本文選題：公司績(jī)效　切入點(diǎn)：控股股東　出處：《北京工商大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：控股股東對(duì)中小股東的利益侵占一直以來(lái)都是全球公司治理研究中備受關(guān)注的問(wèn)題，在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)集中的公司中，控股股東資金占用現(xiàn)象更加明顯。我國(guó)上市公司“一股獨(dú)大”現(xiàn)象普遍存在，控股股東憑借股權(quán)優(yōu)勢(shì)，以各種方式占用上市公司資金，造成公司資金短缺，不利于公司的未來(lái)發(fā)展，也影響整個(gè)市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定有序。但是，控股股東并不會(huì)一味地侵占上市公司，也會(huì)進(jìn)行資源輸送，表現(xiàn)為對(duì)公司的支持行為。掏空和支持雖然利益輸送方向相反，但實(shí)質(zhì)上是控股股東實(shí)現(xiàn)多期利益最大化的方向不同的利益轉(zhuǎn)移行為，其最終目的是獲取控制權(quán)私人收益，控股股東行為的選擇與上市公司的績(jī)效有一定關(guān)系。 因此，本文通過(guò)規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方式，從控股股東對(duì)上市公司的非經(jīng)營(yíng)性資金占用角度出發(fā)，深入探討上市公司績(jī)效對(duì)控股股東資金占用的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，，上市公司績(jī)效不同，控股股東占款行為相應(yīng)不同。當(dāng)上市公司績(jī)效較好時(shí)，控股股東資金占用與上市公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)，表現(xiàn)為掏空行為；當(dāng)公司績(jī)效一般時(shí)，控股股東資金占用與公司績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)，表現(xiàn)為支持行為；當(dāng)公司績(jī)效低于某一水平時(shí)，控股股東資金占用與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)，表現(xiàn)為掏空行為。此外，研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)上市公司具有潛在的配股融資資格時(shí)，控股股東資金侵占行為相應(yīng)減少，表現(xiàn)為控股股東為了使得上市公司實(shí)現(xiàn)配股再融資而進(jìn)行的支持行為。最后，根據(jù)研究結(jié)果，并結(jié)合我國(guó)制度背景和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境，本文對(duì)如何防范和抑制控股股東資金占用行為提出了相應(yīng)地政策性建議。
[Abstract]:The controlling shareholders encroach the interests of the minority shareholders has been the concern of global issues in corporate governance, in concentrated ownership structure of the company, the controlling shareholder funds. The phenomenon is more obvious in China listed companies "dominance" phenomenon, the controlling shareholder equity by virtue of advantages, in a variety of ways to occupy listed company the company funds, caused by a shortage of funds, is not conducive to the future development of the company, also affect the stability of the entire market. However, the controlling shareholder will not blindly occupy listed company, will also carry out resource delivery, to support the company's behaviors. Although the prop and the transfer of benefits in the opposite direction, but the essence is the controlling shareholder to maximize the interests of different multi period interest transfer behavior, the ultimate aim is to obtain private benefits of control, and the choice of the controlling shareholder of listed companies There is a certain relationship between performance.
Therefore, through the combination of normative research and empirical research methods, from the perspective of controlling shareholders of listed companies to the NBRE angle, it discusses the influence of the performance of listed companies to shareholders occupy funds holding. The study found that the performance of listed companies, controlling shareholders exchange behavior different. When the performance of listed companies is better occupation, and the performance of listed companies holding shareholders' funds is positively related to performance for the tunneling behavior; when company performance, controlling shareholder funds negatively correlated with company performance, performance support behavior; when company performance is below a certain level, the controlling shareholder funds is positively correlated with corporate performance, performance for the tunneling behavior. In addition, the study also found that, when the listed companies have the potential financing qualifications, controlling shareholders' embezzlement behavior is reduced accordingly, the controlling shareholder in order to make. Finally, according to the results of the study, combined with the institutional background and market environment, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations on how to prevent and curb the controlling shareholders' capital occupancy behavior.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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