發(fā)布時間：2018-03-09 00:11

  本文選題：交叉上市　切入點：股價信息含量　出處：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2008年金融危機之后,上市公司高管及他們高額的薪酬再一次被推上了風(fēng)頭浪尖：在某些企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效以及員工收入都停滯不前甚至有所下降的情勢下高管薪酬卻以不可思議的速度和金額增長著。高管薪酬也成為了在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)發(fā)展過程中少數(shù)面臨如此多的質(zhì)疑與公憤的問題。其中,高管薪酬的快速增長卻伴隨著股東收益的下降及問責(zé)制度的缺失是導(dǎo)致公眾怒火的一個主要原因。對于企業(yè)的所有者來說,同樣面臨著如何有效的對高管進行激勵的問題。選擇適當(dāng)?shù)男匠杲Y(jié)構(gòu)和構(gòu)成元素可以激勵高管人員的積極性,從而增加公司價值,此時公司績效與高管人員薪酬呈現(xiàn)一種同向變動的關(guān)系(米蘭),這種變動關(guān)系就將高管人員的薪酬與企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效聯(lián)系在一起,這樣就避免了高管人員薪酬“虛高”的現(xiàn)象,不至于出現(xiàn)之前所發(fā)生的企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效下降卻帶來了高管薪酬的居高不下；然而,因為高管薪酬激勵制度的設(shè)計過程沒有可以遵循的標準化的程序,其決定因素往往是紛繁而復(fù)雜的,Murphy(1999)認為行業(yè)因素會對薪酬績效敏感度產(chǎn)生較大影響,Rosen(1992)企業(yè)規(guī)模是影響高管薪酬績效敏感度的一個重要因素,因而在進行測算時很難區(qū)分到底是由績效影響的薪酬還是由規(guī)模影響的薪酬,Schaefer(1998)的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的薪酬績效敏感度與企業(yè)規(guī)模是成反比。每個公司都必須要根據(jù)其自身的治理結(jié)構(gòu)、經(jīng)營規(guī)模、內(nèi)部和外部條件的變化來設(shè)計符合實際的薪酬激勵制度。此外,由于很多外部因素,例如宏觀經(jīng)濟、法律法規(guī)的限制、行業(yè)狀況等也起著重要作用,更增加了高管薪酬激勵的難度。因此,早期的學(xué)者開始針對高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效的敏感性做實證研究,結(jié)果卻未得出一致結(jié)論,甚至大相徑庭。隨著研究的深入,各國學(xué)者開始關(guān)注交叉上市對高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效敏感性的影響。本文就是延續(xù)了這種思路,認為交叉上市能夠為企業(yè)帶來更嚴格的外部監(jiān)管和法律、機構(gòu)投資者的參與、交易的活躍、有效的市場和公司內(nèi)部治理的改善,從而使上市公司的股價信息含量提高來影響高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效的敏感性,即股價信息含量作為交叉上市對高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效敏感性影響的中介變量。 所以本文提出了兩個假設(shè)：1.交叉上市提高高管薪酬激勵敏感性；2.股價信息含量在其中扮演中介變量。在假設(shè)驗證方面,本文采用溫忠麟的有中介的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)模型,分三個步驟進行檢驗。在樣本的處理上,筆者通過CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫找到了2008-2011年四年間有海外交叉上市背景的上市企業(yè),隨后又從行業(yè)屬性和年末資產(chǎn)總額方面找到了與海外交叉上市企業(yè)相對應(yīng)的配對企業(yè),最后構(gòu)造一個基本函數(shù)來驗證交叉上市對高管薪酬激勵敏感性的影響、兩個檢驗函數(shù)來驗證股價信息含量的中介作用。用STATA10.0軟件對所找的樣本進行了分組回歸,回歸結(jié)果對這個問題的回答是肯定的,即,相比非交叉上市的企業(yè),有海外交叉上市的企業(yè)高管薪酬激勵敏感性增加,并且通過股價信息含量的傳導(dǎo)而發(fā)揮作用。 這個中介變量的引入同時也是本文的創(chuàng)新之處,通過此研究可以發(fā)現(xiàn)交叉上市是部分通過提高股價信息含量從而使其更多反映公司層面的信息,那么高管的經(jīng)營管理情況也會更加體現(xiàn)在業(yè)績上,使得薪酬與業(yè)績的敏感性更強,從而帶來更好的激勵效果。也開啟了我國關(guān)于交叉上市對高管薪酬激勵的微觀層面的研究,從而了解交叉上市究竟帶來的公司及市場的那些方面的提升,而這些提升是否給我國高管薪酬激勵有效性帶來了影響以及哪方那面的影響。希望學(xué)者們可以從更圍觀的層面對其進行完善。 所以,本文在不改變我國企業(yè)所有權(quán)性質(zhì)、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上,從其公司治理方面提出了政策建議,如改變激勵制度、薪酬與業(yè)績掛鉤、增加薪酬委員會的作用；從外部市場建設(shè)的加強方面為公司提供有效的市場環(huán)境,如加強法律制度的建設(shè)、改善監(jiān)管機制以及得到海外市場的監(jiān)督和對海外市場的借鑒等。
[Abstract]:After the 2008 financial crisis, executives of listed companies and their high salaries once again brought to the limelight in some business performance and employee income have even declined under the situation of executive compensation is to speed and the amount of unbelievable growth. Executive compensation has become a minority in the development of modern enterprises is facing a challenge with so many public problems. Among them, the rapid growth of executive compensation was accompanied by a lack of decline in shareholder returns and accountability system is a major cause of public anger. For business owners, is also facing the problem of how to effectively carry out the incentive for executives. Choose appropriate compensation structure and composition the elements can motivate executives, thus increasing the value of the company, the company performance and executive compensation is a change in the same direction The relationship between the (Milan), this relationship will pay and corporate executives performance together, thus avoiding the executive compensation phenomenon of "inflated", not decline that occurs before business performance has brought high executive compensation; however, because the design process of executive compensation the incentive system is not standardized can follow the procedure, the determining factor is often complex, Murphy (1999) believes that the industry will pay performance sensitivity factors have a greater impact, Rosen (1992) the scale of enterprises is one of the important factors affecting executive compensation performance sensitivity, so the measurement in the very it is difficult to distinguish from the performance effects of compensation or by influencing the scale of compensation, Schaefer (1998) found that the pay performance sensitivity and the enterprise scale is inversely proportional to every citizen. The secretary must according to its own governance structure, business scale, changes in the internal and external conditions to design the actual salary incentive system. In addition, due to many external factors, such as macroeconomic, legal restrictions and regulations, industry status also plays an important role in more difficult. Therefore the executive compensation incentive early scholars, aiming to solve the sensitivity of executive compensation and corporate performance empirical studies, the results are not consistent conclusions, even be quite different. With the in-depth study, scholars began to pay attention to the influence of cross listing on executive compensation and corporate performance sensitivity. This thesis is a continuation of this idea, that cross listing can bring more strictly the external supervision and law for the enterprise, the participation of institutional investors, active trading, the market and the company internal governance effectively improved, so the listed The increase of company's stock price information content affects the sensitivity of executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, stock price information content is a mediator variable of cross listing on executive pay and enterprise performance sensitivity.
So this paper proposes two hypotheses: 1. cross listing to improve executive compensation incentive sensitivity; 2. stock price informativeness play intermediary variables in them. Under the assumption of verification, this paper adopts Wen Zhonglin mediated moderating effect model, there are three steps in test. In the sample processing, the CSMAR database found 2008-2011 years four years of overseas cross listing background of the listed companies, and then from the industry attribute and the total assets at the end to find matching companies and overseas companies listed corresponding, finally construct a basic function to verify the sensitivity of cross listing incentive impact on executive compensation, verify the intermediary role of stock price informativeness of the two test function the return of the packet. For the samples with STATA10.0 software, the regression results of this question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., compared to non delivery Corporate executives with cross listed companies have increased sensitivity to compensation incentives and play a role in the transmission of share price information.
This is also the intermediary variables introduced the innovation of this paper, through this research can be found by increasing the cross listing is part of the information content of stock price so as to make it more reflect the company's level of information, then the executive management will be reflected in the performance, which is more sensitive to pay and performance, so as to bring a better incentive effect. Also opened a research on the micro level of cross listing on executive compensation incentive in China, so as to understand those aspects and enhance the company's market cross listing what brings, and those ascending to our country whether the executive compensation incentive effectiveness of the impact and the influence which side. I hope that scholars can improve from the more the crowd.
So, this paper does not change in the nature of China's enterprise ownership, based on the structure of the board of directors, the policy suggestions are put forward from the aspects of corporate governance, such as changing the incentive system, compensation and performance, increase the role of the Remuneration Committee; from aspects of strengthening the external market construction to provide a favorable market environment for the company, such as strengthening the construction of law system, improve the supervision mechanism and supervision of overseas market and overseas market for reference.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1586149