is more pronounced in the asset acquisition transaction type.) in the current A-share listed companies, The proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on the decision of M & A.
【學位授予單位】:復旦大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F271;F832.51;B842.6
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前1條
1 張新;并購重組是否創(chuàng)造價值?——中國證券市場的理論與實證研究[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2003年06期
,本文編號:1607315
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