本文關(guān)鍵詞： 信用監(jiān)管 市場(chǎng)反應(yīng) 市場(chǎng)份額 IPO抑價(jià)　出處：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自我國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)保薦人制度以來(lái)，保薦人違規(guī)失信現(xiàn)象時(shí)有發(fā)生，他們從自身利益出發(fā)、對(duì)發(fā)行企業(yè)進(jìn)行“美化包裝”、隱瞞和歪曲重大信息，嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了保薦人的聲譽(yù)，打擊了投資者對(duì)保薦人的信任，嚴(yán)重影響我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展，因此證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)違規(guī)保薦人采取了一系列監(jiān)管措施。 本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容主要有三方面：一方面是研究市場(chǎng)對(duì)違規(guī)保薦人受罰信息的反應(yīng)，發(fā)現(xiàn)只有違規(guī)保薦代表人被撤銷保薦資格的那組相關(guān)公司的股價(jià)在證監(jiān)會(huì)處罰信息宣告前后一定時(shí)間內(nèi)做負(fù)向運(yùn)動(dòng)；一方面從違規(guī)保薦人未來(lái)的市場(chǎng)份額探索證監(jiān)會(huì)的這種處罰是否有效，研究結(jié)果顯示，，保薦人若受處罰其未來(lái)市場(chǎng)份額下降；另一方面是研究違規(guī)保薦人受罰與其未來(lái)保薦公司新股IPO抑價(jià)之間的關(guān)系，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，保薦人受罰后會(huì)規(guī)范自己的行為且投資者會(huì)重新作出選擇，所以新股IPO抑價(jià)降低。 本文以2004至2012年受到證監(jiān)會(huì)處罰的保薦機(jī)構(gòu)及保薦代表人為樣本，從監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)“信用監(jiān)管”的角度對(duì)保薦人制度實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。結(jié)果顯示：在證監(jiān)會(huì)公布處罰信息前后某幾天，違規(guī)保薦人在此之前保薦的公司股價(jià)做負(fù)向運(yùn)動(dòng)，違規(guī)保薦機(jī)構(gòu)及違規(guī)保薦代表人所在的保薦機(jī)構(gòu)在受到違規(guī)處罰后的未來(lái)市場(chǎng)份額下降，其以后的IPO抑價(jià)也會(huì)變低，說(shuō)明證監(jiān)會(huì)的處罰公告是有信息含量的，進(jìn)一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)違規(guī)保薦人的處罰力度越重、涉及的監(jiān)管對(duì)象越多處罰效果越明顯。 本文的分析和結(jié)論豐富了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)“信用監(jiān)管”的研究，彌補(bǔ)了我國(guó)保薦人制度下保薦人“信用監(jiān)管”效率這一研究領(lǐng)域的缺失。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of the sponsor system in our country, the breach of credit by sponsors has occurred from time to time. From their own interests, they "beautify and package" the issuing enterprises, concealing and distorting important information, thus seriously damaging the reputation of sponsors. It has dealt a blow to investors' trust in sponsors and seriously affected the healthy development of China's securities market. Therefore, CSRC has taken a series of supervision measures on sponsors who violate regulations. The main contents of this paper are as follows: on the one hand, it studies the reaction of the market to the information that the sponsor has been punished. It is found that the stock price of the group of related companies whose sponsor representative has been revoked has made a negative movement within a certain period of time before and after the announcement of the CSRC punishment information. On the one hand, from the future market share of the sponsor to explore whether the CSRC's punishment is effective, the research results show that if the sponsor is punished, its future market share will decline; On the other hand, the relationship between the penalty of the sponsor and the IPO underpricing of the future sponsor company is studied. It is found that the sponsor will regulate his own behavior and the investor will make a new choice after the penalty, so the underpricing of the new IPO will be reduced. This article takes the sponsor organization and the sponsor representative who were punished by the SFC from 2004 to 2012 as samples. An empirical study on the effect of the sponsor system from the perspective of "credit supervision" by the regulatory body. The results show that a few days before and after the CSRC announced the punishment information, the share price of the company sponsored by the illegal sponsor made a negative movement before that. The future market share of the sponsor organization that violates the recommendation and the sponsor organization where the representative of the violation sponsor is located after being punished by the violation will decline, and its IPO underpricing will also become lower in the future, indicating that the CSRC punishment announcement has information content. Further research found that the more the CSRC penalizes the sponsor, the more the regulatory object is involved, the more obvious the punishment effect is. The analysis and conclusion of this paper enrich the research of "credit supervision", and make up for the deficiency in the research field of "credit supervision" efficiency under the sponsor system of our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.1;F832.51

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