本文關(guān)鍵詞： 林業(yè)上市公司 股權(quán)集中度 高管激勵(lì) 經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效　出處：《林業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問題》2017年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：選取2010~2015年的12家林業(yè)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,運(yùn)用結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型的研究方法探尋林業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)集中度、高管激勵(lì)對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效作用路徑以及變量之間的效應(yīng)關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明:股權(quán)集中度對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效具有直接的顯著的正向影響,高管激勵(lì)對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效具有直接的顯著的正向影響,且股權(quán)集中度同時(shí)通過(guò)高管激勵(lì)的中介作用間接地顯著地影響經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效;股權(quán)集中度對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效影響的直接效應(yīng)為0.22,高管激勵(lì)對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效影響的直接效應(yīng)為0.28,股權(quán)集中度對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效影響的間接中介效應(yīng)為0.06�；谘芯拷ㄗh建立大股東股權(quán)制衡的股權(quán)集中度結(jié)構(gòu)和提高高層管理者的收入水平。
[Abstract]:The financial data of 12 forestry listed companies from 2010 to 2015 were selected as the research samples, and the ownership concentration of forestry listed companies was explored by using the structural equation model. The research results show that the ownership concentration has a direct and significant positive impact on the operating performance, and the executive incentive has a direct and significant positive impact on the operating performance. At the same time, equity concentration indirectly and significantly affects business performance through the intermediary role of executive incentive; The direct effect of ownership concentration on business performance is 0.22, the direct effect of executive incentive on business performance is 0.28, and the indirect intermediary effect of ownership concentration on operating performance is 0.06.Based on the research recommendations, the establishment of large shareholder shares. Power checks and balances of ownership concentration structure and improve the income level of senior managers.
【作者單位】： 福州外語(yǔ)外貿(mào)學(xué)院工商系;福建農(nóng)林大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;福州外語(yǔ)外貿(mào)學(xué)院金融系;福建農(nóng)林大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F302.6;F326.25;F832.51
，

本文編號(hào)：1548697