本文選題：國(guó)有控股上市公司　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：國(guó)企高管薪酬歷來(lái)都是十分敏感的話題,自從被稱作“限薪令”的《中央管理企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬制度改革方案》的頒布與實(shí)施,國(guó)企高管的薪酬再次成為了社會(huì)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。公眾對(duì)國(guó)企高管薪酬水平高低的紛紛議論和評(píng)判,很大程度上反映出現(xiàn)行國(guó)企高管薪酬的制定缺乏規(guī)范的秩序和科學(xué)的理?yè)?jù),國(guó)企高管薪酬體系存在著某些不合理之處。因此,對(duì)國(guó)企高管薪酬體系進(jìn)行研究是推動(dòng)國(guó)企高管薪酬改革實(shí)踐的需要,對(duì)于解決國(guó)企高管的薪酬機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文以河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司高管的薪酬為研究對(duì)象,采用2004-2015年的有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),通過(guò)構(gòu)建多元線性回歸分析模型檢驗(yàn)了高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性,更加清晰地揭示了河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司業(yè)績(jī)型薪酬體系的完善程度。研究結(jié)果顯示,河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)間并沒(méi)有建立起很好的關(guān)聯(lián)效應(yīng),薪酬體系對(duì)于高管并不能發(fā)揮出有效的激勵(lì)作用。然后在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)高管薪酬體系的優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì)提出了合理化建議,以期為河南省深化國(guó)有企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬改革提供有益的參考和支持。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)主要體現(xiàn)在以下三個(gè)方面:第一,對(duì)河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司與河南省非國(guó)有控股上市公司高管的薪酬業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系進(jìn)行了全樣本的對(duì)比研究,更加客觀地展現(xiàn)了河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)作用發(fā)揮的現(xiàn)實(shí)情況;第二,在絕對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步采取相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的方法對(duì)公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)做出評(píng)價(jià),避免了單純采用凈資產(chǎn)收益率造成的指標(biāo)單一和結(jié)論不可靠;第三,突破了高管薪酬研究只關(guān)注薪酬的局限,基于系統(tǒng)性分析,拓展了研究思路,從改善高管的選拔機(jī)制、建立科學(xué)可行的績(jī)效管理系統(tǒng)、推行全面報(bào)酬激勵(lì)體制、完善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及提升高管薪酬信息的透明度等層面提出了完善和健全河南省省管?chē)?guó)有控股上市公司高管薪酬體系與監(jiān)管體制的對(duì)策和建議。
[Abstract]:The executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has always been a very sensitive topic. Since the promulgation and implementation of the "Plan for the Reform of the compensation system of Central Management Enterprises", which is called the "salary restriction order", The pay of senior executives of state-owned enterprises has once again become the focus of social attention. The public's comments and judgments on the level of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises have largely reflected the lack of normative order and scientific justifications for the establishment of executive compensation in the current state-owned enterprises. There are some unreasonable points in the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to study the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises in order to promote the practice of executive compensation reform in state-owned enterprises. It is of practical significance to solve the problem of executive compensation mechanism design of state-owned enterprises. This paper takes the compensation of the executives of the state-owned holding companies in Henan Province as the research object, and adopts the relevant data from 2004-2015. By constructing multiple linear regression analysis model, the correlation between executive compensation and enterprise performance is tested, and the degree of perfection of performance compensation system of state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province is revealed more clearly. There is no good correlation between the executive compensation and the performance of the state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province. The compensation system can not play an effective incentive role for executives. Then on the basis of this, the rational design of executive compensation system is put forward. The purpose of this paper is to provide useful reference and support for Henan Province to deepen the reform of the compensation of the responsible persons in state-owned enterprises. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects: first, This paper makes a comparative study on the relationship between the compensation performance of the executives of the provincial state-owned holding listed companies and the non-state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province. A more objective display of Henan Province state-owned holding listed companies to play a role in the incentive role of executive compensation; second, on the basis of absolute performance evaluation, Further use the method of relative performance evaluation to evaluate the operating performance of the company, avoiding the single index and unreliable conclusion caused by the pure use of ROA. Thirdly, it breaks through the limitation that executive compensation research only pays attention to compensation. Based on systematic analysis, this paper expands the research ideas, from improving the selection mechanism of senior executives, establishing a scientific and feasible performance management system, and implementing a comprehensive reward incentive system. From the aspects of perfecting the internal corporate governance structure and enhancing the transparency of executive compensation information, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for perfecting and perfecting the executive compensation system and supervision system of the state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51;F272.5

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