本文選題：對賭協(xié)議　切入點：委托-代理理論　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文大量參考前人的研究成果，將案例與理論相結(jié)合，嘗試從委托代理理論的角度分析國內(nèi)企業(yè)參與“對賭協(xié)議”屢遭失敗這一現(xiàn)象背后的原因。本文首先分析了大量國內(nèi)對賭失敗案例，總結(jié)出三個共同特征。接著，本文對“對賭協(xié)議”條款進(jìn)行分析，認(rèn)為國內(nèi)“對賭協(xié)議”的對賭標(biāo)準(zhǔn)類型不合理；對賭標(biāo)準(zhǔn)值過高；對賭條款設(shè)定失衡，協(xié)議的利益明顯偏向投資機構(gòu)，使得融資企業(yè)面臨巨大的對賭失敗風(fēng)險。然而，為什么融資企業(yè)卻仍然選擇簽訂如此高風(fēng)險的協(xié)議呢？于是，本文將“對賭協(xié)議”投資方和融資方置于委托代理理論框架下，通過分析雙方的效用期望和行為選擇來剖析不合理協(xié)議的簽訂過程，投資方基于利益最大化原則制定了不合理的協(xié)議條款，融資方根據(jù)參與約束來判斷是否接受協(xié)議。分析認(rèn)為，導(dǎo)致融資企業(yè)接受了不合理的“對賭協(xié)議”的主要原因有兩個：第一，管理層對企業(yè)未來業(yè)績的預(yù)期太過樂觀。第二，國內(nèi)成長型企業(yè)的融資渠道缺乏。 本文的創(chuàng)新點有兩個方面。第一，本文認(rèn)為國內(nèi)“對賭協(xié)議”條款設(shè)定的不合理不是對賭失敗的真正原因。國內(nèi)很多文獻(xiàn)認(rèn)為對賭條款設(shè)定失衡是對賭失敗的原因，而本文認(rèn)為協(xié)議是人制定的，，協(xié)議本身并不是導(dǎo)致失敗的根本原因。第二，本文運用了委托代理理論的主要觀點來剖析“對賭協(xié)議”的條款、簽訂過程和失敗原因。
[Abstract]:This paper, referring to the previous research results, combines the case with the theory. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper attempts to analyze the reasons behind the failure of domestic enterprises to participate in the "gambling agreement". This paper first analyzes a large number of domestic gambling failure cases, summarizes three common characteristics. This paper analyzes the terms of "gambling agreement", and points out that the gambling standard type of "gambling agreement" in China is unreasonable, the standard value of gambling is too high, the set of terms of gambling is out of balance, and the benefit of the agreement is obviously biased towards the investment organization. Financing enterprises face a huge risk of failure in gambling. However, why do financing companies still choose to enter into such high-risk agreements? Therefore, under the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the signing process of unreasonable agreement by analyzing the utility expectation and behavior choice of both parties. Based on the principle of maximization of benefits, the investor formulates unreasonable terms of agreement, and the financier decides whether to accept the agreement according to the constraint of participation. There are two main reasons leading to the acceptance of unreasonable "gambling agreement" by the financing enterprises: first, the management is too optimistic about the future performance of the enterprises; second, the financing channels of the domestic growth enterprises are lacking. The innovation of this paper has two aspects. First, this paper argues that the unreasonable setting of the terms of the gambling agreement in China is not the real reason for the failure of gambling. Many domestic literatures believe that the imbalance in the setting of the gambling terms is the reason for the failure of gambling. The agreement itself is not the fundamental cause of failure. Secondly, this paper uses the principal viewpoint of principal-agent theory to analyze the terms, signing process and failure reasons of "gambling agreement".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51

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